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BANGLADESH AT A GLANCE
1. Land 144,000 Sq. Km
2. Population (1999) 127.1
3. Division 64
4. District 64
5. Rural/Urban (%) 80/20
6. Literacy (1995) 38.1
7. Gross Enrollment Ratio (1995) 37
8. Life Expectancy at Birth (1999) 60.6
9. Infant Mortality (1999) 70
10. GDP (US$ billions in 1988) 42.8
11. GNP per capita (Atlas Method, US$) 360
12. Percent below Poverty Line (1997) 36
13. Share of Agriculture (1998) 23.4
14. Share of Industry (1998) 27.9
15. Form of Government Parliamentary Democracy
16. Members of Parliament 300
30 Women’s Quota
Source: World Bank, various reports.
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ABSTRACT
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF DECENTRALIZATION IN BANGLADESH
Since the 1980s, decentralization has been upheld as one of the major strategies of 
development in Third World countries. Donors led by the World Bank have pursued 
decentralization policies as a way of reducing the role of the state in welfare and service 
delivery. It has also been argued that decentralizing government to local level facilitates 
democratization in post-colonial states. Central to the concept of decentralization is 
participation as the inclusion of people in the decision-making and development 
processes.
The thesis attempts to illustrate the decentralization policies in Bangladesh with greater 
attention to local government reforms initiated in the last two decades. In order to 
identify the dominant traits of the decentralization process, the study examines the 
sweeping political and economic changes occurring in the country in the period. In 
particular, the overthrow of the military regime in 1990 and the building of democratic 
structures at the national level was an encouraging prospect to transfer power and 
resources to the local areas. By focusing on two key elements of decentralization, namely 
autonomy and participation, the study undertakes the analyses of the composition, 
functions and their politico-administrative implications of the reforms undertaken by the 
various regimes.
On the basis of the findings, the study argues that the transition to democracy did not 
bring any qualitative changes in decentralization efforts, particularly in terms of including 
rural population in the development process, and that the military government in power 
between 1982-90 effected the most far reaching changes in local government structure. 
While the authoritarian regime’s policies reflected its increasing search for legitimacy 
and the need for creating a rural power base, reforms undertaken by both the 
“democratic” governments in the 1990s were characterized by the maintenance of the 







For many developing countries, centralization of political and bureaucratic power was 
accepted as a pragmatic strategy in the aftermath of their independence from colonial 
rulers. Dirigist state and centralized planning were seen as the means for achieving 
economic and social development. The rationale behind a strong centralized state varied, 
ranging from ideological motivation for controlling the means of production to strategic 
concerns for negating separatist movements in remote regions of the country. Essentially, 
the concentration of power at a centre was consistent with policies and practices under 
colonialism where colonial powers ruled territories from far away. The developing 
countries found it quite difficult to break away from the status quo in the periods after 
independence. The approaches taken by these countries in that situation reflected a bias 
towards retaining control and ensuring stability in the midst of political uncertainty as 
well as economic adversity.
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the real conditions prevailing in the third world 
precipitated a shift in development thinking and practice. Macro-economic growth 
models and modernization theories proved to be largely inadequate to take care of the 
poverty situation facing the majority of people of the world. Thus, the need for providing 
basic needs and equitable distribution of wealth among all citizens was realized by many 
governments. Likewise, there was general dissatisfaction with centralized planning and
administrative structures because of their inability to assess and respond to the needs of 
people living in rural areas. State, it was felt, must be brought closer to the people.
One of the policies taken up by a number of developing countries in the 1970s and 1980s 
was the government decentralization programme. Decentralization serves a variety of 
purposes that epitomize the wide and multifaceted scope of the development process. 
Amongst other benefits, decentralization relocates powers to the rural people, contributes 
to the spatial redistribution of resources and creates structures for better service delivery 
at the local level. In subsequent years, the perspectives of democratic governance and 
participation through decentralization gained more recognition at the national and 
international agenda for development. The importance of the link between effective 
participation and reduction of rural poverty had been well recognized in the realms of 
development administration. Understandably, there was widespread enthusiasm about 
decentralization in the developing countries with diverse political systems and variable 
economic conditions. From 1970s onwards, governments of many developing countries 
adopted decentralization policies in varying forms and degrees. According to a World 
Bank study, ‘out of 75 developing and transitional countries with populations greater than 
5 million, all but 12 claimed to be embarked on some form of transfer of political power 
to local units of government.’ '
The case of decentralization in Bangladesh, although having some distinctive patterns, is 
not dissimilar to the experience of other developing countries in many ways. 
Decentralization has a long history in Bangladesh, dating back to 1885 when the Local
Self-government Act was passed during the British colonial rule. Creating a loyal landed 
class in rural areas, the British Empire used the local governments to collect revenues and 
strengthen their grip throughout the whole region. Since the independence of Bangladesh 
in 1971, the local government structure has undergone several changes, but generally the 
core administrative system that was in place in British as well as Pakistan eras remained 
intact.^ As is the case in developing countries, the main impetus for the adoption of 
decentralization policy in post-independent Bangladesh came from the condition of acute 
poverty of the significant number of population living in the rural areas. The stated 
objectives of decentralization as propagated by the leaders and administrators of 
Bangladesh in reforming local government systems have consistently been the 
improvement of living conditions of the rural masses and increased participation of the 
people in the process of development.
The process of development incorporating social and economic equality and participation 
of the people, for the most part, has been a problematic issue in Bangladesh. The colonial 
legacy of socioeconomic stratification has been evident in the formation of social 
relations and political structure in post-independent Bangladesh. Following the civil war 
against the ruling Pakistani regime in 1971, the first government of Bangladesh, the 
Awami League, ‘declared its aim to transform the society into an egalitarian one by 
taking the path towards socialism.’  ̂For all practical purposes, the primary focus of the 
Awami League government was on ensuring stability and the continuity of its rule. This 
led to a systematic attempt for political and institutional consolidation of the party in the
State and society. In this environment, decentralization of power and resources became a 
marginal issue in the context of social and economic development of the country.
By most accounts, the early years of the decentralization experience in Bangladesh was 
characterized by an ‘attempt to politicize the local administration with the ultimate aim of 
perpetuating the regime.’'̂  In this situation, the local government suffered from a lack of 
political will as well as a cogent organizational structure. The dissatisfaction with the 
undemocratic and ineffective local government system was well articulated in political, 
bureaucratic and academic circles.^ Nevertheless, the need for an overhaul of the local 
government system was met with only insignificant changes by those in power.
It is intriguing to note that one of the most radical changes in the decentralization 
programme was introduced under martial law government of General H.M. Ershad, when 
there was hardly any space for democratic action. Coming to power in a bloodless coup 
in 1982, Ershad designated significant powers to the Upzila (sub-district) administration 
and built a local government and administration system with the capacity to develop 
popular participation by the rural people. However, the structure did not function as 
anticipated and by and large failed to promote real participation of people.^ Significantly, 
the push for democratization and social equality in Bangladesh came mostly from 
‘below.’ An alliance of socio-political organizations, students, workers, and the general 
public led the movement against social injustice, cormption of the repressive and 
tyrannical government of Ershad and was successful in deposing him from power in 1990.
The fall of Ershad’s regime in a mass uprising culminated in a broad political consensus 
for ‘real’ democratic and participatory governance both at central and local levels. The 
events presumably demonstrated the presence of an active civil society and the ability of 
the grassroots to effect major changes in the national political arena and to 
counterbalance the despotic characteristics of state in Bangladesh. Justifiably, there was a 
lot of enthusiasm for change leading to the curtailment of the traditional military- 
bureaucratic dominance in state policy making and promotion of a socially inclusive 
process of development. However, the return to parliamentary democracy has not 
furthered the process of democratization and public accountability. The two successive 
democratically elected governments in the period of 1991-2001, Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP) and Awami League, failed to take advantage of the relatively stable political 
climate. This fact is well documented in the antagonism among political parties and 
continued political turmoil and violence, resulting in the absence of opposition parties in 
parliament and a culture of calling frequent strikes protesting the legitimacy and 
decisions of the party in power. Consequently, the crisis of political instability, stagnant 
economic growth, poor governance and law and order, continues to plague the country.
In this backdrop, the issue of government decentralization presents an interesting scope 
of analyses in Bangladesh. Even though both BNP and Awami League implemented local 
government reforms during their tenures, there were no fundamental changes in the 
structure and function of the system. The parties, which draw considerable support from 
the people of the country, found it very difficult to break down the traditional centralized 
bureaucratic and political system. Contrary to expectations, the improvement of
economic as well as political governance through meaningful restructuring of public 
sector did not materialize. On the other hand, it is also worthwhile to examine the efforts 
these governments made to bring qualitative ehanges to local government system.
One of the major constraints faced by the governments in devising their social and 
political reforms is the persistently dire economic condition of Bangladesh. W ith a per 
capita income of US$360, Bangladesh consistently ranks at the bottom of economic and 
development indices.^ Economists have explained the continuous financial and resource 
constraints facing Bangladesh in terms of two-gap model, namely the country’s inability 
to generate enough savings for investment on one hand and earn adequate foreign 
exchange to pay for imports, on the other.^ Inadequate infrastructure for investment, lack 
of growth of the trade and industries sector, narrow capacity for revenue generation, poor 
institutional eapacity of the government, etc., are only a few of the myriad eeonomie 
problems facing Bangladesh for long. Due to the chronic financial and resource 
limitations, governments in Bangladesh have found it diffieult to adequately meet the 
rising development and administrative budgets.
It is no wonder therefore that the country relied heavily on external assistance for 
achieving eeonomie stability and development throughout its history. The overt 
dependence on foreign aid has resulted in the considerable voice of the donor community 
in the formulation of development strategies of the country. Particularly, the Bretton 
Woods pair of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) had been the 
‘friend, philosopher and guide of the regimes in power’ in Bangladesh.^ In the recent past.
the World Bank has emerged as an advisor in country’s policy framework and has been 
instrumental in shaping the course of development. Bangladesh is now a test case for 
World Bank’s new global emphasis on good governance as a pre-requisite for rapid 
growth and sustained economic development. Focusing on the need for greater 
institutional capacity of the state for better service provision, the good governance agenda 
calls for micro-level accountability to be achieved through decentralization, competition, 
and participation.'^
The lack of efficiency and capacity of the state apparatus to serve the rural population 
coincided with simultaneous shift of donor assistance to non-government organizations 
(NGOs). Emerging primarily as relief organizations after the economic crises after 
independence, NGOs gradually became involved with poverty alleviation and awareness 
building programme in the rural areas. Bangladesh now has more NGOs than any other 
country of comparable size. Pre-empting the space created by the apparent absence of the 
state at the local level, NGOs have made remarkable strides in a host of areas including 
micro-credit provision, healthcare, primary education. Thus, the emergence of NGOs as a 
major player in the process of development and the policy of donors to channel 
increasing funds through these NGOs assume great significance in the context of 
government decentralization initiatives in Bangladesh.
The case of contemporary Bangladesh illustrates that decentralization persists to be a 
difficult and complicated issue both in terms of its administrative and political aspects. It 
is interesting to note the fact that successive leaders in Bangladesh, both military and
civilian, have found themselves compelled to erect structures for participation through 
local government. The apparent contradictions in the policy objectives and 
implementation of decentralization initiatives in Bangladesh are manifested in the failure 
to create a stable local government system even after a substantial amount of time. In the 
three decades since the liberation of Bangladesh, as many as six decentralization 
strategies have been devised. These reforms were not more than ‘tier experimentation’ 
with emphasis of local government levels shifting from one to another without any real 
justification.Significantly, in most of the decentralization programmes, the necessary 
emphasis on development was conspicuous in its absence. The decentralization policies 
have suffered from a lack of ‘proper sequeneing,’ raising questions about, among other 
things, the composition of local governments and the interface between bureaucracy and 
politics.'^ In addition, while local government has been entrusted with a large number of 
developmental and administrative functions, they have limited autonomy and resources to 
plan and implement them. Similarly, participation and representation of people in the 
local affairs through decentralization has been a convoluted process in Bangladesh, not 
least due to the somewhat unique agrarian structure. It is quite apparent that some serious 
questions in decentralized governance remain unanswered.
The concern of this study relates to the local government not just as project 
implementation units and the channel for delivery of services but rather as a complete 
system constructed on the basis of effective and sustainable governance in the rural areas. 
In Bangladesh, the emergence of local government system as a political and institutional 
process that can contribute to the betterment of rural people through enhancing the
developmental choices available at the local level and a better inclusion of all social 
groups in these choices has been full of contradictions.'^ Despite much rhetoric, the case 
of decentralization as a strategic goal for development in the spirit of devolution of power 
to local level seems to be relegated to marginal importance. Meanwhile, the fortunes of 
the people in rural Bangladesh have shown little signs of improvement and the situation 
of poverty and what Hartmann and Boyce call ‘needless hunger’, seems to be a perpetual 
phenomenon.'"'
1.2 Research Question
The study explores the dynamics of decentralization process in terms of conditions in 
Bangladesh. In that regard, the study is going to deal with some central questions that 
derive from the socioeconomic context of deeentralization and development in the 
country. These inter-related questions analyze the totality of the factors influencing local 
governance as well as the outcomes of the process in order to understand the dynamics of 
decentralization and the purposes it has served in Bangladesh. Specifically, the study will 
address three core issues that form the basis of thesis argument:
Firstly, what are the circumstances that influenced the policies and shaped subsequent 
reforms of decentralization in Bangladesh? The analyses of the political and economic 
situation will point out the factors guiding the policy framework of the government as 
well as mapping the roles of other actors involved in the thrust for an effective local 
government system. The issue proffers a background to the process of decentralization by
examining the conditions under which the local government reforms were initiated and 
implemented.
Secondly, has the decentralization process in Bangladesh been able to transfer power to 
the local administration? In other words, did decentralization provide the people with a 
responsive, autonomous and accountable administration at the local level? This aspect 
highlights the modes and mechanism of devolution of power from the central 
administration to local government bodies in light of its implications in the development 
process.
Finally, was decentralization able to incorporate the people in the prevailing political and 
economic system? To rephrase the question, has decentralization led to a socially 
inclusive and participatory form of development for the people who were previously 
marginalized? By attempting to determine the participatory processes in local 
government structures in Bangladesh, the study will look into the key determinants 
shaping the role of people in the decision-making process and access to resources as well 
as the challenges of integrating people previously marginalized in the process of social 
and economic development.
1.3 Focus of Analysis
The study analyzes the political economy of decentralization process in Bangladesh. In 
this connection, the scope of analysis is the regional or rural government, and 
consequently the urban local governments will be outside the purview of the study. This
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is primarily due to the reason that the analysis of local governance presents some unique 
features in the socioeconomic context of rural Bangladesh. As well, the majority of the 
population in Bangladesh falls within the jurisdiction of rural local governments making 
them a crucial aspect in the overall development efforts of the country.
The time-span primarily covered in the study is restricted to the period from 1982 to 2001 
for the two following reasons. Firstly, the early 1980s heralded an important point in time 
for Bangladesh as the country began to undergo economic restructuring, mainly in the 
form of structural adjustment and stabilization programmes of World Bank and IMF. 
Thus, a review of policies on decentralization under the conditions of economic reforms 
would, therefore, be possible. Secondly, the political scene in the two decades starting 
from 1980s up to now in Bangladesh can be distinguished by both military and civilian 
rule.'^ Greater focus on the period would be useful in analysis of and comparison among 
decentralization polices in different political environments.
1.4 Rationale of the Study
For long periods in history, control over development activities in most third world 
countries has been centralized in national government ministries and agencies. As the 
economic and social goals of central planning failed to materialize, interests in 
decentralization as an administrative instrument gradually gained ground. At the same 
time, the need for a more inclusive approach to development incorporating concepts like 
democracy, equitable growth, and improvement of living standards, was well recognized. 
With the integration of various political and administrative aspects, decentralization
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became a formidable strategy in the field of development. A clear relationship between 
decentralization and reduction of poverty was also established.
One question that becomes relevant here is how critical is decentralization for 
Bangladesh. Due to the axiomatic disposition of the issue, the reasons for adopting 
decentralization policies and associated reforms are often disregarded. However, recent 
empirical evidence underscores the point; significant gains in the poverty field in 
Bangladesh have occurred without any commensurate advances in the decentralization 
agenda. Notwithstanding weak local governments, Bangladesh made some positive 
strides in the field of food production, rural infrastructure, micro-credit provision (mainly 
through NGOs), and human development indices, all of which translated into major gains 
in the fight against poverty. However, the rationale behind greater focus on local 
governance arises out of the poverty trends itself. With net rate of poverty reduction 
appearing to be stuck at one percentage points in the 1990s, there are adequate 
justifications to re-visit the issue of decentralization.'®
Bangladesh is a country in south Asia covering 144,000 square kilometers of territory. 
With the total population about 130 million, Bangladesh is one of the most densely 
populated countries in the world. A large part of this population lives in the rural areas 
and depends directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood. Although the share 
of agriculture in the economy has shown a declining trend, it still constitutes about 35 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) of the country.'^ Although beset by natural 
calamities like floods and cyclones almost every year, Bangladesh was able to reach food
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autarky in its recent history. In spite of some encouraging developments, extreme 
deprivation and suffering is experienced by a large percentage of the population. This is 
particularly obvious in the rural areas where a lack of productive resources and 
infrastructure is reflected in the unemployment, poor standard of living and the low levels 
of human development. Throughout the history, the rural mass living in the villages have 
frequently been sidelined in the course to progress. Evidently, without the inclusion of 
the rural population in the national development process, it is unlikely that Bangladesh 
would be able to achieve sustainable economic and social development.
There are several compelling reasons as to why the decentralization programmes in 
Bangladesh should be worth academic interest. Politically, the push to institutionalize an 
effective local government has been evident in the numerous reform measures taken up 
by all governments in Bangladesh. Decentralization has featured consistently in the 
development agenda in Bangladesh by politicians, bureaucrats and civil society 
organizations and the like. There was broad consensus for the need to transfer significant 
powers to the rural areas. While decentralization is not a new approach in the context of 
political and economic development in Bangladesh, it has not yet achieved a sense of 
permanence and continuity. As Bangladesh continues to grapple with socioeconomic and 
political problems, the government decentralization programme presents itself as an issue 
worthy of more profound analysis.
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1.5 Thesis Statement
The study underscores that decentralization often has been used as a political tool in 
developing countries. The technocratic interpretation of decentralization emphasizing 
efficiency and privatization of service delivery ignores the contextual factors. Rather, the 
outcome of decentralization depends on the broader political and economic dynamics. 
The thesis further illustrates that a strong authoritarian state is likely to devolve power to 
the local level for political gain and that the relationship between decentralization and 
democratization is not as straightforward as it appears.
In the case of decentralization in Bangladesh, there has been a conscious effort on the 
part of regimes to revert to “recentralization” even in context of decentralization 
initiatives. As a result, local government reforms have generally lacked real devolution of 
power and an overwhelming number of rural people were excluded in the development 
process. The decentralization policy with the participatory form of was in fact devised by 
the military government of General Ershad which served the dual purpose of increasing 
the regime’s credibility as well as providing it with political support base. In contrast, the 
two subsequent reform measures by democratically elected governments were mainly 
defensive in nature with hardly any powers and authority transferred to local level. Even 
though the situation was favourable for genuine political and administrative changes, 
undertaking wide ranging local government reform contradicted with the policy of 
regime perpetuation and decentralization remains a neglected sector in the country.
14
1.6 Conceptual Framework
The study relies upon a political economy approach to examine the case of 
decentralization in Bangladesh. Political economy refers to the correlation between 
power and wealth, suggesting the enmeshment of political and economic domains in the 
process of development. The political economy approach explains ‘how political power 
shapes economic outcomes and how economic forces constrain political action.’*̂  The 
study proposes that the process of governance and democratization through the 
decentralization in Bangladesh must take into account the perspectives of political 
economy of development. Both the economic and political dimensions influence each 
other and neither can solely explain the dynamics of decentralization experience as it 
evolved in Bangladesh.
The decentralization discourse in Bangladesh has mostly been discussed in normative 
terms. Typically, issues like administrative reform, economic efficiency, and liberal 
interpretations of democracy have dominated the views concerning decentralization. 
While these issues are important components of the study, it is critical to incorporate the 
underlying premises of local governance in Bangladesh. In order to do that, the study will 
make an effort to examine the broader political and economic configurations and 
implications of decentralization. Therefore, greater focus will be given to, among other 
issues, the nature of the state, the dynamics of development of productive forces, the 
process of social relations and the effect of internal constraints. The analyses of the local 
governance ought to have economic and political aspects at the central and local level as 
the point of reference.
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As well, it is becoming increasingly difficult to assess the domestic political and 
socioeconomic dynamics without giving adequate attention to the global affairs. Given 
the relentless trend of globalization, the political economy approach offers a more 
rational view considering the shrinking distinction between international and national 
level of analysis. In particular, the order of global economy and international geopolitics 
has significant effect on the internal political and economic situation of the developing 
countries. In the process of globalization, these countries are used as a mechanism 
through which the benefits are appropriated at the global level. The corollary is the 
international market mechanism gaining greater control over the sovereignty and 
independence of the nation states. The inevitable decline of support to public sector, in 
turn, systematically displaces the social infrastructure of the poorer countries resulting in 
increased suffering for the working and lower classes.
Within the political economy framework, a number of concepts have been used to guide 
the analysis of the study. For the purpose of clarity, these key concepts are defined in the 
following way;
Development: is the process of social and economic transformation leading to progress. 
This transformation relates to the step towards the emancipation and empowerment of 
people the on the basis of social equity and advancement.
Decentralization: is the transfer of power to the regional and local government in a 
territorial hierarchy. Decentralization involves both reversing the concentration of 
administration at a single centre and conferring powers to local government.*^ Therefore, 
devolution of power to lower levels involves both political and administrative
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implications. Decentralization is not only a process of administrative restructuring but is 
a strategy of creating autonomous, accountable and responsive local government system. 
Governance: is not only concerned with institutional and administrative issues but also 
relates to political considerations of legitimacy, pluralism, participation and consensus.^" 
Central to the concept of governance is the creation of an environment based on 
democracy and human rights at both macro and micro level. The issue of governance also 
takes eonsideration the contextual factors of the state and society.
Participation: is defined as the active engagement of citizenry in the process of 
development. Participation leads to wider representation and empowerment of the people 
resulting in their access to decision-making structures that affect them and bringing 
benefits for all. Participation is seen both as means facilitating the development process 
and also an end in itself.
Democratization: is understood as a process of building democratic institutions on the 
basis of political participation and representation, protection of human rights, and a 
system of governance promoting equitable access and distribution of power and resources.
1.7 Methodology
The study utilizes a descriptive-analytical approach in an attempt to understand the 
phenomena of decentralization process in Bangladesh. The methodology used is a case 
study of the decentralization programme between 1982 and 2001. The study involves in- 
depth analysis of the decentralization set-up and functions in view of the political 
economic situation of the country. In addition to comprehensively studying the
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decentralization experience in Bangladesh to draw out some intrinsic aspects, the case 
will be used to better explain the research propositions and arguments already formulated.
The study is mainly based on secondary sources- books, journals, documents and other 
types of publication. The secondary data and analysis will be gathered through library 
and computer assisted research in Halifax.^' In order to substantiate the intention of the 
analysis, the study uses both qualitative and quantitative data.
1.8 Structure of the Argument
The thesis of the study will be argued in the following manner:
• Chapter Two critically examines the bodies of literature that relate to the theoretical 
framework on decentralization with particular focus on the developing countries. The 
Chapter will try to draw out the key aspects relevant to the study from an 
overwhelming body of literature on decentralization and development. The objective 
is to set up a theoretical basis for evaluating the research problem. In addition, this 
secondary analysis will highlight some direct and indirect evidence to support the 
thesis argument.
• Chapter Three provides a macro context of Bangladesh within which political and 
socioeconomic issues would be discussed. The macro economic and political contexts 
present a background to the conditions from which the policy of local government 
emerged and evolved over the years. Attention will also be given to the agrarian 
structure and rural scenario in Bangladesh to gain a broader understanding of the
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local arena. This review of the background allows for the identification of the 
conditions influencing the decentralization experience in Bangladesh.
•  In Chapter Four, a case study of the decentralization policies implemented in 
Bangladesh, with greater attention given to the reforms between 1982 and 2001, will 
be taken up. Issues concerning the formulation and implementation of local 
government reforms, the condition of local governance, the administrative structure 
and functions of decentralized bodies, the process of participation in local 
government units, etc. would be critically examined.
• Chapter Five is a summary and conclusion of the study. It will determine the 
dynamics of decentralization in Bangladesh by drawing conclusions from the 
previous sections of the study. The salient aspects of the decentralization initiative 
and local government system in Bangladesh will be highlighted in this Chapter. It will 
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Theoretical Perspectives on Decentralization
2.1 Introduction
In the context a global emphasis on issues of governance, many countries are 
implementing extensive state reforms including decentralization of government structures 
and functions. Attempts at socioeconomic development in the developing world have 
become naturally synonymous with decentralized governance in sharp contrast to earlier 
strategies. Decentralization has been regarded as a major institutional framework for local 
level participation and service provision leading to national progress.
Decentralization has drawn considerable attention in national governments, international 
donor organizations, scholarly and policy-making circles across all regions of the world. 
The rising interest has seen, particularly since the 1980s, the policies of decentralization 
and local government reforms being implemented in an increasing number of developing 
countries. Decentralization had become, in Conyers’ words, ‘the latest fashion in 
development administration.’ ' The widespread implementation decentralization policies 
in Third World, however, have usually been equally followed by debates of much 
complexity and contradiction. Various writers have proposed very divergent meanings 
and much ambiguity surrounds the concept. Decentralization constitutes a flexible 
discourse that can be utilized by different ideological interests. In fact, due to the fluidity 
of the concept, decentralization has been used extremely lithely, permitting different 
theoretical models as well as policy prescriptions to be presented in its name.
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The domain of decentralization is extremely broad. Due to its multi-dimensional nature, 
decentralization encompasses political, fiscal, administrative and social aspects that are 
largely crosscutting. As a result, there is a great diversity of approaches stressing 
disparate tools of analysis of decentralization. This chapter, rather than focusing on any 
particular stream, tries to integrate the divergent traits and provide a framework for 
understanding the dynamics of decentralization and its implications in the distribution of 
power and resources between state and society. To that end, it tries to assemble and 
reconcile the relevant issues that relate to the political economy of development so as to 
proceed to with the analysis of the decentralization in Bangladesh.
2.2 The Concept of Decentralization
Decentralization was not always the norm in the developing countries. For a number of 
reasons- historical, political, economic, developing countries had generally been more 
centralized than industrial countries. Centralization was perceived as particularly 
important after struggles for independence and during periods of domestic and regional 
conflict.^ Leaders of newly-independent nations, in pursuit of rapid development 
objectives, subscribed to centralization of power and planning and saw democratic local 
governments as ‘irritants at best, if not obstacles to their ambition to build powerful 
economic states.’  ̂Related to this, the bureaucracy and nucleus of political power in these 
countries have tended to function in a centralizing manner. Many socialist countries 
adopted centralizing approaches in the belief that political centralization and the 
existence of a strong central state would be able to preside over policies of nationalization 
and the development of productive forces. It has been evident that highly centralized
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States have been able to implement policies of income and land redistribution as well as 
effecting significant reductions in the level of regional disparities.'^
It is also important not to conflate the importance of the centralization of a number of key 
economic functions like energy, communication, industries, and establishment of state 
owned enterprises. The concentration of power in the executive, the inflation and 
compartmentalization of administration and localization of commercial activities in and 
around the capital have all contributed to reinforcing the centripetal bias of development.^ 
As many developing countries gained independence, the process of nation-building had a 
highly centralizing effect, a pattern many of these countries found hard to break away 
from. Centralization was, and still is a reality both in terms of policy and ideology and 
therefore, provides important insights to analyzing the dynamics of decentralization.
Decentralization, in theory, is the opposite of ‘centralization’ or the concentration of 
power. However, ‘centralization and decentralization are not attributes that can be 
dichotomized; instead they represent hypothetical poles on a continuum that can be 
calibrated by many different indices.’  ̂ Decentralization, thus, has deeper connotations 
than merely the dialectical meaning. Decentralization means both reversing the 
concentration of administration at a single centre and conferring powers to local 
government. This definition, according to Smith, sums up the concept of decentralization 
as a political phenomenon involving both administration and government.^ Conyers 
defines decentralization as ‘any change in the organization of government which involves 
the transfer of powers or functions from the national level to any sub-national level(s), or
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from one sub-national level to another, lower one.’  ̂ The basis of transfer of power is 
often territorial as the objective is to place authority at a lower level in a territorial 
hierarchy and thus geographically closer to the service providers.^ As well, 
decentralization can be functional, that is- shifting authority of certain functions like 
education or transport to specialized agencies of the government. Decentralization can 
also involve financial implications through ‘downward fiscal transfers by which higher 
levels at a system cede control over budgets and financial decisions to lower levels.’ 
Developing a systematic typology of decentralization has been difficult and provokes 
many conceptual, ideological and technical debates. Nevertheless, it is useful to delineate 
some distinct dimensions of decentralization as identified in the literature.*'
Manor defines devolution as transfer of resources, tasks, power and decision-making to 
lower level authorities which are largely or wholly independent of the central 
government, and democratically elected. *̂  Devolution therefore, involves transfer of 
political, administrative, financial authority to plan and implement development 
programmes and provide services. Devolution of power to sub-national units or lower 
levels of government is considered as the most desirable form of decentralization as it 
combines the promise of local democracy and self-governance with efficient service 
delivery.'^ Since devolution involves the transfer of power to civil society, the concept is 
synonymous with political equity and popular participation. In devolution, the role of 
central administration is to ensure that the local institutions operate within a broadly 
defined national policy.
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Another variety of decentralization is déconcentration or transfer within public 
administrative or parastatal structures. The focus here lies on administrative 
rearrangement and institutional restructuring for implementing state policies. Delegation 
of responsibilities and functions to state or semi-autonomous entities as a form of 
decentralization has also featured prominently in the public administration literature. 
Delegation refers to the transfer of responsibility of maintaining and implementing sector 
duties to semi-autonomous government agencies that operate independently of central 
government co n tro l.T o w ard s  the end of 1980s, the meaning of decentralization also 
incorporated the replacement of state agencies by private and non-profit organizations. 
This shift was consistent with the emergence of structural adjustment policies aiming 
liberalization and deregulation of economies in developing countries. The inclusion of 
privatization as a category of decentralization is mainly explained in terms of the 
minimalist role of state, rather than re-assignment of authority within the state.
It is important at the outset not to overlook the fact that decentralization has generally not 
followed any singular pattern in developing countries but rather tend to represent mixture 
of different types or ‘hybrids.’ Decentralization policies in most developing countries, in 
general, have been explicitly or implicitly confined to déconcentration. While an efficient 
field administration is important aspeet of loeal development, it is still and essentially an 
extension of the central state. Manor argues that déconcentration is usually undertaken by 
governments not demoeratically accountable and used as a device to provide such 
governments with greater penetration into and control over local arenas and civil 
society.'^ In déconcentration, there is no horizontal integration as the power still lies at
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the hand of the central state. Samoff, taking a similar view, argues that administrative 
decentralization through institutional reform is not decentralization, as it does not 
empower the disadvantaged and under-represented groups.'^ Due to the political 
implications, the imposition of decentralized structures on the basis of devolution has 
been particularly difficult to attain in developing countries. As such, despite the 
desirability of devolution as a form of decentralization, the imperatives of democracy and 
autonomy that it entails has generated much contestation in practice.
In addition, determining the extent of decentralization has also faced problems of clarity 
and perception. Comparisons over time and among countries and regions as to the level 
and outcome of decentralization as well the criteria for evaluation has been a subject of 
extensive debate. One major problem in this context is that of holding the other 
determinants and indices of local autonomy and policy formulation constant so that the 
variable impact of decentralization can be assessed. Decentralization thus has to be 
accepted as a variable, not an attribute. Broadly, measurement of decentralization can 
be classified in two general categories of politico-administrative and economic.'^ Under 
the first category, an obvious element is the governmental functions- types, level of 
importance and territorial distribution. The relative autonomy of the local government to 
formulate and carry out policies provides a further indication of extent of powers and 
responsibilities. Moreover, the election or selection of personnel, both officials and 
representatives, in the local institutions is an additional criterion, particularly in the 
context of democratization process of the government.'^ In relation to the economic 
factors. Smith mentions that areas of decentralization can be compared according to their
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revenue-generating powers including the locally raised revenue in proportion of the total 
state figure. On the other hand, the level of total local expenditure or spending as a 
proportion of the total public expenditure can shed light to the significance of 
decentralization over time in the same political system.
The emergence of decentralization as a policy tool for economic and social development 
has some historical points of reference in developing countries. Many factors converged 
to the thrust of decentralization discourse into the development agenda. The emphasis on 
decentralization in the development debate and in donor policy is generally concerned 
with the improvement of government performance and the implementation of 
development programmes.^** It is linked to the broadening of the concept of development 
to comprise growth-with-equity and emphasizing basic needs of the poor through local 
level participation. Political considerations probably influenced most decentralization 
policies in the Third World. The perception that a decentralized decision-making system 
ensures well-being of those who are likely to be affected is widely accepted. This premise 
mostly derived from the political, i.e., democratic imperative that citizens have to take 
part in decision-making process in order to bring material benefits as well as qualitative 
changes in their lives. A centralized system can work as an obstacle to stable political 
system and limit the scope of participation and representation of people, and as a result is 
generally considered as inimical to democratic values. Therefore, emphasis in 
decentralization programmes and reforms have been on democratic decentralization and 
‘local government’ in which development is seen as requiring political autonomy to be 
devolved to government institutions located at the regional level.
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The rationale for decentralization also derived from the problems of centralized power 
structure and decision-making system. The difficulties faced in effecting social and 
economic development away from the basic spatial units like villages and districts were 
recognized by a wide spectrum of policymakers. With power centralized at the top of 
space in a pyramidic power base, there is no representation for backward regions and 
weaker sections of the society. In such a system, the interests, felt-needs and aspirations 
of the people living in remote areas tend to be overlooked. Centralization may also give 
rise to the emergence of enclave-type power bases and unequal distribution of power, and 
breed separatist or secessionist movements.^' Similarly, ethnic and religious diversity 
may cause unrest from centrifugal forces leading to disintegration of state. Delegating or 
devolving power and functions is seen as a way of being more easily accessible to local 
people and increasing effectiveness and promptness in service delivery. Decentralized 
units of government are in a better position to articulate the needs and implement 
development programmes by taking into account the uniqueness or peculiarity of regions. 
As well, decentralization cuts red tape and improves promptness and efficiency of service 
delivery so that the government functions in an efficient, cost-effective and timely 
manner. Decentralization also enhances downward accountability as local representatives 
are more accessible to tbe populace and thus can be held more accountable for their 
policies and outcomes than distant national political l e a d e r s . I t  is believed that 
decentralization can potentially increase local resource mobilization and create 
employment in rural areas.
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2.3 The ‘Technocratic’ State
In recent times, the public sector in developed, developing and transitional countries had 
been undergoing wide-ranging changes as part of a broader process of political and 
economic reform. There has been a discernible shift in the emphasis from ‘welfare’ 
functions of states towards a more efficient and modern government institutions. While 
receiving initial impetus in the North, such processes have reached global dimensions in 
the early 1990s with their diffusion through multilateral and bilateral aid mechanisms. 
Government decentralization, seeking division and dispersal of functions and procedural 
efficiency, is at the heart of this ‘new order.
During the 1980s, developing countries, in view of the acute debt crisis and economic 
stagnation, experienced a reorientation of their economies through structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP) prescribed by International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The 
policy instruments used to carry out SAP consists of privatization of state owned 
enterprises (SOE), devaluation of currency, deregulation of central government activities, 
withdrawal of subsidies to social and agriculture sectors, promotion of export-led 
industrialization, and opening up the economy to international capital. The neo-liberal 
assumption that shaped SAP was that an unfettered market could solve the economic 
problems facing developing countries. The emphasis of SAP was therefore clearly on 
downsizing the state apparatus in order to facilitate market-driven policies, a process of 
‘hollowing out the state.’
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The notion of decentralization focusing on dispersing state functions and responsibilities 
to private and other non-state sectors therefore was conveniently situated within the 
framework of structural adjustment and became formalized at the policy level. At the 
core of decentralization policy under SAP was the improved capacity and reduction of 
expenditure and size of central and local governments, reduction of local government size 
and public sector deficits, and competitive production of public services that would 
improve the quantity and delivery of services. The borrowing countries were encouraged 
to seek alternative instruments for the delivery of services from parallel and informal 
economies and institutions.^"^ In addition, it was perceived that local government would 
offer incentives for the development of local private as well as public economies by 
separating provision from production of services.
The governments of developing countries, operating under the constraints of SAP and 
looking for ways to decentralize some of the burden of service provision to the local 
level, were forced to seek funding for decentralized services not from the traditional tax 
sources or government transfers but from user fees- for basic services like health and 
educa t ion.Whi le  public subsidies were maintained for political reasons, expenditure on 
investment and the maintenance of infrastructure diminished.^^ The overt disregard of 
social aspects had highly deleterious effects in the social and economic polarization and 
instability- a process vivid across numerous counties in sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America and Asia. The ‘benefits’ the economic model of SAP not only failed to percolate 
down to the grassroots but also reinforced the disparities between macro and micro level 
and accentuated the poverty situation.
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The donor policy, in view of the SAP failure has undergone a systematic reformulation in 
policy moving away from the singular focus on economic growth to governance and 
poverty reduction. It is perceived that effective governance results from continuing 
economic liberalization and decentralization, carried out by accountable and efficient 
bureaucracies to produce economically friendly and in turn politically empowering 
environment.^^ The emergence of governance in the agenda of donors reflects the need 
for an enabling environment to facilitate prescribed economic reforms. As a result, the 
issues concerning decentralization still relate to fiscal or financial aspects- macro- 
economic stability, and institutional capacity, corruption and governance and so on.
An overriding concern for the World Bank is a possible imbalance between expenditure 
responsibilities and revenue resources which may lad to macro-economic stability- 
mainly due to ‘the deficit behavior of local governments.’ The lack of success in 
initiatives of decentralization in developing countries is attributed to weak institutions 
resulting in the lack of transparency and accountability in decision-making which in turn 
produce frail democratic systems. According to World Bank, ‘...evidence suggests that 
the problems associated with decentralization in developing countries reflect flaws in 
design and implementation more than any inherent outcome of decentralization.’^̂  Much 
emphasis is placed on the institutional reforms in designing policies for decentralization; 
weak institutions are an impediment to responsiveness, accountability and governance.^^ 
The role of participation in this context is to improve the effectiveness of state through 
pressures to local government performance as well as to ensure better implementation of 
development programmes.
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Decentralization has therefore become an important underlying principle of the move 
towards ‘the technocratic managerial s t a t e / W h i l e  SAP provided a political-economic 
channel for disseminating the decentralization discourse to the developing countries, 
governance agenda reinforces the link between market mechanism and administration 
and pursues development as a ‘single process of technical policy making.’^' In the 
‘revisionist’ neo-liberal discourse, there has been shift towards not only less government, 
but also an efficient one. The donors’ perception of decentralization as shifting the 
burden of service delivery and revenue generation to local stakeholders is a very different 
inflection compared with liberal and radical approaches that see devolution of power to 
local government as a means of forming the seedbed of democracy.^^ Decentralization is 
seen as instrument independent of social and political aspects, and development a 
procedural and technical process. Giles and Stokke state that these new type of 
development interventions ‘divorce technical questions of economics from the 
ideological concerns of politics so that the logic of the market is presented as natural. 
Consequently, decentralization, as viewed by the technocratic state, is reduced to a 
functional tool of economic efficiency.
2.4 Good Governance and Democratization
The international development agencies introduced the concept of ‘good g o v e r n a n c e i n  
late 1980s when there appeared to be an impasse in the policy framework of development 
assistance. An overriding donor concern at present is the promotion of good governance 
through democratization, participation, human rights, rule of law and decentralization. 
Political conditions have been attached to this new framework of development aid in a
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move towards the broader agenda comprising the reconfiguration of states and 
development process in Third World countries. At the heart of the of good governance 
agenda therefore is a transparent, participatory, accountable and effective state, which 
would facilitate development process through increased growth, reduction of corruption, 
and promotion of democracy. The approach has been rigorously followed by donors, led 
by the World Bank, and thus has major effects on the developing countries.
The concept of good governance, if it is not interpreted as an invention to explain the 
setbacks of SAP, has come under criticism specific to itself. Primarily, the concern relates 
to the contradictory focus of good governance discourse on the political goals of 
participation and accountability, as well as on the technical goals of efficiency and 
effectiveness. Despite the centrality politics to governance, there has been a systematic 
attempt by the donors to forward the attainment of good governance in apolitical and 
technical-administrative terms. However, as Bryld points out, the achievement of parallel 
objectives of participation and efficiency through good governance is difficult, as ‘an 
authoritarian regime with a single string of command is presumably the most efficient 
and least participatory government.
Governance essentially, ‘...goes beyond government and includes some of the less formal 
power structures that affect the lives of ordinary people’. S i n c e  governance involves 
more than the state and civil society entities, it is rather elusive and hard to develop. As 
such, concepts like accountability, legitimacy, and transparency are usually attached to 
the state and its institutions rather than to governance thereby neutralizing the latter. The
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concept of good governance has been narrowed down to technical discourse of state 
ignoring the power relations that influence the whole process. Leftwich, taking a more 
critical view, states that good governance essentially ‘means a democratic capitalist 
regime, presided over by a minimal state which is also a part of the wider governance of 
the New World O r d e r . T h e  emergence of good governance thus can be seen as an 
endeavour to sustain the ‘international technocracy’ in the developing world.
The dimension of governance has important implications for decentralization as it 
broadens the political space to include the critical roles played by civil society and other 
non-state actors. When the concept of governance is applied to the local arena, a case of 
‘local governance,’ it necessarily includes elements that are considered outside of the 
public policy p r o c e s s . W h i l e  local governance allows the reconsideration of local 
government as more than just the extension of the central government, it also undermines 
the role of state and ignores economic and social bases of political power.
As indicated earlier, democratization has been attached to the concept of good 
governance and both of them are considered mutually reinforcing the development 
process in peripheral societies. This perspective refers to a political regime based on 
liberal democratic political model that protects human rights, combined with a competent 
and accountable public sector as the basis of political equality, liberty and stability and 
therefore as an integral part of democratization process. Economic models are also 
incorporated into this democratization discourse where the citizen can seek to maximize 
personal utility and choice by way of localization of decision-making and voting
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behavior. It is perceived that ‘such political systems are functional for competitive, free 
market economies, and vice v e r s a . I n  this regard, an obese state, with a large stake in 
economic life is considered incompatible with an independent and pluralistic civil society 
and hence seen as an impediment to effective democracy.
The democratic good governance discourse proposes that ‘democracy is a necessary prior 
or parallel condition for development, not an outcome of it.’‘̂ ° Economic growth, 
democracy and equity objectives are can be pursued successfully without any inherent 
tensions or contradictions, it is assumed. That democracy should precede development is 
a complete about-turn from the modernization perspective which prioritized 
industrialization and urbanization ahead of political plurality. As well, there is no 
examples of good or sustained growth in the developing world have occurred under 
conditions of uncompromising economic liberalism, whether democratic or not."^‘ 
Furthermore, there is very little evidence that either democracy or decentralization is 
necessary for poverty reduction in rural areas.'*^ Critics of liberal interpretations of 
democracy have, instead called for a developmental state with reasonable amount of 
autonomy in policy formulation and objectives and also enjoying a balanced relationship 
with society and economy.
According to Leftwich, the move towards a combination of economic and political 
liberalization must be understood in the context of global political events such as the 
emergence of neo-liberals, collapse of communism, pro-democracy movements across 
many nations. Leftwich, sketching a bleak scenario, argues that ‘the interaction of free
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markets and competitive democracies in poor, unequal and divided societies will unleash 
highly unstable variables which will combine to undermine both economic growth and 
d e m o c r a c y . I t  is in view of the tenuous relationship between decentralization and 
development that prompted one author to conclude, ‘decentralization is one thing, 
democracy is a n o t h e r . T h e  corollary is that no clear relationships exist between 
democracy and development and in turn, there is ‘no inherent correlation between local 
government set-up and d emocr acy .Moreover ,  there are doubts as to the necessity of 
democratization for development since sound economic performance requires a system of 
governance that favours planning and coherence over demands of democratic 
representation.'*^
Throughout the 1980s, decentralization policies were implemented in the process of (re)- 
democratization in many developing countries in Asia and Latin America. 
Notwithstanding the donor policies, virtually all types of regimes- military dictatorships, 
single or multi party rules, monarchies, introduced some forms of decentralization at 
different points in time. For some countries, this shift can be attributed to the search for 
legitimacy of regimes in view of the uncertainly caused by the sudden lack of external 
support after end of the cold war. Related to this trend, increasing internal pressures for 
democratization following popular uprising against state domination and coercion was 
also evident. Since the installation of representative form of democracy at the national 
level is often seen as a first step towards placing powers at the hand of people, political 
devolution from the central state to provincial or local governments often comes fast on 
the heels of national democratization process as was the case of in the many Asian and
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Latin American countries.'*’ Veltmeyer points out that the rationale for taking up 
participatory decentralization for many Latin American countries was a quest for 
legitimacy in the context of redemocratization process and associated pressures from civil 
society.'*^ In these countries, decentralization can be seen as a ‘second wave’ of 
democratic reform, depending and building on the democratization process taking place 
at the national level.
Decentralization is thus considered to be a cornerstone of good governance both in 
promoting local accountability and transparency, and enfranchising local populations. 
However, the conceptual connection between decentralization and democratization in 
developing countries is somewhat blurred in that very few countries have been able to 
tolerate or sustain pluralism and competition political parties at the national level and a 
democratic decentralization at the same time.̂ ** Democratic local government systems 
have mostly been undertaken within the context of a de facto  one-party or authoritarian 
state. Similarly, Ingham and Alam in analyzing the sub-district system in Bangladesh 
argued that only a strong central state usually is likely to cede powers to local 
government. Military regimes over the years have often tended to establish very powerful 
local government set-up with the premise, among others, that ‘to allow an excessive or 
unnecessary distance to arise between the government and the governed is to encourage 
disorder.’^' Here, the local administration is considered as not much more than an 
instrument of control for the state. In a related manner, highly authoritarian regimes have 
been seen to use decentralization as a pretense to retain power. The situation often leads 
to situation where responsibilities are decentralized but not power. National leaders.
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military or ‘democratic’, reluctant to devolve power, only promulgated decentralization
without genuinely attempting any significant change to the existing system.
Similarly, Hart argues that the commitment to democracy must precede commitment to 
decentralization if the latter is to be instrumental in promoting the former. Promoting 
decentralization polices without that prior commitment can result in ineffective and 
undesirable outcomes as evident in many developing coun tries.M oreover, it is very 
likely that autonomous local governments can work against democracy rather than 
furthering it.
As well, the potential of local democracy in developing countries is uncertain due to the 
relative absence of the pre-conditions of popular democracy such as high levels of 
literacy, an established middle class, a strong civil society and relatively limited forms of 
material and social inequality .M cA llister argue that the states in developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, are still undergoing the phase of state formation due to the complex 
internal and external processes like regime failure, structural adjustment and so on.^^ As 
such, the first imperative of those may be a process of re-centralization towards a more 
effective centre with the tools that can facilitate civic participation and better regulate 
sub-national tiers of government. As those countries struggled for a national identity, the 
regional, ethnic, and clan based solidarity reigned over the national one creating a 
fragmentary social structure confronting the transition to democracy rendering 
decentralization initiatives cosmetic or toothless.
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2.5 ‘Glocalization’
The process of globalization with its surveillance of world capital has far-reaching effect 
on the governance of developing countries, particularly in respect to the vital decisions 
that influence the lives of the people. Along with the systematic limitation of states, 
globalization represents a more dialectical relationship between the global and the local. 
Decentralization thus has to be seen in the context of an emerging need to reconcile two 
contrary tendencies, globalization on one hand, and local self-governance in the other.^^ 
The interplay between global and loeal, termed ‘glocalization’ by Schuurman,^^ is 
essentially a process of capitalist restructuring and homogenization of economic and 
cultural values. The convergence of global, national, and local forces have only resulted 
in only a ‘indebted globalized city’ as the local government face austerity measures in 
response to increasing overseas debts of developing countries.
Similarly, Kothari expresses doubts in viewing the world as ‘a global village’ pondering 
what it means and how to make the global village truly decentralized. Moreover, the 
emergence of the local as the site of empowerment, knowledge generation and 
development is problematic. This romantic theorization of the local arena views the local 
in isolation from the broader national and transnational forces and underplays local social 
inequalities and power relations.^^ In addition, it remains to be seen whether economic 
globalization can make impact on the marginal local economies of the South. It is 
unrealistic to suppose that local economies can attract foreign capital and earn profit 
when the poorer nation states themselves have failed to do so. Even in case of investment 
being attracted, the benefits are generally appropriated by external forces at a high
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socioeconomic and environmental cost for the ‘host’ societies. In this context, neither 
local nor global can offer anything substantive for social action and emancipation for 
Third World societies.
Sheth sees the international power structure and local elites working together to 
perpetuate political domination and cultural hegemony in South Asia. International 
power, mediated through the economic and social policies of elites in developing 
countries effectively curbs the initiatives of economic self-reliance, political autonomy 
and cultural vitality of the poor and non-state actors.®° As a result, the independence of 
developing countries is increasingly under threat from what can be termed ‘global 
governance.’ The intervention of international donor agencies in the policy and political 
matters such as structure of government is only one of the ways of sustaining this kind of 
governance. The role of decentralization in the context of the wider global regulatory 
forces becomes uncertain and ambiguous. The issue of local governance is now part of 
the ‘new manageralsim’ that demonstrate how a common set of political and 
organizational principles is being circulated globally at the same as these are being 
contested and modified in line with contingent local conditions. While transformations in 
local governance is are much more complex than simply being the effect of global forces, 
‘the increasing presence of transnational corporations, the construction of newly 
integrated trade blocs and the globalization of économie and socio-cultural development 
and the persistence of international debt and austerity measures, all find expression in the 
city.’^' Following Kothari’s contrary view, decentralization, rather than being a
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facilitator, has to be seen as a counter to the process of homogenization, globalization, 
modernization, liberalization and privatization.*^^
2.6 The ‘Washington Consensus’ on Decentralization
While decentralization has been persistently advocated by the World Bank, there appears 
to be a lack of consistency and coherence in its policy framework. In its own language, 
‘decentralization is neither good nor bad for efficiency, equity and macro-economic 
stability; but rather its effects depend on institution-specific d e s i gn . Recen t l y ,  there has 
been acceptance by the World Bank about the centrality of politics in initiatives of 
decentralization- the dominant force behind decentralization is, in the final analysis, 
political and political pressure probably drives most decentralization efforts.®"  ̂
Decentralization in this perspective is seen as a strategy of institutional mechanism for 
providing political stability.
If there is one policy goal that has been pursued with much vigour by the Bank within the 
framework of decentralization initiatives in developing countries, it the call for 
privatization and deregulation, ‘the most complete forms of decentralization’ that 
‘...shift(s) responsibility for functions from the public to the private s e c t o r . I t  is argued 
that decentralization enhances access by the poor through increased competition in 
delivery of services. World Bank goes on further to recommend the separation of equity 
and efficiency objectives in policy reform, thereby enabling decentralized institutions to 
charge user fees and focus on efficiency and utilize the revenues to improve quality and 
expand coverage for an increase in options for citizens.^^ Privatization as a form of 
decentralization, according to World Bank, can range in scope from leaving the provision
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of goods and services entirely to the free operation of the market to ‘public-private 
partnerships’ in which government and the private sector cooperate to provide services or 
infrastructure.^^ Decentralization and private sector development have an inter dependent 
relationship ‘whereby the former enables the latter, and the latter strengthens the 
former.’®*
A somewhat similar approach has been forwarded by Rondinelli et al. who offer an 
‘integrated political economy framework’ for analyzing decentralization in developing 
countries.®^ This model largely draws from neo-classical economic theories public choice 
and policy analysis using public finance and administration approaches. Public choice 
theory argues that if large a number of local institutions, instead of only the central 
government, are involved in provision of public goods is more economically efficient 
under conditions of reasonably free choice. It is asserted that decentralization can create 
‘a system in which public goods and services are provided primarily through the revealed 
preferences of individuals by market mechanisms.’ ®̂ Pubic choice theory, in this context, 
denotes provision of public service where ‘user charges can be levied or for which a 
criteria of exclusion can be developed.
The integrated political economy approach has been criticized by Slater who points out 
that the expressions of needs of the by poor for national and local development resources 
contradicts the call for privatization.^^ While Rondinelli barely mentions privatization in 
the beginning of adjustment era,^^ it has been converted into the first option amongst the 
organizational arrangement of decentralization in the ‘integrated’ framework. The
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approach, therefore, treats the local as a functional, economic space with policies 
designed to increase efficiency and service delivery with little regard for weaker sections 
of the societies.
Similarly, the World Bank sees decentralization on the same plane as privatization in 
terms of ideology and practice. The role of local government is to create an ‘enabling 
environment’ that would facilitate the private and other non-state actors to deliver 
services. However, if decentralization is to bring development for the people in 
developing countries, it is necessary to go beyond the parameters of given policies that 
are market-driven and emphasizing economic factors, particularly, with regard to poverty 
and equity. As such, in order to gain access to the standard livelihood of health, 
education, employment, the people have to be empowered with productive resources 
through the structures mandated by the state. In similar vein, Schuurman doubts whether 
the Third World poor can attain emancipation without referring to nation-state as a 
political, ideological and juridical framework.’"̂ Where the national political interest is 
focused on neo-liberalism and on export-led development disembedded from a welfarist 
state policy, decentralization is powerless to prevent spatial inequalities and 
immiseration.^^
2.7 The ‘Convergence’ of Political Economy
While political economy is an attempt to specify relationships between economic and 
political behavior, such relationships can be conceptualized in very different ways. Toye, 
for one, raises the question of direction of causation in theories of political economy as to
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whether economic forces are interpreted as causing political outcomes or vice versa/^ 
For Toye, ‘economism and politicism are two extreme types of political economy, where 
a single line of causation is assumed and the causal direction of one is the exact reverse 
of the causal direction of the other.
Neo-classical political economy sketches a cynical view of politics in developing 
countries where the adopted policies and regulations governing trade and industrial 
investment reflects the countries’ perceived vulnerability as political ex-colonies and 
economic late-developers.^^ Here, political and policy elites are actively engaged in 
maximizing their political power over state and society. Therefore, policy outcomes do 
not represent societal interests and mobilization of interests takes informal shape through 
political and elite level. Moreover, Third World politicians, vulnerable to loss of power 
and instability, exercise ‘politics of survival’ and therefore have low tolerance for policy 
r e f o r m . T h e  consolidation of political independence could be achieved through 
substantial control over economic forces, which in turn is used to subvert it.
Similarly, the new political economy (NPE) uses assumptions of neo-classical 
microeconomics- methodological individualism, rational utility maximization, to explain 
the under-development in developing countries. Political economy in this context, ‘is 
intended to suggest the symbiosis of neo-classical economics, public choice theory and 
policy a n a l y s i s . I n  the NPE approach, rulers of developing countries are motivated 
only for their individual self-interest and ensuing political and bureaucratic interference 
impedes smooth governance. Interest group pressures are seen to negatively affect public
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interests identified with economic liberalization policies. The underlying principle of 
NPE is in the thus drawn out of economic analysis of the consequences of bureaucratic 
control and ‘the failure of state to create the right system of incentives for an efficiently 
operating economy.’*’ In other words, it is insisted that incorrect economic policies 
creates a society with irrationalities like poor industrial growth, a corrupt administration, 
and a political structure dominated by interests.
The NPE represents a dramatic shift away from a pluralist, participatory ideal of politics 
towards a non-participatory, authoritarian, and technocratic ideal based on small and 
highly efficient government. The approach, in the name of economic efficiency, ignores 
the link between complex and polarized structure of developing societies that determine 
the process of people’s access to resources. Here, the political focus is a particularly 
narrow one of political influences inhibiting economic liberalization. Rather than 
presenting an independent analysis of political and economic factors in developing 
countries, the view sees political constrains, social norms and religious principles 
restraining people from pursuing rational self-interest. Sidestepping the integral 
connections among polity, economy, and society, this ‘new’ political economy envisions 
and addresses institutional reform by conceiving the political setting as a sphere 
sufficiently separate and distinct to be excluded from primary analytic attention. As well, 
NPE does not take into account the external factors such as policy interference and aid 
conditionalities imposed by donors. While NPE provides tools for understanding 
economic problems, it does not offer any coherent means of achieving policy goals.
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In contrast to neo-classical economic theory, Marxist oriented approaches permits a more 
holistic explanation of social structure and state in developing countries. In the Marxist 
political economy analysis, contradictions and struggles within the economy are 
systematically related to changes in the political and cultural spheres.D ecentralization 
policies are viewed as parochial, non-egalitarian and purposefully designed to bolster 
exploitation in the national and local structures. In orthodox Marxist theory, the local 
level is seen as contributing to the state’s functions under capitalism of renewing the 
forces of relation of production and maintaining the legitimacy of the social order. In 
the process, it creates new socioeconomic interests for those who in turn use the local 
political system as the key mediator. Therefore, the state at the local level is far from 
being a mere extension or replication of the state in its national manifestation.
These criticisms correctly point out the inadequacies of normative liberal perspective 
overlooking the contextual realities in local and national levels. However, such analysis, 
for the most part is reductionist in that the explanation of spatial or regional problematic 
is based on econo-centric determinism. In the Marxist economy-polity relationship, 
political phenomena are explained in terms of either the reproductive requirements of the 
capital or the interests of the economically dominant classes. The former explanation is 
teleological as political institutions and developments are explained in terms of the 
changing systemic needs of the capitalist mode of production.*"^ On the other hand, the 
dominant class analysis neglects to give due consideration to ‘the complex organizational 
and institutional realities’ which lie between classes and state. Aspects such as political 
parties, pressure groups, clientelistic networks which mediate between forms of class
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struggle and state are therefore overlooked in the analysis. While the reductionism is 
somewhat addressed by giving ‘relative autonomy’ of the political sphere, it does not lead 
to the elaboration of specific tools for the political and politics and state continues to be 
defined in class/economic terms. In the same way, Laclau and Mouffe question the 
centrality of class as the locus of political consciousness arguing that society cannot be so 
easily and statically explained.*^ The complex process through which the structure of 
state in developing countries undermines economic development is ignored in such 
deductions.
Still within the critical framework. Slater argues that econocentrism and universalism 
have shaped the conceptualization of space in the process of capitalist development in 
peripheral states. In development theory, Marxist and neo-Marxist form of econometrism 
is characterized by a concentration of issues such as the dynamics of capital 
accumulation, the articulation of mode of production and the international division of 
labour. According to Slater, themes such as militarism, the state and political regimes, 
popular mobilization and political ideology are often left out of account or implicitly 
subsumed under more familiar ones mentioned a b o v e .S la te r  instead proposes 
formulation of a regional problematic where it is possible to incorporate notions of spatial 
impact of capitalist development or state intervention. Here, the state, civil society and 
economy are not presented as separate levels or instances but as interlocking spheres of 
social relations and political practices.
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The neo-Marxist political economy of development combined a cynical view of state in 
developing countries with critical role of foreign capital inhibiting development. 
Gradually, however, this view bifurcated with some neo-Marxists retaining the stress on 
‘capital logic’ while others focusing on domestic exploitative class system.^" The class 
reason of Marxian political economy is morphologically identical with NPE’s 
concentration on the problematic role of interest groups. Therefore, the NPE is ‘new’ 
specifically in succession to the ‘old’ political economy of neo-Marxism.^'
Partly in view of the above, there has been acceptance of the indivisibility of formal 
institutions of state, politics and market in both neo-liberal and Marxist oriented thinking; 
and the need to go beyond only market or state had been recognized. In this sense, there 
has a high level of agreement between institutions of ‘new’ Right and ‘new’ Left.^^ With 
greater importance being placed on institutional reform and social development within a 
global market system, neo-liberal development strategy sets out to support democratic 
stability and good governance in developing countries. Civil society is seen to exert 
organized pressure to unresponsive and autocratic states. For post-Marxists, 
empowerment is a matter of collective mobilization of marginalized groups against state 
and market. The focus shifts to local political actors and a celebration of their difference 
and diversity rather than their common relationship to the means of production.^^ In both 
these development paradigms, participation and empowerment of the target groups as a 
challenge to centralization of top-down state and through local governance.
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2.8 State Power and Civil Society
The perceptions on decentralization, as Smith observes, will ‘be coloured by whatever 
theory is held, implicitly or explicitly, of the state.'^ In his seminal work. Slater point out 
that while decentralization can be articulated into a monetarist discourse, but alternatively 
it can be linked into a discourse that combines ideas of state, collective empowerment, 
democracy and socialism.^^ In the era of globalization characterized by worldwide 
homogenization of societies, the role of state has come under increasing critical scrutiny. 
While this shift adds more intrigue to the study of governance, the ideology and reality of 
peripheral state remains fundamental.
Historically the emergence of modem state began with theories of sovereignty. 
Subsequently, the necessity to protect form state abslolutism was gradually recognized 
and the parameter of state involvement has increased to incorporate functions such as 
welfare services and income (re)distribution. The process of state formation however still 
manifested in the ‘competition for definition and control over territorial boundaries of the 
state centred on claims to represent national will.’̂ ® Most developing countries assumed 
their stmcture in the process of decolonization; centralization of power reflected the 
‘external logic’ of the colonial experience rather than an internal process of societal and 
economic transformation.^^ Therefore, in the decolonization process, the legacy of 
inherited structures of state provided the most viable mode of organization. The 
consolidation of control through those structures started a period of negative nation- 
building.^* As well, colonized people were regarded as not having the intellectual and 
cultural capacity for local self-governance.^^ This created the phenomena of ‘indirect
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rule’ where colonial officials, with compliance of local power holders provided the 
minimal conditions of law and order and revenue generation.
Related, the looser the social structure prior to the expansion of state power, the greater 
the likelihood of excessive use of violence and force as the state tries to secure its grip. In 
this context, the state is not simply a mechanism through which to mould societies and 
economies but ‘....a  structure of management and control that was at the same time 
awkwardly and sometimes precariously poised between the people whom it sought to 
manage and the international setting in which it had to exist.
The notion of class is intricately connected to the analysis of state. Poulantzas emphasizes 
the connection of social space and mode of production- ‘towns, frontiers, territory don’t 
at all possess a single reality and meaning in capitalist and pre-capitalist mode of 
productions.’ Furthermore, Poulantzas integrates the role of state, suggesting that 
capitalist state tends to monopolize the procedures of the organization of space and plays 
a key role in the national unity and development of homogenization. The notion of 
political domination is not dissimilar to Gramsci’s characterization of state as a ‘whole 
complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its rule but also manages to win active consent of the governed.’ 
The supremacy of a social class is manifested in the domination and hegemony, i.e.- 
intellectual and moral leadership, where a particular group dominates opposing groups 
through state power but ‘leads’ allied groups as well.
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In this perspective, political domination through state resembles the formation of colonial 
rule where extraction of resources were accompanied by a concomitant move to provide a 
stable control mechanism and political order in realization of the first objective. As such, 
measures like revenue generation, tenancy legislation and other forms institutionalized 
domination went hand in hand with a complex social and political process of 
collaboration and compromise that did not necessarily entail force. In the spatial analysis 
of colonial state power, field administration in the territories was allowed a certain degree 
of flexibility and discretion in its relation with indigenous social forces, a process 
wherein ‘centralization of control was accompanied by decentralization of discretion.’
The concept of power has to feature in the analysis of the interface between state and 
society. In Foucalt’s analysis of ‘ govemmentalization, ’ state power is both an 
individualizing and a totalizing form of power. In addition to the maintenance of 
sovereignty through the preservation of a territory and the submission of people to the 
authority of law, another form of power is exercised through government where the 
concern is the relationship between people and things, human relationships, ways of 
living, e tc .'^
On another plane, it is held that micro-spaces and small communities are powerless and 
therefore needs to be integrated into the bigger and powerful entities. Rahnema questions 
this assumption and suggest instead that people holding power at the top consider 
themselves powerful only because they are in a position to take advantage of the ‘means 
of power’ such as the state apparatuses and other devices, modalities, and techniques of
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intervention.**’̂  On the other hand, the state with the supremacy of its apparatuses is 
unable to preempt ‘...the whole field of actual power relations’ and can only operate on 
the basis of the other, already existing power relations.'**^
Mouzelis’ conceptualization of mode of domination is also pertinent in this regard. 
According to Mouzelis, political inclusion of the lower classes through incorporative- 
clientelistic mode brings people into the centre via their insertion into the personalistic 
and highly vertical patron-client networks.'**’ In this analysis, a mode of political 
domination can designate the major political technologies of domination like types of 
means of administration, party and political apparatus, etc. Central to Mouzelis’ argument 
is the view that in the modernization process of late developing countries, the state 
‘brings in’ the masses to the centre in a heteronomous and authoritarian manner. This 
signifies a weak civil society, as there is no extensive downward spread of political and 
civic rights. The basic effect of incorporative-clientelisitic mode is the maintenance of 
status quo, as class differences are systemically displaced and a weak civil society is 
unable to check centre’s dominating features. As Turner and Hulme point out, in such 
analyses, decentralization policy is usually viewed as a tool that is cynically deployed by 
the holders of political power to maintain their control and achieve their narrow 
objectives.
In response to the incapacity and arbitrariness of state, there has been a significant rise in 
civil society organizations that attempt to provide a counter to state though engaging in 
activities to create socio-political consciousness, building social network, etc. Civil
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society is viewed as the associational arena between state and family, usually not 
including the organizations and institutions of state or the market. The upsurge of civil 
society in the recent donor agenda sees the role of civil society in promotion of better 
governance and also instrumental in poverty alleviation schemes.
The concept of civil society re-emerged primarily in discussions on democracy in 
transition and developing nations. Its value is seen in its role in reinforcing societal 
pluralism, securing human rights leading to furthering of liberal d em o cracy .H o w ev e r, 
the definition of civil society using a western liberal framework understates both 
configurations of power within civil society and also the enmeshment of civil society 
with s t a t e . I n  other words, civil society institutions are vulnerable to penetration by 
dominant states in Third World countries and therefore being transformed into agencies 
of the regimes. The perception of international donor may create a new elite class in 
accordance with their values rather than viewing the historical and social context of civil 
society formation.
It was Gramsci who was able to extricate the association and cultural dimensions of civil 
society from both economy and state. Gramsci developed the idea of civil society as a 
sphere of conflict in the struggle for ideological hegemony. Here, distinction is made 
between spheres of political society- dominant groups assert their dominance directly 
through state or government and the civil society- wherein the same dominant groups 
assert their hegemony indirectly throughout the society. The form the civil society 
takes in this framework is an outcome of class struggle and the organizations represented
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functions to stabilize the process of domination. The Gramscian analysis of civil society 
offers a better explanation as it implicates civil society in the maintenance of social 
structure that is reproduced in the form of unequal distribution of wealth and poverty 
through the state.
In recent times there has been a phenomenal rise in the number of NGOs who are seen to 
have ‘comparative advantage’ and provide an alternative to the top-down centralized 
development models of state. NGOs tend to enunciate a more participatory and 
grassroots mode of operation and are regarded as being more effective in targeting the 
poor. Donors perceive NGOs as a major channel for service provision and 
implementation of projects. The growth of NGOs around the developing world has 
important implications for the development process due to their part in the wider political 
economy. However, like the civil society agenda, the role of NGOs demands deeper 
scrutiny.
Firstly, the NGO’s dependence on external sources of funding creates some 
contradictions. While many southern NGOs were established or originated with the 
ideological motivation of removing the structural causes of poverty, they are increasingly 
being forced to transform themselves towards agenda set by others limiting their scope 
for social action. As a result, NGOs have become vehicle for short-term project 
implementers rather than potential engine of societal transformation. On the other hand, 
international financial organizations are discovering in NGOs ‘a most effective 
instrument for promoting their interest in penetrating Third World economies and
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particularly the rural interiors which neither private industries nor government 
bureaucracies were capable of doing.’ ' ' *
Another likely incongruity arises from the increasing political role of NGOs which are 
viewed as vehicles for democratization and are considered as an integral part of civil 
society. As such, NGOs can play a complementary role to the economic dimension, i.e., 
private sector initiatives based on neo-liberal agenda. The rise of the popularity of NGOs 
among donors therefore has come hand in hand with neo-liberal economics and 
governance agendas. NGOs in this context, have been able to achieve desirable economic 
and political goals as ‘their relationship with the people is seen as giving them greater 
public legitimacy than government while their managerial features are seen as permitting 
private sector levels of cost control and efficiency’.*'^ The close relationship between 
NGOs and northern governments, donors, as well as developing countries in terms of 
interests, values, methods, priorities, have resulted in them being ‘socialized into the 
development industry.’ * *̂
Similarly, Wood connects the good governance discourse with the ‘franchising of state 
responsibilities to NGOs.’**'̂  Major services like primary education, health, rural banking 
are being taken over NGOs from the state with ideological support being provided by 
donors. In such a situation, the full potential of decentralized service delivery through 
local government system is at risk. This also questions the necessity of decentralization in 
view of the presence and in many instances successes of NGOs in developing countries. 
Wood draws attention to the fundamental issue of loss of political rights of citizens in
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view of transferring basic needs of people to non-state actors as this raises the key issue 
of accountability- NGOs are legally liable to the state for service delivery rather than to 
the beneficiaries. The state, for its part, sees the emergence of NGOs with donor support 
as encroaching in their legitimacy and thereby breeding discrete conflicts o f interests 
within the society.
2.9 The Centrality of Politics
While ideologically decentralization has proven to be an indispensable concept, the 
development burden placed on it has been too great to bear."'^ Experiences of 
decentralization in less developed countries have almost everywhere fallen far short of 
expectations and declared objectives of policy makers."^ The debates surrounding 
decentralization, for the most part, originate from the rationale of it. Conyers asserts that 
concepts like local democracy and popular participation that are readily attached to 
decentralization are not only complex but also ‘highly emotive.’*'  ̂ For almost every 
principle regarding decentralization, one can find an equally plausible acceptable 
contradictory principle.*'^ The assumptions by international donors and government 
policy makers as to the effectiveness of decentralizations in solving institutional and 
developmental problems ignore the reality that decentralization is not a model per se. 
Rather, it represents a ‘...catch-all within which there are many variations, affecting the 
amount of power and resources which are devolved, and to whom, which will variously 
affect its success and failures.’*'  ̂ In Particular, the interface between state and society 
that decentralization entails, produces a whole range of complex socio-economic and 
political implications. The raison d ’etre of decentralization as a means to bringing greater
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economic and social development or as an end in itself has been either put forward in 
normative terms or suffered from a high level of abstraetion. When decentralization is 
seen as a means, ‘important societal eonsequences are o v e r l o o k e d / O n  the other hand, 
restricting of decentralization to a technical discourse is to bypass its very essence as an 
engine of social transformation at the local level.
Decentralization programmes in most developing eountries have been plagued by the 
reluctance to devolve significant power to the local level. Bureaucratic and political 
interference has been a typical phenomenon as transfer of power is considered zero-sum 
process where local government gains at the expense of the ‘centre’ or those holding the 
power. The power devolved to the local government reflects the interests of those who 
control the state level and the extent to which they are willing to cede control over the 
important inputs of the government.
The politics of central-local relationship determine what interests gain or lose from a 
particular set of institutional opportunities, policy initiatives and resource allocation. 
While the modern states in developing countries are expanding their bureaucratic 
organization of social and political infrastructures, this expansion of social activities of 
state has occurred in forms which are decentralized but always isolated in terms of 
participation and direct control by the people.'^' As such, the emergence of 
decentralization as a process of self-governance has not eome about in most countries. In 
fact, there has been a clear tendency of states to centralize even in context of 
decentralization initiatives.
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Samoff, formulating explanations for failure of decentralization programmes questions 
whether decentralization has in fact occurred. In order for decentralization to be effective, 
transfer of power has to be matched by simultaneous transfer of responsibility and 
resources, a chronic problem in developing states. On the other hand, there is also 
widespread albeit contentious view that greater financial dependency results in the loss of 
local independence and action. In any case, resource constraints both at the public and 
regional level have been a persistent problem in developing counties. In this context, 
construction of decentralized structures by an economically and politically weak central 
state assumes that ‘there is something to decentralize.’ It is also unrealistic to expect that 
local government would be able to generate sufficient resources by themselves when the 
national governments have failed to do so. As well, decentralization may potentially 
engender local elite control and jeopardize public interests. Smith, in this context writes 
that devolution of power may only help to augment the dominance of those who are 
already powerful because of their wealth and s t a t u s . T h e  muscle power of dominant 
groups may lead to a ‘mafia phenomenon’ where weaker section of the society is kept 
away from political and economic structures. Griffin, echoing similar views, states that 
‘...in many countries, power at the local level is more concentrated, more elitist, and 
applied more ruthlessly against the poor than at the centre.’
Decentralization essentially means economic and political distribution of power and 
therefore cannot be a po l i t i c a l . Wh e n  the resources are transferred, a struggle for power 
usually follows. As Conyers states, ‘any decentralization of responsibility for planning 
and/or implementation alters the balance of powering the sense that it changes the extent
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to which particular individuals, groups, organizations influence both what is planned and 
what actually happens- and therefore the extent to which they benefit from 
development’.'̂ '̂
The crux of the matter is the willingness on the part of national leadership to share power. 
Evidently, regime type is not as much a factor as the nature of state and associated 
politics in the development process. Autonomy of local government may not even be 
desirable in certain contexts as greater autonomy may lead to greater likelihood of elite 
capture. According to Crook and Sverrisson, pro-poor outcomes are more likely in 
situations where continuing central intervention and external alliances for supporting the 
mobilization of the disadvantaged are linked to the conflict between central and local 
forces.
The role of political parties in decentralization is an important, yet under-researched 
issue. Politics in both federal and unitary states tends to be dominated by national 
political organizations with local branches seeking electoral office in national and sub­
national government. Particularly in the context of developing countries, political parties 
tend to be caucuses of influential persons operating at the local l e v e l . A s  such, rather 
than articulating the demands of people, local government often serve the purposes of 
national political entities. On the other hand, it is argued that the ‘politicization’ of 
decentralized institutions is not undesirable in that the presence of strong opposition will 
deter arbitrariness and work as a system of check and balance.
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2.10 Participatory Development
While there are many reasons for decentralization, the most persuasive rationale lies in its 
capacity to create optimal conditions for citizen participation. Conversely, it is argued 
that the attainment of participatory democracy and development becomes difficult 
without decentralization of power and resources. The central idea of participation in 
decentralization initiatives is to give citizens a meaningful role in local government 
decisions that affect them. Although participation has is roots in the liberal democratic 
theory, the concept resurfaced in recognition of the structural crisis of development 
thinking following the pervasive poverty situation throughout the developing world in 
1970s. The concept of participation has been adopted by a variety of development 
paradigms seeking to end the immiseration prevailing in the Third World.
For the proponents Another Development, with community and grassroots social 
organizations as the agents of progress, the process of development is need oriented, 
endogenous, self-reliant, ecologically sound, and based on and resulting in structural 
transformation.*^* In this framework, it is argued that participation and ensuing 
empowerment could lead to a process of social transformation that is centred on people 
rather than on, as Chamber puts it, ‘things.’ Therefore, in order to prevent the destruction 
of societies and cultures in developing countries, there is a need to ‘delink’ from the 
conventional paradigms of development and the type of elitist politics associated with it.
As well, participation of people in the decision-making process is central to the Basic 
Needs oriented development model. Basic Needs approach implies that the ‘thrust of
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development efforts should be on meeting the consumption requirements of the 
population, particularly the disadvantaged and deprived socioeconomic groups with the 
aim of reducing existing levels of poverty and i n e q u a l i t y H e r e ,  the relevance of 
participation is in the articulation of and meeting the needs of those groups in society to 
bring about human well-being. Similarly, there was an increasing realization in the donor 
community of the failure of development projects in which the targeted beneficiaries 
were left out of formulation and implementation process.
The World Bank takes the ‘stakeholder’ approach defining participation as ‘a process 
through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives, 
decisions, and resources that affect them.’'^° For the World Bank, the two factors in 
relation to participation that are needed to be taken into account in designing 
decentralization programmes is the ‘fair, regular local elections and high levels of social 
capital,'^' which would enable citizens to both signal their preferences efficiently and 
enforce leaders’ compliance with their wishes.’ Participation in this context is seen as a 
pre-condition for successful decentralization initiatives through popular pressure on local 
government officials and associated build-up of social capital as a result of the 
participatory mechanisms. On the other hand, where participation is restricted at the local 
level, decentralization can be designed to strengthen the process of improving the flow of 
information to create awareness for necessity of avenues of participation and formulating 
demand-driven projects.
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With the convergence of many perspectives and practices, participation became a potent 
tool in development and generally evokes positive views. The concepts of participation 
and participatory development, however, have gone through different interpretations and 
applications over the years and are full of complexities and ambiguities. Broadly, two 
aspects of participation require deeper analysis; one deals with participation as delivery 
of services of basic needs and consumption as the primary goal, while the other as a 
process of empowerment and conscientization for social transformation. This dichotomy 
can also be roughly interpreted and analyzed as the distinction between participation as 
means for achieving developmental goals and participation as an end goal in itself.
The ease of participation as put forward by Another Development process has come 
under criticism. Primarily, while the framework holds out objectives of participative, self­
managed and decentralized democratic polity, it has failed to how identify the realistic 
means for achieving those goals. According to Sheth, there has been a lack of proper 
articulation of political and democratic processes in alternative development. By focusing 
on the para-political event and processes, the approach shuts out considerations of the 
forces intrinsic to various political systems which may endanger crisis points in a 
particular process of alternative development.'^'* In addition, concepts of alternative 
development models suffer from sociological determinism in the assumption of 
universality of alternative value system ignoring historical, cultural differences. Devoid 
of empirical and political thrust and action, alternative form of development is easily 
amenable to manipulation of by elite, and run the risk of being subsumed or co-opted in 
the mainstream development thinking and practice.
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For grassroots radicals, participation started with class and gender struggles dealing 
directly with the unsophistieated consciousness of the poor, marginalized and alienated. 
In this perspective, community is the basic unit of social, political, economic and cultural 
interaction which provides the main centre of reference for politics of resistance and 
opposition to the dominant models of capitalist development.
However, the post-modernist emphasis on individuals as the human subject, relations of 
difference and the politics of social identity allows only a limited scope of analyzing 
social entities larger than or beyond communi t y . Acco r d i ng  to Schuurman, there is 
nothing progressive about cultural identity or community feeling in the broader spirit of 
separatist discourse as ‘...fragmented identities work in the interest of capitalism as long 
as surplus value eould be subtracted.’ The opening of national economies and 
liberalization of trade and capital have in fact undermined the development efforts of 
community-based organizations. As O’Malley states, ‘(0)n the receiving end of 
decentralization, and thus left to their own devices and with few resources, communities 
all over the world have been increasingly forced to adjust their loeal economies to the 
forces and requirements of a world eeonomy in terms of whose dynamic structure they 
are non-entities.’ '^  ̂ In this context, the view that ‘closed’ societies with ‘almost 
impermeable membranes of protection against external influences’ that help them to 
develop an immune defense system allowing the preservation and reproduction of modes 
of life is beeoming increasingly problematic.'^*
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Veltmeyer draws attention to inherent confliet between communities and decentralized 
political-administrative units in his analyses of decentralization and participation in the 
eontext of Latin Ameriea. In the decentralization process, community and government 
are brought together under the conditions that serve the purpose of government and that 
tends to undermine and weaken organizational capacity of traditional c o m m u n i t y . T h e  
forced integration of communities and ethnic groups into the larger political and 
administrative units has made them weaker or destroyed their cultural and economic 
structures. Furthermore, focus on the local as a site for development circumscribes 
consciousness and action. By limiting the scale of social and political issues to local 
levels, decentralization policies inhibit any structural changes necessary for 
development.
On the other hand, the community itself is prone to dissolution due to its own dynamics 
of power and class structures. In contrast to the romantic post-modernist view, most 
communities suffer from the same evils and contradictions that affect other societies. 
Communities are far from being idyllic places where oppression, violence and division 
are frequent within and between them.*"̂ * Nelson and Wright observe that community is a 
concept often used by state and other organizations, rather than people themselves, and it 
carries connotations of consensuses and needs determined within the parameters set by 
o u t s i d e r s . A s  well, excessive emphasis on the local and the community ignores the 
ways in which the state uses the local arena politically through material and discursive
143practices. ‘
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Participation at the local level may be an important concession to be offered to the lower 
classes if they are to be incorporated into the system of government an economy which 
permits very little individual autonomy and personal p o w e r . B y  the same token, local 
democracy can offer the appearance of self-governance and participation without actually 
offering any substance. As such, participation has been used as a process of political and 
social co-optation restricting the terms on which people participate but at the same time is 
justified as democratization. Kothari taking a more skeptical view on participation 
remarks that, ‘the more the economics and politics of development are kept out of the 
reach of masses, the more the masses are asked to participate in them.’ ''*̂  On another 
plane, many governments have come to realize that participation no longer poses a threat 
as long as people are integrated into the economization process or service and 
consumption system. Participation, in this context, ‘has come to be disembedded from the 
socio-cultural roots and is now perceived one of many resources to keep the economy 
alive.’ There are hardly any development projects now that do not have a participatory 
component and it is increasing evident that participation is a necessary and dependable 
tool for the governments and NGOs to attract financial assistance from donors.
Similarly, in participation as a means, ‘development agenda is predetermined, objectives 
are defined, and solutions envisaged’ without the local people being involved in the 
p r o c e s s . T h i s  represents ‘the manipulative form of participation where the participants 
do not feel they are being forced into doing something but are actually led to take 
decisions which are inspired and directed by centres outside their control.’ In this 
sense, participation is a form of instruction and intervention from outside against which
65
the targeted people are powerless to stop. As such, when participation enters the realms 
of projects, then the very essence of the concept is lost, as participation is made technical 
and stripped of radical implications. This is not dissimilar to post-development view of 
‘development’ as a process which ignores the principle of cultural diversity and the 
ability of people to devise their own development.
Rahnema highlights the problems of perception associated with the view of micro-spaces 
or ethnic communities as ‘a conglomerate of objects to be scientifically analyzed, or 
utilized’ and their reification in terms of political and economic u s e f u l n e s s . Ra h ne ma  
distinguishes between micro-spaces like districts, divisions, etc., which are artificially 
created and are part of the macro-space as opposed to being culturally and endogenously 
constituted. For Esteva, promoters of participation perceive its necessary when 
mobilization within people is considered i n a d e q u a t e . A s  such ‘society becomes a 
collection of numbers and issues of an unmanageable mechanism that goes wild with 
time and only follows its own indifferent and blind logic.’ Rahnema points out that 
knowledge systems suffer from questionable values and biases and inhibitive 
prejudices.
The concept of power is central to exploration of theory and practice of participatory 
development; as Nelson and Wright conclude ‘participation involves shifts in power’.'^^ 
Participation as an empowering process implies loss of central control and proliferation 
of local diversity and consequently threatens the loss of the powerful.'^'* Stmctures affect 
or influence the behavior of actors in society and ‘changes in structure are channeled
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through the life-worlds of individuals or affected groups and eventually produce new 
consequences’.E m p o w e rm e n t assumes that a particular social group has no power or 
do not have then right kind of power. As well, participation and ensuing empowerment of 
people at the grassroots level cannot be viewed in isolation from broader economic and 
political structures. Moreover, the local social and power relations tend to undermine 
participatory processes.
While the very act of launching democratic local governance ensures a certain degree of 
participation, the relationship between decentralization and participation is not linear as it 
appears. Bryld demonstrates how technocratic regulations are not sufficient to ensure 
genuine participation for all in democratic decision-making in analyzing India’s 
decentralization programme -the Panchayet Raj.'^^ The study documents how positive 
discrimination policy did not bring about meaningful change because partieipation of 
those groups has been influenced by factors cutting across class, caste, gender, religion, 
ethnicity and other causes. As well, lack of parallel emphasis on education, training of 
those reserved members of decentralized bodies furthered the social exclusion process. 
Since decentralization created significant new openings for village elites to influence 
government institutions, its overall impact was to intensify already extreme inequalities. 
Therefore, one basic effect was that decentralization simply empowered local elites and 
even worse perpetuated the existing poverty and inequity.
It is often argued that local governance enhances the democratization process through the 
direct elections for members of local council bodies. However, this normative liberal
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perspective of decentralization takes a narrowly institutional and procedural view of 
democracy. According to Smith, an ability to influence local level planning and gain 
access to decentralized services depend on many factors other than the right to vote.'^^ 
The existing oligarchic structure of power at mral areas may undermine and even worsen 
democratic behavior rather than promoting it. Political alliance and support depend on 
economic status and access to land and resulting patron-client relationship undermine 
freedom of lower classes to act independently. In the context of Indian sub-continent, 
landowners influence the voting patterns of people who are dependent on them for 
livelihood. The distribution of power within the local institutions reflects the distribution 
of wealth within societies. As a result, the less-privileged members of the society are 
unable to form electoral majorities based on their common class interests. In addition, 
poverty has a debilitating affect on the ability of the poor to participate and engage in 
formal political process.
Democracy has an in-built bias that discriminates against pro-poor and redistributive 
policies that decentralization entails, because the policies require that gains for the poor 
come at the expense of the elites. Blair, summarizing a study of decentralization in six 
countries apprehended that the democratic local governance causal f o r m u l a o f  
participation leading to poverty reduction is problematic. Even though marginalized 
groups were able to achieve higher representation as a result of higher levels of 
participation, it has not impacted significantly in the alleviation of poverty. The solution 
for Blair is to take a universal approach that would bypass different power structures 
situated in local as national arenas and provide benefits for all.
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2.11 Conclusion
There is little doubt that decentralization, if it takes the form of devolution of power to 
local level, is a desirable strategy of development administration. Particularly, 
decentralization enhances the opportunities for participation of people in the decision­
making process. The stress on the governance and local level participation and service 
provision has brought about a certain measure of consensus among diverse approaches of 
development. The conceptual connection between decentralization and development, 
however, has not always materialized into uniform policy outcomes in developing 
countries. Decentralization incorporates notions of equity, democracy and redistribution 
of power, and as such, the process has a profound impact on the socioeconomic fabric of 
peripheral states. It is partly in view of the above that Slater termed decentralization as a 
myth, mask, and mirage.
The study takes a political economy approach in analyzing decentralization in 
Bangladesh. In this context, neither the new political economy with its cynical view of 
Third World politics, nor Marxist political economy with its economic determinism, can 
adequately explain the political and economic changes in developing countries. Rather 
the study situates itself somewhere in between the two divergent political economies. 
Here non-economic factors like nature and territorial dimension of state, integration of 
local-national politics, militarism and bureaucratic power, are given greater attention. The 
study also underscores the relationship between state and civil society particularly how 
the society becomes embedded with the state.
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On the basis of the discussions in the Chapter, the study contends that the issues 
concerning decentralization is more political than economic and as such the political 
economy approach has to be based on a broader understanding politics at the all levels in 
addition to the inherent relationship between the polity and economy. Moreover, the 
social biases embodied in the most institutional structures of state are important element 
of the decentralization and the political an administrative aspects not distinct of each 
other.
In synthesizing the various strands of theoretical debates surrounding the concept and 
policy of decentralization, it is also clear that the local arena is a site of conflict where 
struggles for power are continuous occurrences. The structural class and conflict 
perspective of the local or the community provides a more reasonable approach to the 
analysis of development process. Moreover, the local level cannot be viewed in 
isolation from broader political and economic structures as emphasis on the local 
underplays the importance of state and associated power structures.'^'* In particular, the 
restricted analyses of local arena ignore the way in which state uses local arena 
politically. As well, the concepts of participation and empowerment have to be seen in 
terms of both the politics of development intervention and the socioeconomic structure 
prevailing in peripheral societies.
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Chapter Three
Macro Context of Bangladesh
3.1 Introduction
With a fertile land, abundant water and adequate natural resources, the region of Bengal 
had been endowed with most of nature’s bounties. Indeed until the 18*̂  century, 
Bangladesh as part the Bengal was one of the prosperous regions in the world. Although 
the colonial experience had a profound impact, the people of Bangladesh looked forward 
to a better future at independence in 1971. Optimism, however, gradually gave way to 
despair. Bangladesh now features prominently among the poorest countries in the world 
and is known as a country of insoluble problems. In 1975 Faaland and Parkinson termed 
Bangladesh as a ‘test case for development’ while United States Foreign Secretary Henry 
Kissinger went a step further to declare the country a ‘bottomless basket case.’ While 
Bangladesh has achieved considerable successes in many fields in the three decades since 
then, the initial pessimism still finds echo in most development efforts of the country.
This chapter is broadly divided into three sections. The first section specifies the direction 
of Bangladesh’s economic and political reforms particularly during the period between 
1982-2001. It provides an outline of the interrelationships between economic and 
political spheres characterized by economic liberalization on one hand and increasing 
pressures of democratization on the other. Drawing from first part, the next section 
provides with a brief overview of the development trajectory of the country focusing on 
the key dimensions of governance and policy reforms, macroeconomic situation resulting 
from donor policies and human development. The final section analyzes the state-society
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interface in the context of the emerging political economy. The relationship between state 
and civil society, particularly the emergence of NGOs as a major economic and political 
force and the implications thereof are analyzed. The section also looks at the agrarian 
structure given the dissimilar urban-rural socioeconomic conditions existing in the 
country along with rural development strategies undertaken the government so far. 
Together these sections provide a background of the political economy of development 
and the nature of state in Bangladesh. The objective is to identify the key aspects that 
shaped the decentralization policies as well to delineate the conditions in which those 
policies have taken place.
3.2 Political Economy of Adjustment
After independence in 1971 following a bloody civil was the Pakistan army, the first 
government in Bangladesh was formed by the Awami League with Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman (Mujib) as the prime minister. The reconstruction of the war-ravaged country, 
organization of a new nation, a deteriorating economic condition, and a host of other 
immediate tasks confronted the government. In 1972, the Bangladesh constitution was 
approved with four fundamental principles- nationalism, secularism, democracy and 
socialism. Mujib initially moved towards a system of parliamentary democracy and 
announced ‘a package of populist economic measures’ including land reform and 
nationalization of the few industries the country possessed.' Mujib’s leadership role in 
the war of liberation gave him popularity initially among the people. The Awami League, 
which has a long tradition in political opposition to military-bureaucratic rule, also tried 
to systematically curb the powers of those two state machineries.^
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Bangladesh inherited an over-regulated economy in the aftermath of the liberation war 
with subsidized food price under public distribution system, import control, an 
overvalued exchange rate and publicly provided agriculture inputs and institutional 
credit. Approximately 34 percent of value of fixed assets in the modem manufacturing 
sector was contributed from state enterprises.^ The share of public enterprises in 
manufacturing increased further as the Pakistani owners who dominated trade and 
finance in the then East Pakistan abandoned their enterprises. The expansion of publie 
sector can be attributed to ‘circumstantial pressures arising out of independence’ rather 
than a categorical commitment on the part of the ruling party to develop a command 
economy."^ Despite some attempts at divesture of state enterprises and devaluation of 
taka, the Bangladesh currency, there was no substantial change in the direction of the 
economy from the 1960s during the Mujib regime.
The discontent with Awami League regime grew as the economy recovered very slowly. 
The corruption and mismanagement of the administration and party workers was 
widespread and resulted in the decline of the popularity of the mling party. On the 
economic front, task of developing available infrastructure within a socialist framework 
remained elusive. In the wake of a strong anti-government movement, the Awami League 
staged a constitutional coup dissolving all other parties and establishing a one-party 
presidential form of government in 1975.^ This arbitrary domination of the party further 
antagonized the people, and before Mujib could implement his experimentation he was 
assassinated by a group of junior military officers in the August 1975.
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Following a series of coups and countercoups, General Ziaur Rahman (Zia), as the army 
chief of staff, became chief martial law administrator in 1976 and in the following year 
assumed presidency. Zia reinstated a military bureaucratic state modeled after Ayub 
Khan^ government in the Pakistan era forming a broad-based coalition of political forces 
opposed to the Awami League drawn from military, bureaucracy, business community 
and pro-Islamic elements.^ Zia created his own political party Bangladesh Nationalist 
Party (BNP) in an attempt to ‘civilianize’ the government and sought people’s vote of 
confidence in his leadership and support for his policies and programmes in a 
countrywide referendum in 1977. The following year, he was elected president which 
provided immense creditability to his position.
With all the groundwork complete, the country made the transition from martial law to 
civilian rule during the second part of the rule (1979-1981). The process of civilianization 
was somewhat successful in creating a civilian support base which made him less 
dependent on the military. In addition, economic and social reforms initiated by the 
government, including trade licensing, state financed capital, state direction of private 
credit were successful in enlarging the sphere and the rate of private capital 
accumulation.* A process of disinvestments in the public sector was initiated to reverse 
Awami League’s ‘commitment to socialism.’
Economic reforms in the period of 1975-1982 were characterized by a greater emphasis 
on the promotion of private sector development. Between 1976 and 1983, a total of 217 
units were disinvested or denationalized indicating a sharp acceleration in the
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privatization process/ The performances of those units were however not satisfactory 
despite enjoying some favourable provisions from the government. While the expansion 
of private economic activity was in trade, industry and finance was a desired goal o f the 
Zia government, the instrument of choice was massive lending to prospective private 
enterprises through the public sector development finance institutions (DPI). While the 
economy showed some signs of improvement with a 7.8 pereent growth in GDP and a 4.4 
percent increase in per capita income during 1977-78, by the end of 1981 the GDP 
growth declined from 6.1 percent in 1980-81 to 0.9 percent. A deterioration of macro- 
economic balance forced Bangladesh to take recourse to IMF’s Enhaneed Fund Facility 
(EFF) worth $800 million in 1980. The result was a temporary revival and burst of 
private sector investment and gradual emergence of a new class of entrepreneurs. 
However, the wealth and economic power was highly eoncentrated in few family-based 
business groups with little or no development of small-scale and medium enterprises. A 
study of 462 borrowers showed that almost 70 per cent of the entrepreneurs were drawn 
from the trade and industry while the remainder came from military, bureaucracy and 
services." A large number of this entrepreneur class directly benefited from the 
patronage of the regime. The mutual interdependence has also seen the business 
community having greater influence in the affairs of the state.
Whatever successes Zia had in the economic and social fronts, he was unable to contain 
instability and unrest within the armed forces and was assassinated in failed coup in May 
1981. While BNP was able to survive the assassination of Zia, its government was 
toppled in a bloodless coup led by General H.M. Ershad in March 1982. An authoritarian.
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military-bureaucratic state dominated by the all-powerful president was established 
which would rule the country for a decade.
3.2.1 Stability of Military Rule
Immediately after coming to power Ershad, highlighting the failures of previous 
politicians to effectively manage the democratic system, promised to bring stability to the 
uncertain political situation and pledged to restore representative government. The 
‘familiar rituals of post-coup situation’ soon followed; suspension of the constitution, 
proclamation of martial law, dissolution parliament and a ban on political activities.'^ 
Thereafter a systematic process of personalizing the polity began with Ershad dominating 
the decision-making process and building an elaborate system of patronage to ensure 
support of the military corps, the rising business community, and his civilian allies.'^
The stability of Ershad regime can be primarily interpreted in terms of developments 
within the army. The defense forces in Bangladesh have been afflicted by factionalism 
and instability, particularly due to its involvement in tbe liberation war and failed to 
preserve a hierarchical and rigid discipline.'"^ Like all military dictators, Ershad’s first 
priority was to nurture his constituency, that is, to keep the armed forces satisfied."’ The 
increase in the strength of armed forces from 60,000 in 1975-76 to 101,500 in 1988-89 
was indicative of the efforts of military expansion.'^ Correspondingly, the defense budget 
increased on average by 18 percent over the period while the total yearly budget 
increased by 14 percent'^ and between 1972-73 and 1998, military expenditure increased 
by a staggering 153 percent.'* The astronomical increase in salary and benefits meant that
the real wages earned by army personnel was double the wages of corresponding civilian 
posts. The central administration, in the form of a ‘martial law committee’ (MLC), was 
almost exclusively composed of armed forces. As well, military personnel were placed in 
a number of strategic positions in civil administration including large corporations, 
foreign missions and police. Ershad also included bureaucracy in his side forming an 
alliance mutually advantageous for both groups.'^ The state apparatus was used 
effectively and efficiently towards the preservation of authoritarian rule.
The advent of the military government in the early 1980s coincided with the Bretton 
Wood’s institutions’ embarking on the structural adjustment polices throughout the 
world. The new martial law regime was more responsive to those pressures to carry out 
wide-ranging macro-economic reforms. Ershad government began to implement IMF 
measures through a New Industrial Policy (NIP) in 1982 that emphasized privatization of 
public enterprises and phasing out of price controls on foods, withdrawal of subsidies 
from agricultural products, austerity measures and cost-effective education policies.^*^ 
Within a year of announcement of NIP, Ershad transferred ownership of 60 large jute and 
textile industries to private investors and public sector involvement was limited to only 
six basic and heavy industries. Steps were also taken to deregulate the financial sector. In 
sum, the reform process was much more holistic in its coverage, attempting to change the 
entire direction of the economy towards a private enterprise dominated market 
economy.^'
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The drastic measures saw the public sector control of industrial assets declining from 92 
per cent in 1972 to 40 percent in 1988.^^ Importantly, there was gradual decline in the 
developmental efforts in the 1980s. This trend is reflected in the waning share of Annual 
Development Expenditure (ADE) to GDP from 10.6 per cent in 1980-81 to a low of 5.8 
per cent in 1991-92.^^ In addition, while Ershad’s industrial policy included tax holidays 
and credit assistance to enhance access to the global market, it facilitated new forms of 
rent-seeking and accumulation through the state. The policy institutionalized the move 
away from a national planning model and allocated resources and support to the growth 
of trade and manufacturing to an increasingly liberalized economy premised on the use of 
public resources and patronage to build an indigenous capitalist class simultaneous with 
sustained support for the public sector.^'* As such, while the reasons for Ershad’s market- 
oriented strategies can be put down to his reliance on the ‘external actors’ i.e. donor 
pressure, Ershad simultaneously allowed the business elites to further accumulate wealth 
through favours at the cost of public funds in exchange for their support.
Like his military predecessor Zia, Ershad was conscious of the lack of civilian support 
base. Ershad organized and obtained an overwhelming majority of votes cast in a ‘risk- 
free’ nationwide referendum, giving the government a semblance of credibility.^"’ 
Collecting opportunists and deserters from opposition parties, neophytes, senior military 
officers, Ershad formed a new political party, Jatiya Party and put on a civilian face 
discarding his military appearance. In 1986 the party won the parliamentary elections and 
Ershad became president. The parliamentary approval of the Seventh Amendment to the 
Constitution paved the way for legalizing all actions taken during the four and half years
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(March 1982-September 1986) of martial law in the country. The withdrawal of military, 
however, only masked its continued dominance.
The Ershad regime faced stiff opposition to his rule mainly from Awami League and 
BNP who enjoyed generous support among the people of Bangladesh. Significantly 
however the two main opposition parties did not follow a unified strategy of cooperation 
against the autocratic regime. Ershad enjoyed tacit support from Awami League, which 
hoped to return to power once the military regime is removed and participated in the 
parliamentary elections while BNP stayed away. Thus Ershad was successful in dividing 
the weakening the opposition to his regime as well as demonstrating to donors his 
‘honest’ intentions to establish a democratic polity.^^
3.2.2 Transition to Democracy
While Ershad managed to secure the support of the armed forces and bureaucracy, he was 
less successful in efforts to establish hegemony and domination over the civil society. 
The disillusionment with his economic and social policies grew as constraints of SAP 
evident with huge tax increases antagonizing the middle and lower classes. Domestic 
resource mobilization and savings were the decline and expenses in the non-productive 
sectors such as administration and defense continued to increase. The performance of a 
large number of privatized corporations left a lot to be desired and the nexus between the 
industrial class and the state led to the creation of a new group of loan defaulters. Instead 
of rationalizing the private sector, the denationalization programme consistently benefited 
few industrialists unfairly while simultaneously causing massive retrenchment in public
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enterprises. This resulted in rising inequality and marginalization of poor and a 
deterioration of living standard across the country.
As well, political opposition gradually gained momentum in view of the regime’s use of 
force to quell anti-government movement, a deterioration of human rights situation and 
continued non-performance and corruption by the government. The 1988 parliamentary 
elections, boycotted by main position parties, may have been the beginning of the end of 
Ershad re g im e .E rsh a d 's  refusal to surrender power sparked off an urban-based mass 
uprising which led by students, opposition parties, professional groups, civil society 
organizations, workers with tacit support from civilian administration. In October- 
November 1990, violent demonstrations demanding Ershad’s resignation ensued. Ershad 
was forced to resign in December 1990 in the wake of the mass agitation, withdrawal of 
military support, and growing donor unhappiness with his corrupt and ineffective 
government. The popular upheaval ended a decade of authoritarian rule and ‘Bangladesh 
joined the third wave of democratization sweeping the post-cold war world.
The fall of the military dictator in face of a decade of continuous political movement 
marked a watershed in Bangladesh’s history. The 1991 elections were held under a 
neutral interim government which can be termed the first free and fair elections in 
Bangladesh. Indeed, the holding of free and fair election was undoubtedly the singular 
essential achievement for the caretaker government. Although the Awami League was 
expected to win, BNP emerged the as winner in polls. BNP’s victory was attributed to the 
steadfast anti-Ershad image of its leader Khaleda Zia, Awami League’s political isolation
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and complacency, the activist role of BNP’s student wing in electoral mobilization and a
residual hostility toward Awami League’s 1972-75 governmental record.^^
3.2.3 Return to Political Rule
While BNP preferred a presidential system of government, the party agreed to restore 
parliamentary democracy, and following the passage of the 12'*’ Amendment to the 
Constitution, Khaleda Zia became the new prime minister. Although there was the 
widespread consensus in support of the new political order, BNP inherited a fragile 
democraey. The new government however did not appear to have significantly different 
polieies from the previous regime in that the development strategy based on ‘an ideology 
of developmentalism driven by market f o r c e s .T h e  government expressed its intentions 
to assume a ‘promotional rather than regulatory role’ in facilitating the development of 
the private sector.^* It made efforts to complete what the World Bank calls the 
‘unfinished reform p ro g ram m e .F o re ig n  investment was encouraged to set up export- 
oriented enterprises by offering tax exemptions, investment procedures were simplified 
and regulatory role of key government agencies ware eliminated.
From the beginning, a discernible change in power structure was observed in favour of 
business and industrial class being at the helm of the government as ministers and 
members of parliament. Almost half of the BNP candidates for the parliamentary 
elections of 1991 belonged to the industrial class forging a dominant force in politics. At 
59 percent, they constituted the largest group in the parliament as newly eleeted 
members, reflecting an increase of over 95 percent.
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Initially, BNP’s greatest success was in the macro-economic programme which was 
reflected in the an increase in tax revenues due to a newly imposed value-added tax, low 
inflation and higher level of investment and a decline in government deficit. Despite 
favourable macroeconomic polices and relative political tranquility, BNP government 
was soon facing a number of pressing problems. Firstly, the government failed to 
translate its macroeconomic policies into successful micro level development that would 
encourage growth. While the IMF and World Bank targets of lowering inflation and 
increasing revenues were met, the country failed to increase its economic growth rate 
from an average of 4 percent (from 1973 to 1993) to 6 percent.'^"  ̂ As a result ‘the 
economy remained sluggish due to low levels of investment, low savings, and rising local 
d eb t.’^̂
In addition, Khaleda Zia’s slow, centralized and highly personalized decision-making 
style led to poor political management, a focus on narrow policy issues and a tendency to 
drift from one political crisis to another. Ineffective coordination and an inability to 
control the complex bureaucratic machine further compounded the problems of 
administrative paralysis and slow implementation of projects. The inexperienced BNP 
government proved to be fragile, insecure, and ineffective, and by 1995 Bangladesh faced 
a new political crisis. The last two years of BNP government was marked by continuous 
political agitation led by Awami League. In March 1994, the Awami League accused 
BNP of rigging parliamentary by-election,^^ resulting in the rest of the opposition joining 
a movement demanding the appointment of a neutral care-taker government. The 
campaign went on for two years and used a number of tactics including calling repeated
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hartals (general strikes) designed to force the government to capitulate to the demand. 
From 1994 to 1996, Bangladesh suffered 175 days of political disturbances including 95 
days of countrywide hartals and 22 days of continuous ‘non-cooperation.’^̂  A massive 
opposition to the regime ensued in which political parties were joined by students, 
professionals, business community, much in manner of anti-Ershad movement in 1990. 
The resignation of all opposition members of parliament en masse, the dissolution of 
parliament and holding of election that was boycotted by opposition parties,^^ created a 
virtual paralysis in the political system. BNP finally relented and resigned in favour of a 
caretaker government and Awami League won the June 1996 parliamentary elections.
Table 3.1: Distribution of parliamentary seats among political parties between 1973-1996 39
Percent of seats won 
(Percent of votes received)
Awami
League
BNP Jatiya  Party Others
1973 97.7 (73.2) NA NA 2.3 (26.8)
1979 13.0 (24.6) 69.0(41.2) NA 18.0 (34.2)
1986 25.3 (26.2) NA 51.0 (42.3) 23.7 (31.5)
1991 31.0 (32.6) 46.7 (30.8) 11.7 (11.9) 10.6 (24.7)
1996 (June) 48.7 (37.5) 38.7 (33.3) 10.7(16.1) 2.7(13.1)
Awami League with its history (1972-75) of alienating civil bureaucracy and the military 
assured institutional autonomy for these dominant groups. It also discarded its socialist 
stance and affirmed committed to a free market economy. The transformed Awami 
League in fact ‘looked quite similar to BNF.’"̂*̂ The government articulated a need for 
‘national consensus’ on key issues including health, health and civil administration. The 
economic policies encouraged foreign private investment, particularly in energy and 
power sectors.
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In course of time, several factors gradually eroded the creditability of the government. 
Sheikh Hasina’s preoccupation with he father’s legacy and strong sense of partisanship, 
Awami League factionalism, and the patronage preoccupations of party members created 
serious concerns for the government in its relations with donors, opposition parties, key 
sectors of civil society and the general public. The political and policy problems 
confronting the new government began early in 1997 and continued to grow with 
increasing poor governance. Consolidation of democratic practices however remained the 
principal challenge. Alleging suppression of its workers, BNP repeatedly boycotted 
parliament sessions, engaged in street demonstrations and adopted a tit for tat strategy of 
destabilizing the government. At the dawn of the new millennium, Bangladesh again 
faced a political crisis as the two major parties failed to settle their differences through 
dialogue and negotiation.
3.3.1 Politics of Confrontation
Since the overthrow of Ershad regime, Bangladesh has continuously experienced 
negative form of politics instead of democratic consolidation. The confrontational and 
agitational politics, what Blair terms ‘politics of the streets,’"̂ ' has resulted in constant 
instability despite the convergence to the centre in terms economic policy and political 
ideology.'^^ Political agitation without a clear popular mandate has been characteristic of 
both Awami League and BNP leading to further systematic political polarization between 
the two. According to Hossain, the confrontational politics as practiced by the two 
leading parties are ‘a manifestation of an in built undemocratic political culture in which 
each party seeks to monopolize state power.
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According to Khan, ‘Bangladesh shows all the symptoms of an underdeveloped polity / 
While political parties can be blamed for the political anti-development, the very texture 
of Bangladesh society and the pattern of personalized relationships and politics contribute 
to the problem of institutional weakness and absence of consensus. The process is 
reinforced by a number of factors including opportunistic nature of leadership, 
fragmentation of parties into smaller factions, and perpetuation of personality cults. 
Hossain holds that the current leaders of the parties have ‘divided the nation, created and 
perpetuated dynastic myths around two past leaders, and thereby derived legitimacy for 
their leadership.
It is pertinent to point out that the rivalry between Awami League and BNP is not merely 
for state power but also for control over actual or perceived history of Bangladesh 
identity.'^^ Both the leaders of the two main political parties were chosen for reasons of 
hereditary and kinship and the supreme leadership position that both these leaders have 
led to arbitrary exercise of power and undermined governmental functions. The 
parliamentary system that has been in existence for over a decade ‘can best be termed as 
a prime-ministerial system.’"̂* The disagreement over conflicting identities, values has 
been compounded by the patrimonial style of dynastic leadership in which the leaders 
have become embroiled in a bitter, personal struggle to restore their patrimonial right to 
control the state.^^ In such a situation, democratization as a part of the governance system 
has yet to be institutionalized.
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3.3.1 State of Misgovernance
The sociopolitical scenario mentioned-above in turn has had a negative effect on the 
governance of the country. One pressing problem is the politicization of public 
bureaucracy which has taken the form of partisan interference of the polity in the affairs 
of civil administration. Corruption is pervasive in all sectors of the government.'^® Lack of 
independence of the judiciary, the use of administration for political gains has rendered 
the state apparatus ineffective in bringing meaningful changes in governance.
On the other hand, the dominant position of the executive within the political system in 
Bangladesh is well known with the former controlling the latter’s agenda.^' The civil 
service in Bangladesh has resisted reform initiatives of reorganization and rationalization 
for a long time through organized resistance. As well, measures to tackle problems of 
corruption, inertia, indolence, and inefficiency in bureaucracy proved to be 
counterproductive, and at best brought marginal changes to the status quo. The 
bureaucracy, insulated from the broader society, manifests a highly paternalistic attitude 
towards the people, a legacy of colonialism. Indeed, the state of misgovernance 
prevailing in the country has been attributed to its colonial experience by some who see it 
as ‘a product of historically constructed structures which the government keeps 
reproducing.’^̂  Eventually, ordinary citizens have to bear the burnt of bureaucratic 
misrule whose prevalence can be attributed to the failure of effective political control.
This crisis of governance manifests itself in the breakdown of law and order, non­
performance of the administration, and the dysfunctional nature of parliamentary
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democracy. In virtually all public services including banking sector, power, gas, water 
supply, state has lacked efficiency and capacity. The state in the eyes of the citizens of 
Bangladesh has lost its legitimacy due to its own failure to govern. The incapacity of state 
to serve its citizens is encouraging the people to seek alternative avenues for provision of 
goods and services, healthcare and education. However, except a few sectors like 
readymade garments, housing, the market mechanisms have largely failed to provide 
improved service. Access to the private goods and services remain unequal and quality 
private in healthcare and education is limited to a very narrow segment of the population 
It is doubtful whether the move towards market is a viable solution in view of nature of 
the Bangladesh state and society. As Sohhan points out, ‘markets operate within the 
political economy of particular societies which influences both their efficiency as well as 
incidence of benefits to those served by or serving the market.
3.4 Structural Adjustment and Macro economy
Since independence, the Bangladesh economy has been characterized by a structural 
change in composition of output and employment away from agricultural sector in the 
direction of manufacturing and service sectors. However, Khan argues that this does not 
represent a dynamic transformation of the economic structure as the reduction in the 
share of agricultural output was not sufficiently rapid and was not matched by vigourous 
industrialization and tertiary growth but almost entirely in the contribution of 
construction, public administration and services.
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While Bangladesh achieved faster growth rate in GDP after independence, annual growth 
seems to be locked permanently locked at 4 to 4.5 percent with little or no sign of 
acceleration in recent years. Recent data suggests that Bangladesh have been able to 
achieve moderate progress in macroeconomic framework over the past few years 
including in the rate of inflation, investment and domestic sav in g s .D esp ite  these moves 
toward macro economic stabilization, the economy did not grow sufficiently as required
to reduce mass poverty. 58
Table 3.3: Sectoral composition of GDP (Per cent shares at constant 1984/85 prices) 59
Sector 1975/76 1997/1998 Change
Agriculture 49J 31.6 -17.7
(Crops) (38.5) (22.8) (-15.7)
Manufacturing 10.2 11.5 1.3
(Large-scale) (4.4) (7.6) (3.2)
(Small-scale) (5.8) (3.9) (-1.9)
Construction 2.5 6.3 3.8
Transport, communication 10.6 123 1.7
& Storage
Housing service 8.4 7.1 -1.3
Public Administration and Defense 2.4 5.5 3.1
Other (mainly services) 16.6 25J 9.1
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The nature of the structural adjustment as pursued in Bangladesh can be termed 
‘corrective’ in that they aimed to improve fiscal and external balances, reduce distortions, 
encourage competition and promote market development.^® Except a largely liberalized 
export regime and spurts in export growth, and decrease in inflation rate, the results of 
these reforms reveal very limited positive achievements. Bangladesh attainted a much- 
reduced public sector, very limited input subsidies in agriculture, and a reduced role of 
state in manufacturing where virtually no new investment has taken place in the last 15 
years. As well, there was a fall in investment rate, a stagnating GDP growth and domestic 
savings rate. While the international financial institutions attribute the disappointing 
results to the failure to follow through with economic reforms as well as the lack of 
effective governance for growth, the policy framework of the reforms itself were ‘neither 
drastic nor comprehensive’ lacking a clear direction and sense of purpose.®'
Table: 3.4: Changes in selected macroeconomic and human development indicators in 
pre-adjustment and adjustment period®^
Indicators Pre-adjustment period 
(Average of 1981/82 to
1985Æ60
Adjustment period 
(Average of 1986/87 
to 1990/91)
Real GDP growth rate (Percent) 4.3 3 .9
Public expenditure development (As percent 8 .4 7.2
of GDP)
Investment (As percent of GDP) 1 3 ^ 11.8
Public expenditure on education (As percent 2 .2 (1 9 8 6 ) 2 .2 (1 9 8 8 -1 9 9 0 )
ofGNP)
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In the face of resource constraints, the government squeezed expenditure on social 
development. The absence of complementary institutional reforms has led to the 
stagnation of the economy. Income inequalities are on the rise; the Gini coefficient rose 
from 0.372 in 1985 to 0.430 in 1995 in both urban and rural areas.^^ Bangladesh is no 
exception to the recent donor focus on the poverty reduction to redress the failures of 
adjustment. Currently the government in the process of preparing the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, a country-driven ‘broad- based’ policy document characterized ‘national 
ownership.’ Rehman Sobhan, the foremost critique of donor role in Bangladesh, contends 
that the change in policy from structural adjustment to poverty reduction is likely to be of 
very little consequence in Bangladesh.^''^














1973 3.0 13.4 2.0 51.7 9.4 3.9 3.4 11.4
1981 6.7 9.0 2.6 61.0 8.1 5.0 4.0 2.9
1985 9.0 9.2 5.0 51.6 9.8 5.7 1.7 4.2
1988 9.7 10.5 6.9 43.7 9.6 3.6 2.0 1.0
3.4.1 Political Economy of Foreign Aid
Bangladesh has been perennially dependent on foreign aid. Donor reliance has been 
evident from the very beginning when the United States withheld its food aid 
commitment in 1974 contributing to the worsening the famine situation in 1974 when 
100,000 died. The country’s total amount of outstanding foreign debt is more than US$
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12.5 billion, which is more than 50% of the GDP.^^ Over the years, there has been a shift 
in the type of with the contribution of commodity and food declining with concomitant 
increase in project aid.
Among the donors. World Bank and IMF have the most contribution, together accounting 
for about 21% of the total foreign assistance received by Bangladesh during 1971/72 to 
1993/94.^* The great influence exerted by the institutions in the economic affairs of the 
country reached to the extent of Bretton Woods’ duo being labeled as ‘major political 
force.’ Given the high volume of aid through, it is not surprising that policy advice has 
been as big a role as lending.
Table 3.6: Sectoral breakdown of World Bank’s resource flow to Bangladesh^^
Sector Percentage
Physical infrastructure (Water management, flood control. 35^7
energy and natural resources, transport and communication.
rural development, etc.)
Import support (Commodity loan) 27A6
Economic sector (Agriculture, industries, private sector 2&94
support)




From the table, it is quite clear that the focus of World Bank was explicitly on physical 
infrastructure while aid flow to social sectors remains modest. As indicated earlier, 
towards the 1980s, World Bank took steps to move away from project-based to policy
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based lending. These steps included,’® (i) use of non-project or programme lending were 
the programme was divorced of aid for specific items of investment and provided general 
support to deficit balance of payment; (ii) combining of programme ending with policy 
change conditions; and (iii) broadening of these conditions from sectoral to 
macroeconomic level. While structural adjustment lending characterized the World Bank 
policy prescription since mid 1980s, institutional reforms including efficiency of public 
enterprises, improved institutional capacity and legal framework to support the 
productive sectors received less attention during the period.’ *
The amount of development assistance to Bangladesh has shown a declining trend with 
aid-GDP ratio of 10 percent in 1981/82 declined to 4 percent in 1996.’  ̂ Nevertheless 
there has no lessening of the donor inclination of intervening in policy matters of the 
country. A series of conditionalities that were accompanied with the assistance amounted 
to serious erosion of sovereignty. As well, foreign aid has contributed to the growth of a 
moneyed class through the policy of patrmonialism where the political leaders used 
national wealth to create a subservient class through transferring public wealth to private 
hands.’^
3.4.2 Social Development
Bangladesh achieved some successes in social and human development in the last two 
decades. The total fertility rate (TFR) declined from 6.8 in 1975 to 3.1 in 1997 while the 
population growth as per UNICEF figures in 1991 is 1.6 percent per annum, which is one 
of the lowest in the developing world.’"*
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Table 3.7: Human development indicators Bangladesh (1990-98)^'^
Year Life expectancy Adult Literacy Real GDP per Human
at birth rate (%) capita (US$) development rank
1990 5L8 353 872 Î47
1992 52.2 36.6 1,160 146
1994 56.4 37.3 1,331 144
1998 58.6 40.1 1,361 146
Importantly however the pace of human development has been faster over the last two 
decades than corresponding achievements in reducing income poverty.^^ In other words, 
the growth in human development has failed to translate into additional growth 
possibilities for the poor. This can be attributed to the unequal access to the distribution 
of human development, particularly the urban-rural disparity. In 1995/96, per capita 
private expenditure on education in urban areas was nearly four times as high as the 
figure in rural areas and in mid-1990s only 15 percent of the rural population has access 
to public health care.^^ While the expenditure on social development has increased, the 
rate and quality of the growth in these sectors still needs to be scaled up to have a 
significant impact on poverty reduction.
Table 3.8: Percentage of social sector expenditures in Annual Development Programme^^ 
Category 1990 1996 2001
Total social expenditure 9 .95 2 4 J 9 2 9 .4 3
Education 3 .9 6 13.57 15.45
Health 1.71 5.00 8 .93
Family Planning 3 j # 4 .2 2 3.12
Social welfare 0.45 1.60 1.93
Total ADP 100 100 100
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3.5 State, Civil Society and NGOs
There are a rich variety of civil society organizations in Bangladesh including community 
groups, landlords association, cooperatives, religious organizations, business associations 
professional groups and the like. Bangladesh has a long history of civil society activism 
with the most famous being its role in the anti-Ershad movement in 1990. However, civil 
society defined within the western liberal framework is misleading in the sociopolitical 
context of Bangladesh. For the most part, civil society has not shown homogeneity in 
terms of putting organized and sustained pressures on the state expect for ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances like the democracy movement for which there were mass popular support.
In Bangladesh, civil society, in conventional use of the term, is composed of higher strata 
of the society and is far removed from the ordinary people.’  ̂Although these civic bodies 
would like to be referred to as civil society, their associational activity exists among only 
themselves to further strengthen their coalition. While other civil society actors such as 
student bodies, trade unions can be more identified as part of orthodox civil society they 
are generally divided along political lines and therefore lose the neutrality of being 
entities independent from the state. It is in this context that Davis and McGregor 
emphasize the enmeshment of civil society with the state in Bangladesh and suggest that 
activity by civil society may in fact be implicated in the ongoing reproduction of poverty 
rather than alleviating it.^° Therefore, the relationship between state and civil society is 
somewhat paradoxical in that substantive redistribution policies were not allowed to take 
shape and be effective due to configurations of power exerted by the dominant social 
groups. Similarly, while increasing foreign aid has provided some positive welfare
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outcomes for the poor, it did little to undermine the control of civil society by elites 
groups and in some cases served to reinforce the unequal order.
NGOs form a major part of the civil society in Bangladesh. Historically NGOs were 
involved with relief work after natural disasters or private voluntary work undertaken by 
affluent class in organizing schools, mosques, etc. The continuing levels of poverty 
across the country led to widespread disillusionment with the government’s model of 
development. In addition, the absence of strong industrial bourgeoisie and skilled labour 
force provides a suitable ‘market’ for NGOs. NGOs gradually began to formulate an 
alternative grassroots development strategy working directly with marginalized sections 
of society, a process known as ‘targeting the poor.’ This was somewhat in contrast to the 
state’s reliance on trickle-down benefits as seen in Bangladesh in an early part of its 
history. NGO strategies in Bangladesh could be categorized as; providing credit resources 
without collateral with which low income household members could begin to generate 
income through non-land, small scale economic activities, and adapting Freirean 
approaches to group formation or conscientization designed to development the potential 
of poor to challenge structural inequalities through education, organization and 
mobilization.*^
A majority of the NGOs in Bangladesh have endorsed the credit-based approach as it is 
generally regarded as economically more viable because of substantial external support. 
As well, many NGOs have pursued different indigenous income-generating activities for 
women like cattle and poultry rearing, food processing, handicrafts, etc. While the
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‘conscientization’ NGOs undertake political action at the community level, they have for 
the most part remained discreet from wider political debate and action. As Lewis 
contends, ‘NGOs remained largely closed off from the rest of civil society and tended to 
be greeted with some skepticism by the middle classes and the media, which saw them as 
self-interested and accountable only to foreign donors.
Table 3.9; Flow of foreign grant through NGO Affairs Bureau*"^
Period*" Projects financed Funds released (US$ million)
Prior to June 1990 8 5.42
1990/91 464 106.60
1992/93 6 2 6 195 .70
1995 /96 337 156.77
Cumulative through 1997/98 4 ,5 7 9 1288.57
There has been a sharp increase in the total number of NGOs working in the country; 
foreign funded NGOs increased from 494 in 1990-91 to 986 in 1994-95 while local 
NGOs rose from 395 to 848 in the same period.^^ A World Bank report shows that there 
has been a significant increase in the percentage of official development assistance 
(ODA) through the NGO channel from 8 percent in 1991 to 14 percent in 1994-95, in real 
terms a rise from US $120 million in 1991 to US$188 million in 1994-95.^^ NGOs are 
now estimated to work in 78 percent of the villages in Bangladesh.^* The report also 
indicates that nearly 70 percent of the funds are consumed by 10 largest NGOs of the 
country. Organizations such as Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and 
Proshika are now comparable in size, coverage and influence to government departments 
or local corporations.*^
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With the emergence of new policy agenda resulting in the convergence of market 
liberalization and democratic governance and the global level and democratic transition 
in Bangladesh, NGOs have assumed new roles in Bangladesh. The recent trend among 
some big NGOs to venture into commercial activities raises many questions about their 
role and status in society. On the other hand, NGOs, which generally eschewed a political 
role, are more vocal these days given the relatively stable political situation in which to 
operate. The donors’ readiness to support NGOs also reflected the changing stance under 
the good governance and ‘thickening of civil society’ agendas. However, given its strong 
external linkage, the NGO sector cannot be equated with civil society and needs to be 
examined in terms of its own distinctive institutional forms.
As a whole the trend of increasing donor reliance on non-governmental sector indicates 
the loss of creditability and a change in balance of economic power from state to NGOs. 
NGO, donors, and state in Bangladesh are therefore locked into a mutually reinforcing 
structure of conflictual relationships.^® The government for its part is in the contradictory 
position of witnessing the rise of NGO influence with increasing donor support at the loss 
of its own legitimacy. Not surprisingly there have been attempts by the state to ‘regulate’ 
NGO activities. All funds brought into the country by NGOs have been subject to lengthy 
bureaucratic approval procedures. In 1989 the NGO Bureau was established to provide 
‘one-stop’ service to NGOs, which according to observers, increased the government’s 
ability to monitor and interfere in NGO activities.
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Table 3.10: Number of Foreign-funded NGOs registered with NGO Affairs Bureau, 1990-9891
Period Local NGOs Foreign NGOs Total NGOs
New Cumulative New Cumulative New Cumulative
1990 293 293 89 89 382 382
1992/93 77 600 14 125 91 725
1995/96 92 882 3 132 95 1014
1997/98 48 1045 5 140 53 1185
3.6 Rural Poverty
Situated in the delta of three major rivers, agriculture is the lifeline of the economy. 
Adequate rainfall and warm temperatures provide ideal climate for agriculture and crops 
are grown throughout the year. Bangladesh’s land may be rich, but its people are poor, 
most of them residing in the countryside. Bangladesh has often been dubbed a land of 
small farmers. The country’s agriculture is described as subsistence farming where 
peasants grow barely enough to feed themselves. While the causes of rural poverty can be 
explained in terms of decline in agriculture growth especially since the 1980s, and the 
gradual elimination of subsidies whicb increased living cost, reduced income for the 
relatively poor segment of the population, the single-most factor in deterioration of rural
poverty is the unequal distribution of land. 92
The causes of landlessness can be traced back to the country’s colonial experience. 
Historically, the land system in Bengal was one of community-owned property. The 
mode of localized and village-based production was destroyed by the advent of British 
colonial rule in the Eighteenth Century. Under the “Permanent Settlement” system of the 
colonial administration in 1793, the traditional rights of the village community over land
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was superseded with zaminders or landlords exercising control in return of payment of 
land revenue to the British government. This resulted in the emergence of a large number 
of rent-collecting intermediaries between colonial state and the peasants. While the 
abolition of zamindary system in 1950 somewhat eased the plight of rural poor, the role 
was taken over a new class who were converted into the status of owners. By 1947 when 
the end came to the British Empire in India, 'Eastern Bengal had been reduced to an 
impoverished agricultural hinterland.
Table 3.11: Percent of population in poverty in Bangladeshi‘S
Year Rural Urban
1983/84 5 i a 4 0 ^
1985 /86 45.9 30t8
198& #9 49.7 3 5 4
1991/92 5 2 9 33 6
1995 /96 51.1 2 6 J
The present agrarian structure is characterized by high concentration of land ownership 
and prevalence of share tenancy. According to a recent World Bank report, there has been 
significant increase in landlessness- as many as 56 percent of rural households were 
‘functionally landless’^̂  in 1997 compared to 46 percent in 1983/84.^^ Because of the 
effects of inheritance patterns and progressive dispossession, most landholdings are 
extremely small. An indication of the growing fragmentation of the landholdings is 
evident in that the average size of farms worked by their owners dropped from 3.1 to 2.0 
acres and the average size of tenant holdings from 2.4 to 1.5 between 1960 and 1977.^^
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In rural areas, social organization is based on intricate net of exploitation by the larger 
landowners. The poor are forced to pay the price of continued subservience in order to 
get access to employment, credit, and land for tenancy cultivation. This has led a social 
anthropological perspective emphasizing patron-client relations with vertical integration 
of different classes in the polarized agrarian structure.^^ This structure has also been 
articulated in ‘class’ terms with the systematic relations of exploitation observed between 
owners of means of production and those who are separated from such ownership.^^





Per capita income 
1989-90 1987
Bottom 40% 1.9 2.1 2.1 15.7 15.7 18.7
Mid 40% 2T9 2&8 296 35^ 36.3 39A
Ninth decile 19.6 19.9 21.0 I&9 15.7 15.8
Top 10% 5&6 51.2 47.2 31^ 32.3 2&2
Top 5% 3A6 35.7 30.0 19.9 21.4 16.0
Gini concentration 
ratio
0.64 0.70 0.67 0.42 0.42 035
Analysis of the dynamics of rural poverty underscores its multi-dimensional character 
Bangladesh, consisting not just of economic but complex social and cultural conditions. 
Scholars have tended to use terms like ‘semi-feudal’ to describe the socio-economic order 
in rural a r e a s . T h e r e  is a lack of dynamism both in terms of agricultural development 
and social reform in rural society. The structure of dominance is reinforced the social 
inequalities on the basis of religion and patriarchic ideologies. Indeed, poverty has 
important gender dimension in Bangladesh and particularly so for rural women who
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experience it very differently and disproportionately. The lack of access to healthcare, 
nutrition, education and legal services has a differential impact on women in Bangladesh. 
It is therefore not surprising that Bangladesh fares poorly in most indices related to the
status of women. 102
The role of state is not benign in the preservation of unequal socioeconomic order. The 
political attitude of rural electorate is primarily eoncemed with supporting those who can 
secure and distribute state patronage. By virtue of their dominance over traditional 
political and social institutions as well as elose links with the administration, the 
dominant interests of the rural society is able to secure a disproportionate benefit and 
access to donor or state sponsored development inputs and solidify a well-established 
network of exploitation and manipulation.
Table 3.13: Unemployment and underemployment rates, 1995-96 103
Percentage of Bangladesh Urban Rural
labour force All Men Women All Men Women All Men Women
Unemployed 16.5 7.1 29.0 11.3 6.2 24 j 17.6 7.4 2&8
(Includ ing  less than 
15 hours)
Underemployed 3A6 12.4 70.7 19.6 10.0 44.4 37.9 13.1 74.6
3.6.1 Rural Development and State
With about 80 percent of Bangladesh’s 13 million people living in rural areas and 
agriculture contributing one third of the total GDP, the economy and society of 
Bangladesh is overwhelmingly rural. Although the state policy in the sector has seen 
some fundamental changes over the years, the government has taken active role in the
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development of agriculture given its importance in the overall political economy of the 
country.
The first government of the country formed by Awami League espoused cooperative 
policy to ensure equity consistent with its ‘socialist’ strategies. The distribution of 
agriculture inputs including fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation equipment, high-yielding 
varieties of paddy seeds and expansion of mechanized tube-well irrigation has been 
primarily state sponsored ventures with the government exercising virtual monopoly 
through Bangladesh Agriculture Development Corporation (BADC). The rural 
development strategy taken by the government was the Comilla cooperative model which 
originated in the 1960s during Pakistan era and had achieved a measure of success and 
international recognition. The model, developed by Bangladesh Academy for Rural 
Development (BARD), had a two-tier cooperative system intended to promote an 
equitable Green Revolution strategy through farmers’ c o o p e r a t i v e ; a s s i s t  with 
agricultural extension, supervised credit training; and provide a structure for needs-based 
farmers’ o rga n i za t i on s . Th e  Comilla approach continued after the independence and 
replicated on the national level under the Integrated Rural Development Programme 
(IDRP).
While the approach appeared to work under the intensive ‘laboratory conditions’ of 
Comilla district, attempts to scale up the model throughout the country weakened its 
innovative character and left the formal cooperative embedded in the rigid bureaucratic 
structures of the executing agency Bangladesh Rural Development B o a r d . A l t h o u g h
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the emphasis of the programme was on the ‘small farmer,’ the cooperatives were prone to 
capture by the local elite and larger farmers in collusion with local administration.'®^ 
Despite substantial increase in the total agricultural production, the cooperatives further 
enhanced the power of dominant class. According to Kramsjo and Wood, the model had 
two major problems- (i) socioeconomic profile of Comilla was not typical for 
Bangladesh, and (ii) the significance of conflicts and inequalities were understated within 
the cooperative system.'®^
The shift in public policy in agriculture began with structural adjustment programmes 
being carried out in 1980s which saw the withdrawal of subsides in agriculture. Extensive 
reforms in the fertilizer, seed and irrigation marketing were undertaken in mid 1980s 
through mid 1990s as a result of which agriculture input markets became substantially 
liberalized and this continued to be the pattern ever since. IRDP were taken up with 
extensive donor support, particularly by World Bank and USAID to improve rural 
infrastructure and effect technological transformation of agricultural sector. The policies 
under Ershad government involved a significant reduction of in direct state involvement 
in favour of private enterprise, reduced subsidy levels, and state disinvestments in minor 
irrigation ownership. The reduction of state monopoly of distribution of agriculture inputs 
has been justified on the grounds that a measure of competitiveness and economic 
accountability would be introduced and avoid the bureaucratic dysfunctions. Against the 
backdrop of the privatization, there has been a growing trend in the use of NGOs in 
agricultural research and extension by donors as more efficient alternative to public 
distribution of agricultural inputs.
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After initial spurt in late 1970s and 1980s largely due to conversion to high yielding 
varieties and introduction of fertilizer-irrigation technology, agriculture growth stagnated 
in early 1990s. However, the situation improved in late 1990s and with record production 
of 25 million tons in 1999-2000, Bangladesh enjoyed near self-sufficiency in food 
grains. The irrigated land area of the country increased from 2.6 million acres 
immediately preceding liberation to 4.5 million acres in 1985."*^ The use of chemical 
fertilizers jumped from 200,000 tons to more than a million in the same period while 
official agricultural credit expanded from 90 million taka in 1966-67 to more than 10,000 
million in 1984-85.'“
Table 3.14: Agriculture growth rates in Bangladesh 1970-2000“ ^
Average 1970s 1980s 1990s
Agriculture growth rates 1.9 2.7 3.0
While gross agricultural productivity has shown appreciable improvement over the years, 
access to agricultural inputs was skewed in favour of the dominant classes. In rural 
Bangladesh, the social order determines who benefits from rural development and foreign 
aid and development assistance generally builds upon and thereby reinforces the unequal 
relations of production and exchange. Along those lines Rahman has argued that the rural 
development efforts have in fact accelerated the process of peasant differentiation and 
polarization."^ There has been reluctance on the part the part of successive governments 
to make substantive changes in the agricultural policy. Hossain terms agricultural policies 
undertaken by both Zia and Ershad governments ‘politically defensive’ in that they were
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highly conscious of and concerned with the political implications.'*'^ As such, contentious 
policies like land reform and taxation were largely dictated by political interests while 
giving the impression of efforts being made to mobilize local resources from agriculture. 
A comprehensive national policy for the rural areas has never been formulated; instead 
the process has been subjected to a number of competing strategies undertaken by 
different government agencies."^ As a result, despite much rhetoric productive 
investment in agriculture has not materialized resulting in a virtual stagnation in rural 
economy.
3.7 Conclusion
Political economy in Bangladesh has been characterized by two distinctive formations 
since independence. Up until 1990, it consisted of urban-based strata of bureaucracy, 
military and political leaders allied with rural power holders in the countryside."^ In 
contrast, the scope of the political economy since then has become wider with the 
additional actors of the NGOs and the business community."^ A number of factors have 
precipitated the changes, notably growing dissatisfaction by donors with state failure to 
take care of its citizens and the rising commercialization of power due to the rigorous 
liberalization policies started in the 1980s.
Ever since its creation, Bangladesh’s bureaucratic-military oligarchy has dominated the 
political process. Extended periods of military rule in Bangladesh have left an undeniable 
legacy in make up of the country, what Jalal dubs ‘the political economy of defense.’"^ 
Although there has been a firmer commitment to capitalist principles beginning with Zia,
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the need to maintain political control also militated against a policy of strictly devolving 
state resources."^ The strategy of a mixed economic model characterized by 
denationalization and privatization policies reinforced the link between the select few 
controlling the state. The decline in the social expenditure and the absence o f meaningful 
redistribution policies has led to increasingly unequal and polarized society.
On the political front, continuous conflict between and within political parties and 
characterized by strong-man, or for that matter ‘strong-woman’ rule, have resulted in lack 
of consensus in major policy matters. It is evident in the fact that the only ways to change 
governments in Bangladesh has been assassination, military coup, or street politics.'^® 
During a span of 20 years between 1971-2000, the country’s constitution remained 
suspended for over eight years due to military takeover of state p o w e r . T h e  
civilianization of military rule in Bangladesh is essentially were a political means to 
consolidate regime perpetuation and accommodate the private sector in the legal 
framework of state structure.
Bangladesh seems to reflect the contradictory relations between state and civil society. 
Sarah White associates Bangladesh as a ‘weak state’ in a ‘strong society’ given that the 
repeated failures in land redistribution, administrative reform or prohibition of dowry. 
Indeed, these failures point to a weak institutionalization of state and lack of 
independence between executive and administrative arms. Civil society, in this 
perspective, has encroached upon the state. On the other hand, the state has over the years 
maintained its dominance over civil society through subtle incorporation and brute force.
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As such, the inference that Bangladesh can be identified as strong state in a weak society 
equally holds true.
The state has also been unable to make much impression on the rural contradictions in 
part due to the social backdrop in the countryside as well as the integration of local and 
national stmctures of power. While the homogenous and egalitarian view of rural arena 
grossly undermined the pattern of underdevelopment for an overwhelming number of 
people, state intervention in agriculture and mral development only helped to reinforce 
the existing inequalities in rural Bangladesh. The rise of NGOs has to be seen in the 
context of government’s inability to formulate and implement development policies. The 
ensuing relocation of credibility and resources has significantly altered the balance power 
in the political economy of the country.
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Decentralization has always been a much-debated topic in Bangladesh. Since 
independence, decentralized local government has been identified and upheld as the one 
of the major instrument of providing resources to the majority of the people as well as 
enhancing a democratic political system. With pervasive rural poverty and one of the 
highest population densities in the world, effective local governments are considered 
imperative for the country and development approaches have sought to promote local 
level institutions with participation as a key element within a decentralized framework.
The chapter is intended to provide an overview of evolution of the major decentralization 
policies in Bangladesh.' It will begin with a brief account of the pre-independence history 
of decentralization efforts in the region as well as a broad outline of the structure of the 
local government. Next, decentralization policies in the first decade of the country will be 
summarized. It will be followed by an analysis of two decades of decentralization 
experience beginning in 1982 until 2001 in the backdrop of sweeping political and 
economic changes at the national level. The section will analyze local government 
reforms in the period in light of their politico-administrative implications focusing on the 
two key aspects of autonomy and participation. In particular, it will illustrate the different 
composition, functions, and operational modes as part of the reforms undertaken by the 
various regimes. The purpose is to identify the dominant trends and the underlying
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processes shaping the decentralization policies by analyzing the extent of participation by 
the greater majority of the rural population in the development process.
4.2 History of Local Government
Decentralization has a long history in Bangladesh.^ The beginnings of local government 
can be traced back to the twelfth century B.C. when villages were like tiny republics, 
each with its own unique way of managing governance.^ Even though these entities were 
placed under some degree of central authority, they were by and large able to preserve 
their autonomous character. There were several variants of local government structure; in 
some cases, large kingdom altered the status quo of local self-governance while in others 
a form of hereditary rule under control of distant empires emerged.
For the British Empire who ruled the Indian sub-continent for almost 200 years (1757- 
1947), the main objective with regard to local governments was to collect revenues and 
strengthen their grip throughout the whole region. To that end, the feudal property law 
was enacted in 1973 which replaced indigenous self-rule with the reign of landlords. By 
creating a loyal landed class known as zamindars, the colonial system tore apart the rural 
organizations and agrarian structure in Bengal and provided the central regime with a 
sound political support base. The advent of British imperial rule thus gradually 
deinstitutionalized the local government system.
For the overriding reason of protecting and sustaining the colonial interests, a number of 
institutions and acts were introduced between 1870 and 1947, notably, the Chowkidary
119
Panchayet Act (1870), the Local Self-Government Act (1885) and the Bengal Village 
Self-Government Act (1919)/ The first local government reform regime was established 
in 1870 with the revival of indigenous system but remodeled to suit colonial governance/ 
A system more suitable to the loeal conditions was in place through the 1885 and 1919 
Aets, which put together a three-tiered structure of rural areas. However, these bodies 
lacked autonomy and resouree and were controlled by imperial bureaucrats. As an 
imperial power, the British had little interest in understanding and appreciating the 
indigenous local self-government system.^ As a result, all the proposed structures 
designed to suit the imperial interests were introduced and ‘efforts during this period can 
only be described as pieeemeal, narrow and restrietive.’  ̂ In the attempts to maximize 
revenue collection and maintain law an order, the need for effective local government to 
serve rural people was of marginal importance for the British eolonial administration.
The colonial system continued by and large under Pakistan rule (1947-1971) and the 
formation of Pakistan in 1947 did not bring any substantial change in the system until the 
military rule of General Ayub Khan who created a four-tier local government system 
termed ‘Basic Democracy’ in 1959. The new scheme replaced the old union board system 
of local government by putting together a carefully orehestrated system combining direct 
elections at the village level with successively more indirect representations at the higher 
level. Only the lowest unit had some representative character. Local councilors had the 
dual role of serving the community and electing the country’s president as well as 
members of national and provincial assemblies. It was the latter role which assigned great 
importance to the ‘basic democrats.’
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A convenient system of state patronage thus ensued with political support and 
misappropriation of development funds. The introduction of a structure of indirect 
democracy inevitably led to patronization of the union council members and eventually 
institutionalized the system of political bribery and corruption. While zamindars tied to 
colonial regime got a cut of the money on its way up from peasants to distant colonial 
administration, the flow of direction was opposite here- basic democrats’ allegiance was 
purchased through his getting a cut on the money on its way down to peasants.^
The programme of the military government has been criticized by analysts who perceive 
the system as a move towards further centralization. Although the regime realized the 
need for popular participation, it was equally concerned to keep the rural order under 
careful control. Blair terms the Basic Democracy a political ploy to extend the authority 
of the regime throughout the whole country.^ It ‘not only perpetuated bureaucratic 
dominance but created mechanisms to enlarge and intensify such dominance further.’ '^
4.3 Local Government Structure in Bangladesh
Bangladesh is a unitary state. Next to the national level, the government is divided into 
six administrative divisions. The divisions are in turn sub-divided into districts or zilas, 
the focal point of administrative system that has been in place since colonial times. Zilas 
are further broken down into smaller units depending on whether the area is urban or 
rural. For the rural or regional administration, the concern in the study, the following 
basic hierarchy is followed: gram (village), union, thana'' or upzila (sub-district). Every 
union is composed of several villages and around ten unions constitute a thana or upzila.
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Traditionally there has been a blending of central government field administration and 
local government in Bangladesh. For the field administration, there is a four-layer 
structure below the ministerial level including division, district, sub-division,'^ and thana. 
The division, headed by a commissioner, does not provide direct government services but 
instead reviews and approves development programmes. Deputy Commissioner heads the 
district, for long a cornerstone of the colonial system. It encompasses a wide range of 
activities including land revenue administration, correctional and development 
administration and contains line officials from government ministries and supervises 
delivery of services to rural areas. Central government services were provided primarily 
at the thana (later upzila) level at which each service ministries like agriculture, health, 
and livestock maintain officers.
Table 4.1: Administrative structure in Bangladesh: 13






Division 6 11,459 22 million
District (zila) 64 895 1.7 million
Thana/upzila 495 117 224,697
Union 4600 13 24,686
Mouza 59,990 1 F832
(Administrative village)
Next to the field administration, there was a three-tiered rural local government system. 
The district was to have a council or parishad, however elections are yet to be held and 
the deputy commissioner usually acts as the chairman. Thana, the tier below district in 
local government hierarchy, also did not contain a truly local self-government. Thana
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parishad included both administrative officers of central government and elected 
chairman of union parishad, the next tier."^ This level lacked a coordinated rural 
development efforts in the absence of an elected body and bureaucratic dominance. The 
only truly self-government at the local level in rural areas was the union parishad  which 
was headed by an elected chairman and included nine popularly elected members. The 
local governments provided minimal development oriented services but rather 
concentrated mostly on maintaining facilities, providing local justice, and minor 
protective services.'^ In sum, local government in Bangladesh has persistently been 
dominated by central government officers and lacked a developmental purpose; it was 
essentially no better than an extended arm of the centre.
Given its long history of struggle for freedom and democracy, Bangladesh government
realized the importance and necessity of developing a democratic system to facilitate
people’s participation in the political and developmental process and local governance
was considered integral part of this effort from the very beginning. Local government
was embedded in the 1972 Constitution of Bangladesh; it provided for elected local
governments at every level. Article 11 of the Constitution reads, ‘people will effectively
participate through their elected representatives at all levels of administration to ensure a
truly democratic system.’ As well. Article 59 stipulates that:
“(1) Local Government in every administrative unit of the Republic shall be 
entrusted to bodies, composed of persons elected in accordance with law.
(2) Everybody such as is referred to in clause (1) shall, subject to this 
Constitution and any other law, perform within the appropriate administrative 
unit such functions as shall be prescribed by Act of Parliament, which may 
include functions relating to (a) Administration; (b) the maintenance of public
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order; (c) the preparation and implementation of plans relating to public 
services and economic development.”
Article 60 of the Constitution provided for the powers of local government bodies:
“For the purpose of giving full effect to the provisions of Article 59, Parliament 
shall, by law, confer powers on the local government bodies referred to in that 
article, including power to impose taxes for local purposes, to prepare their 
budgets and to maintain funds.”
The Constitution therefore provides adequate opportunity for the lawmakers to develop 
viable self-governing local government institutions. It does not however specify the 
number of tiers nor it stipulates the functions of individual local government bodies. It is 
also relevant at the outset to point out that local government elections are not held on 
political party ticket; however, candidates have tended to associate themselves with 
dominant political parties over the years.
4.4 Decentralization in the First Decade
4.4.1 Reforms under Awami League
The administrative structure that Bangladesh inherited at independence was mainly elitist 
in composition and insulated from people; it ‘exhibited all the cardinal features of 
colonial bureaucracies.’’’ The legacies of colonialism as well as the Pakistan era are 
omnipresent in most local government structures and reforms introduced in independent 
Bangladesh.
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At independence, Bangladesh inherited from Pakistan a four-tier rural local government 
system with a couneil at each of the following administrative levels- division, district, 
thana, and union. District and union councils, as mentioned earlier, owed their origin to 
the British and have enjoyed executive powers, performing regulatory, administrative, 
and munieipal functions since their inception in the late nineteenth century.'^ On the 
other hand, divisional and thana eouneils did not possess any exeeutive authority and 
were responsible for eoordinating activities at lower level eouneils and promoting rapport 
between local councils and government departments. Of the four tiers, only the union had 
elected members and ean be termed as a representative body; while the other three were 
mainly bureaueratic in nature being composed of two categories of members- union 
eouncil chairmen and locally posted central government officials. Although the union 
eouneil ehairmen constituted half the members of these eouneils, they could only play 
second fiddle to the bureaucracy, which was armed with wide powers to restriet the 
influenee of eleeted representatives over loeal policy making and administration.'^ In 
sum, local government in immediately after the liberation war was no better than an 
extended agency of the centre.
The Awami League government made bureaueraey one of the principal targets of its 
attacks and sought initially to curb its powers and make it subservient to the ruling 
party’s will.^° The formation of Administrative and Services Reorganization Committee 
(ASRC) (1972-73) supplied impetus and credence to the neeessity of reforms. Sheikh 
Mujib, the country’s unquestionable leader at the time, sought to bring structural changes 
in local government system with each union parishad reorganized into three wards with
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provision of three members to be directly elected from each of these wards.^' As well, the 
chairman and the vice-chairman for the parishad were elected directly. The Awami 
League government dissolved the inherited system. However, union and district councils 
were soon revived, albeit with different names- union parishad and zila parishad. 
Functional boundaries of the union parishad continued to be the same as Basic 
Democracy system with very little revenue generating powers. The Thana Development 
Centres and Zila Boards were headed respectively by the Circle Officer (Development) 
and Deputy Commissioner and were responsible for supervising development 
programmes while monitoring and coordinating among the different tiers.
Elections in for a new system of union panchayet, later renamed union parishad, were 
held in December 1973 and an average of four persons contested the chairmanship of 
each parishad while the voter turnout was 54 p e r c e n t . I t  was anticipated that elected 
bodies would soon be set up at thana and district level. As it turned out, despite such an 
enthusiastic rural response to local democracy, the Awami League did not hold elections 
to the higher-level councils nor did it take any measures to devolve authority and 
responsibility to any of them.
Awami League, which is essentially a petty bourgeoisie organization drawing its support 
from rural elites, consciously avoided any radical reform in local government which 
would antagonize their supporters. While reasons for not holding elections at thana or 
district levels are unclear, one possible explanation is the poor performance of Awami 
League candidates in the union parishad elections.^^ In general, the decentralization
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programme did not receive any serious attention and the various councils at the local 
level were allowed to languish.
In the midst of grave political and economic crises, the Awami League government, 
following the abolishment of parliament and introduction of one-party rule at the centre, 
sought to establish control over the periphery by drastically ‘reforming’ local government 
structure.^"^ In addition to continuing with the existing tier-based elected local government 
system, the regime planned to establish an authoritarian decentralized local 
administration and compulsory village cooperatives.^^ A highly centralized system within 
a one-party framework to ensure total control over local governments was established. 
Under the District Administration Act promulgated in March 1975, the existing sub­
divisions were upgraded to districts, each of which would be governed by Member of 
Parliament, essentially from the single national party BAKSAL. Termed as the ‘second 
revolution,’ the move also replaced the deputy commissioner with a centrally appointed 
governor in 61 districts who would exercise supervision and control over regulatory and 
development functions of the district and only be accountable to the President. The whole 
system was top-down with little or no input from the local level and was intended to work 
under central- in effect presidential control.
However, in August 1975, before it could take off, the army overthrew the regime and 
terminated the presidential system. Notwithstanding the many problems faced by the first 
government, the situation was conducive for a comprehensive overhaul of the local 
government system with a democratically elected government in power. However, the
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anticipated change did not materialize. The government resurrected the old system with a 
few insignificant changes being made. As was the case pre-liberation years, except for 
the union parishad, all the other tiers were bureaucratically controlled.
4.2.2 Reforms under General Zia
The military government of General Ziaur Rahman pledged to reinvigorate the issue of 
decentralization by strengthening the local government structure. Local Government 
Ordinance 1976, often regarded as the Constitution of local government system in 
Bangladesh, clearly spelt out the functions of local government with three tiers- union, 
thana, and zila (district). A striking departure from the Ayub and Mujib models was the 
new zila parishad for which there were to be direct elections.^^ Zia redesigned the local 
government bodies by granting the status of body corporate with functions classified as 
corrective, financial, developmental, adjudicatory and welfare.^^
The degree of union parishad's scope and representation was enlarged with a directly 
elected chairman, nine members from each of the three wards. Union parishad had to 
undertake civic, police, defense, revenue and general administration and development 
functions. Thana parishad functioned as non-elective body although all the union 
parishad chairmen under the thana were members. It was nonetheless bureaucratic in 
nature with a number of government officials representing national line ministries among 
the members. In addition, the appointment of sub-divisional officer (SDO) as chairman 
and thana circle officer as vice chairman only enhanced bureaucratic dominance. Thana
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parishad had no power to generate revenue. Zila parishad, the highest tier was designed 
to be both elected and nominated body with elected members forming the greater share.
Elections to union parishad were held once again in January 1977 and aroused 
considerable enthusiasm and interest with a high voter turnout of about 66 percent. 
However, the process helped to induct the rural elites in the local level power structure 
and rural development funds were channeled to union parishad. The councilors elected 
both chairman and members were subsequently won over by the bureaucrats and the 
patronage system under the guise of development activities. The union parishad"s leaders 
in turn became the regime’s ‘rural votes’ bank.’^̂  It provided Zia with massive support in 
the national referendum called in May 1977.
On the other hand, zila parishad however was never operationalized and district level 
administration continued to be dominated by bureaucrats. Contrary to promise elections 
at zila level never took place, leaving representatives of various government departments 
to run the council and supervise developmental functions. This reluctance to hold 
elections has been attributed to the government feeling threatened by a possible 
opposition takeover in directly held elections. Like General Ayub, Zia used the rural 
administrative organization of union parishad and the state machinery to create a civilian 
support base for his regime. While the revival of zilla and union parishads was 
considered a step forward in the right direction, lack of genuine effort by the regime 
resulted in the maintenance of the status quo.
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In 1976, the government formulated a new programme of based on the concept of 
grassroots participation known as gram sarker (village government). The scheme as the 
name suggests was completely based on villages and was designed to enable direct 
participation and involvement of different sections of village society in poverty 
alleviation, literacy programmes, population control, cooperatives, law and order and 
other activities. The gram sarker management, being close to village residents was more 
easily accessible and accountable. The Zia government clearly saw a major role for gram  
sarker which were linked with union, thana and district level institutions to undertake 
rural development planning and implementation at villages, ensure participation of 
various interest groups and organize voluntary labour activities. The programme was 
innovative and had the potential to involve people from different economic backgrounds 
in local development.
With gram sarker in place, Zia moved towards the formation of swanivar gram sarker 
(SGS) or self-sufficient village governments in April 1980. The micro-government 
system was an amalgamation of two experiments, the swanirvar andolon (movement for 
self-reliance) and the existing gram sarker with the aim of achieving a breakthrough in 
agricultural production along with reduction of population growth. The attempt focused 
on the grassroots, with aim to make villages the centre of development with emphasis on 
self-reliance. The gram shava (village assembly) constituted a gram pradhan (village 
head), eleven village ‘ministers,’ representing various occupational/functional interest 
groups. The village councils were given the mandate to ensure participation and 
representation of people from all walks of life. Participation by marginalized groups like
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women and peasants were ensured by nomination of two members from each group, a 
process otherwise problematic in the rural context of Bangladesh.
Zia believed that villages were the most crucial units of development and administration. 
The village-level development effort marked the first time the, an explicit recognition of 
class in mral areas. Both the village-based schemes however were criticized as being 
orchestrated to strengthen the ruling party’s grip in the countryside and to extend its 
influence to the villages. The use of grassroots governance system by the BNP regime for 
partisan political purposes saw the gram sarker establishing a vested alliance of rural 
elites patronized by central state.
As well, as the swanirvar gram sarkar were linked with other levels of government, the 
‘control of the nation government over the SGS was extensive.^*^ Structurally and 
functionally, these units were subordinate to central government and could not operate 
freely without bureaucratic influence.'^' Having no revenues of its own, gram sarker 
failed to function properly. As Jalal points out, ‘like Ayub’s basic democracies system 
these local governments were controlled by the bureaucracy, the only difference being 
that these were village governments rather than union-level governments.’^̂  Nevertheless 
gram sarker was the first attempt to challenge the landed elites and integrate the 
disadvantaged groups in the process of local government and to delineate class and group 
distinctions in the rural socie ty .T herefo re  despite it’s the prospect in bringing about a 
participatory grassroots development process, the gram sarker did not get the adequate 
time consolidation and further growth because of change in government in 1982.
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4.5 Reforms under Military Regime of Ershad
4.5.1 Formation of CARR
From the very beginning, the military government wanted to depict itself as a ‘reformist’ 
one. Shortly after declaration of martial law in March 1982, General Ershad reiterated his 
intentions to ‘take the government nearer to the people’ through a process of political and 
administrative reforms. High-powered committees were formed to look into 
administrative and judicial systems, land reform and education policies.
Launching a new administrative decentralization policy was at the core of the reform 
agenda of the martial law government. To that end, a high-powered planning body was 
formed- Committee for Administrative Reorganization/Reform (CARR). The Deputy 
Chief Martial Law Administrator Rear Admiral M.A. Khan chaired the ten-member 
committee. CARR was directed to review the structure and organization of the existing 
civilian administration and to recommend appropriate, sound, and effective 
administration system based on devolution of authority and responsibility. Broadly, 
CARR’s terms of reference were, (i) to review the structure and organization of central 
government’s administration serving rural areas, and (ii) to recommend changes in this 
system to bring administration ‘nearer to the people.’ CARR submitted its report in June 
1982 in which it identified several major inadequacies in the existing politico- 
administrative system.
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CARR recommendations included the following:
• creation of representative bodies with wide powers and supporting bureaucratic 
staff at two sub-national levels of zila and upzila (sub-district).
• establishment of a process where major function of each of these sub- national 
entities was to undertake developmental activities within its respective 
jurisdiction through a process of local level planning without governmental 
intervention.
• upgrading the quality of thana administration, establishing local self-government 
at district, thana and union levels, abolishing the sub-division.
The CARR recommendations were well received by the government. On the basis of 
these recommendations, 460 existing thanas were upgraded to upzilas, with councils 
under directly elected chairman giving them it a democratic look. In total 461 upzila 
parishads were formed in the country with the last one in 1990.' '̂  ̂The focus of attention 
shifted from villages to thana/upzila level and this increased the power of and authority 
of local government considerably. One of the most important characteristics of the upzila 
system was the retention of the regulatory and administrative functions by the central 
government while the residual development functions were transferred to the upzila 
parishad?^ Moreover, the upzila parishad were given funds for development including 
the responsibility for preparing five-year and annual development plans. As part of the 
decentralization programme, two Ordinances and five Acts were passed.
Upzila parishad was characterized by:
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• A democratically elected chairman as head of upzila parishad.
• The eleeted chairman of union parishad was to be representative member of 
upzila parishad. There were also three nominated women members. These 
members had voting rights.
• A large number of activities including agriculture, healthcare, education, 
infrastructure development, and sanitation were transferred to upzila parishad.
• Upzila parishad were empowered to raise finances from a number of local 
sources.
• Senior officials from various departments posted at the upzila level were made 
accountable to the upzila parishad.
• The technical staff of upzila was greatly expanded to 250 and government 
department personnel like engineering, livestock, etc. were upgraded in 
qualification and training.
• Upzila parishad also comprised of the heads of fourteen government departments 
working at that level.
• Upzila was declared as the focal point of local administration and development. It 
was authorized to plan and implement projects without requiring approval from 
higher authorities.
The upzila parishad had jurisdiction over the following areas
• All development activities at the M/?zi/a-level; formulation of upzila level 
development plans and programmes and implementation, monitoring and 
evaluation thereof.
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• Promotion of social development programmes particularly healthcare, family 
planning and family welfare.
• Promotion and encouragement of employment-generating activities.
• Planning and execution of all rural public works programmes.
• Promotion of livestock, fisheries, forestry, and agricultural activities for 
maximizing production.
Besides upzila parishad, other tiers of the local government also faced restructuring. The 
military regime, following the footsteps of its predecessors abolished the gram sarker 
established by Zia government. At the time of Ershad takeover, union parishad was still 
in place and their chairmen serving as members of thana parishads. Thana parishads 
were in turn chaired by sub-divisional officer and vice-chaired by circle officer 
(development), the administrative head at the thana level. Although the structure at 
union level remained unchanged, their status and power were reduced. Ershad’s local 
government system thus consisted of three tiers: union, upzila and zila parishads.
At the local level, upzila was the only unit where a representative body existed alongside 
a centrally controlled bureaucratic apparatus. The representative body (upzila parishad) 
consisted of a directly elected chairman, chairmen, also elected, representing union 
parishads located within the upzila, nominated members including women and a 
representative of the upzila central cooperative association. In addition, there are 
members of the bureaucracy at that level who have voice but no vote in council meetings. 
According to Khan and Zafarullah development administration was the raison d’etre of
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the upzila system/^ The functions of upzila parishad encompass formulation, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of all development projects and coordination 
of the activities of officials of line ministries located at that level.
Table 4.2; Administrative and local government hierarchy in Bangladesh before and after 
1982:" '̂











Division 4 Commissioner - 4 Commissioner -
District 21 Deputy ZiTa 64 Deputy ZtVa
Commissioner P arishad Commissioner P arish ad
Sub­ 71 Sub-divisional - 0 Abolished -
division Officer
Thana! 474 Circle Officer Thana 460 Upzila Executive U pzila
Upzila Parishad Officer P arish ad
Union 4354 Union 4354 - Union
Parishad P arishad
With all these features, upzila parishad marked a significant step forward in
decentralized governance in Bangladesh. It was the first time in the history of local 
government that elected body was established higher than union level. Although there 
was no difference between thana and upzila in terms of area and population, two tiers 
differed significantly in organizational and functional features. Importantly, the elected 
chairman was placed over government officials and parishad decisions were taken with 
votes from elected members with field administration posted only having non-voting 
membership. These measures facilitated people’s representatives to administer local
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development efforts. The government also provided substantial amount of money upzilas 
under development assistance funds. The upzila had the provision to plan, approve and 
implement development projects. The purpose of local bodies was more clearly defined 
and democratic principles were extended to cover higher tiers namely upzila.
The number and range of functions allocated to upzila parishad far exceeded those 
entrusted to its predecessors, the thana parishad. Upzilas differed from thanas in terms of 
services rendered and the quality of central government personnel posted. As well, the 
financial resources available to upzila were much larger in scope both in terms of 
allocation and augmentation. The appointment of a high-ranking Upzila Nirbahi Officer 
(Executive Officer) was an important step towards equipping the council with effective 
powers. An increased number of trained departmental officers were also placed in upzilas 
with some positive effects on rural service delivery.
Moreover, a permanent National Implementation Committee for Administrative 
Reorganization/Reform (NICARR) was also assigned with the responsibility of directing, 
overseeing, and coordinating the implementation of CARR’s recommendations. To the 
protagonists of reforms, CARR’s recommendations represented ‘a big leap towards a new 
governmental system in rural B a n g la d e s h .In  introducing the reform, General Ershad 
declared that ‘the process and system of future democratization of the country would be 
built through the direct participation of the people.’ He further proclaimed the new policy 
was an ‘epoch-making step in the history of democracy in the world.
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4.5.2 Evaluation of Ershad’s Policy 
Central-local Relations
The functions which were transferred upzila parishads included agriculture, agricultural 
extension, input supply and irrigation; primary education; health and family planning; 
rural water supply and sanitation; Rural Works and Food for Work programmes; disaster 
relief; cooperatives and cooperatives based rural development programmes; and fisheries 
and livestock development.'^'^ The most important responsibility of the upzila parishad  
however was undoubtedly planning, promotion and execution of development 
programmes within the upzila. The councils were assigned with responsibility of 
promoting local economy, fostering agricultural and industrial growth, and creating 
employment opportunities. The tasks given to upzila parishad were massive and 
significant. It had to prepare an Upzila Development Plan both for five and one year 
periods and had to maintain a plan book, which would continuously be updated in each 
financial year. The strains on the capacity of the council were obvious.
While the upzila parishad carried major responsibilities in development administration at 
the sub-national level, the central government maintained strong authority over local 
council. According to the 1982 Local Government Ordinance 1982, the national 
government had the following controls: (a) development plans of the upzila parishad 
require the sanction of national government in respect of functioning, execution, 
implementation and supervision, (b) the national government can quash the proceedings, 
suspend the execution of any resolution if anything done inconsistent with the law and 
policy of the national government and it can enquire into any issue it considers
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essential.'^^ In other words, subject to any actions that the government deems ‘inconsistent 
or in contradiction to national policy,’ it could overturn the resolution passed or order 
made by the p a r i s h a d . It was also announced that the government ‘shall exercise 
general supervision and control over parishads in order to ensure that their activities 
conform to the purposes of this (1982) O rd in an ce .T h ere fo re , whereas theoretically 
upzila had large number of powers, in reality it had been severely restricted by these 
regulations.
Another major setback was the bureaucratic-polity interface at the upzila level hampering 
the smooth functioning of the upzila. Firstly, conflicts arose between the highest-ranking 
government official- Upzila Nirbahi Officer and directly elected upzila chairman even 
though the 1982 Ordinance clearly state that the former is under the latter’s control. As 
well, it was the employees of line ministries included: health and family planning, 
education, agriculture, engineering, cooperatives, livestock, fishery, social welfare, rural 
development, mass communication, revenue and police, who called the shots in the 
decision-making process. There was no scope for representative district administration 
based on participation of the people. Moreover, line ministry personnel working at that 
level were more accountable to their respective ministries than to the upzila parishad. 
The coordination between different departments of the upzila was also poor.
Financial Issues
While all levels of local government have been empowered to raise revenue, the major 
source of revenue for the bodies however is from the central government grant. The
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development funds of the upzilas came mostly from block allocation o f the central 
government under its Annual Development Programme (ADP). While substantial support 
was provided by the government to upzila development initially, gradually the assistance 
declined, particularly due to constraints of economic liberalization policies pursued by 
the regime/^. Consequently, the developmental activities centred on upzila gradually 
started to decline as well.
Table 4.3: Support to rural development sector and upzila parishad 1987-91:"*^
Year Expenditure in rural Development assistance to upzila




1989-90 n i l 3.9
1990-91 - 1.0
The upzilas by and large failed to mobilize resources locally. Hasan identified five major 
problems of resource mobilization in upzila level namely- a meager resource base, a tax 
ceiling, the national government’s control over sources of revenue, the planning and 
budgeting guidelines and administrative rules and regulations.^^ As mentioned earlier, 
upzila parishads were highly dependent on the block grant allocations made by the 
central government. The authority and scope for generating own revenue was limited 
with land development tax, leasing of markets, jalmahals (publicly owned water bodies) 
and ferry ghats insufficiently appropriated. While the list of rents, taxes and fees as 
possible sources seems adequate, the money collected was negligible. In his study of 
locally generated resources, Hasan found that the most that any upzila had put into
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budget from its own resources was 17 percen t/' Central government grants were, by far, 
the main sources of revenue.
While the central government grant were ideally guided by a principle of balanced 
development of all sectors, in reality there was bias in favour of infrastructure work 
against education, healthcare and social welfare.^^ As a result, more importance was 
given to building roads, culverts, etc. than to productive sectors like agriculture and 
industry and socioeconomic development.
Table 4.4: Guidelines for allocating Upzila Development Assistance Grants^^
Sector Minimum share (%) Maximum share (%)
Agriculture, irrigation, and industry 30 40
Physical infrastmcture 25 35
Socioeconomic infrastructure 17.5 27.5
Sports and culture 5 10
Miscellaneous 2.5 7.5
As the sources of income at upzila system yielded only a small amount, insignificant in 
terms of total needs of development plans, in essence this meant that upzilas could not 
formulate any plans whatsoever. On the other hand, project planning at the local level 
was subject to strict central control. Moreover, government instruction stated that upzila?, 
should ‘undertake only those projects which can be planned and implemented with 
resources available to them.’'’"' With insufficient resources generated locally, elected 
chairman and representatives of upzila parishad have very little say in the planning and 
allocation and preparation of budget at that level. The national government’s control over
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resource allocation has been extensive by most standards. The spending of the grant was 
to be decided locally but within the allocation and therefore does not indicate total 
freedom in allocation of funds.
Political Implications
The decision to democratize the upzila parishad faced stiff resistance from the 
mainstream opposition. Holding local government, particularly the upzila elections, 
proved to be the most problematic aspect in the decentralization proeess. While union 
parishad elections were held in December 1983, upzila elections were strongly resisted 
by opposition opposed to the military regime. Due to the resulting unrest, upzila elections 
were postponed from March 1984 until May 1985. In its efforts to force the government 
to comply with the demands of cancellation of polls, opposition parties started agitating 
through mass demonstrations, strikes, and asked their candidates to withdraw their 
nominations.
The opposition parties’ objection to the upzila election was based on constitutional 
grounds that only a sovereign parliament could take a decision on such fundamental 
policy issue. Ahmed, however, holds that such arguments were not rational, as the 
Bangladesh constitution did not provide for a sovereign parliament at that time.^^ The 
announcement of polls created a dilemma for the opposition; on one hand, it provided a 
great opportunity for renew contact with rural electorate while on the other hand, it was 
apprehensive of the regime’s capacity to enlarge its rural support base, particularly given 
the ‘adaptability’ of rural areas in ehanging allegiance to political parties on basis of
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changes at the centre/^ The government on its part, aware of its weaknesses in terms of 
legitimacy in the eyes of public, did not want to use the coercive state machinery for fear 
of mass uprising. The military government thus approached local government reform 
incrementally or was forced to do so. As such, while the upzila scheme was swiftly put 
into place, other aspects of the reform took much longer to be conceived and 
implemented amid political opposition, bureaucratic restraints, and other practical 
problems in implementation.^^
Table 4.5: Positions of political parties/independents in 1985 upzila elections:^^





Jatiya Samajbadi Dal 18
Others 33
Two union parishad elections were held in 1983-84 and 1988 during the tenure of 
Ershad. Upzila elections were held twice in 1985 and 1990. In 1985 upzila parishad  
elections, theoretically without party involvement, Jatiya Party won 18-19 percent, 
Awami League 30 percent, and BNP 9 percent. However soon after the elections, 55 
percent of the new chairmen became Jatiya Party members giving Ershad the support of 
majority of the sub-districts in the country.^^ The election was also marked by violence 
and vote rigging. Ershad government was more restricted in 1990 upzila parishad 
elections because the emergence of popular protest has thrown it on the defensive. 
Moreover, the election was considerably less violent and there were fewer malpractices.
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The outcome of the change in context was apparent: an overwhelming number of 
incumbent upzila chairmen, well in excess of 90 percent, lost their positions.
Although these elections were supposed to be held on a non-partisan basis, there were no 
secrets as to the political affiliation of the candidate. Upzila level elections provided a site 
for action for all key actors in the political scene as ruling party wanted to enhance its 
grip on power while opposition parties saw it as an opportunity to challenge the 
incumbent government. Participation of marginalized groups in the political process was 
minimal. Only very few were women. In 1985 upzila parishad elections in 495 sub­
districts, only 8 stood as candidates and all of them lost and a study in 1987 indicated are 
only six elected women members in served on the upzila parishads in the capacity as 
union chairwoman out of the nationwide total of 4401 union parishad, most of whom 
were ‘filling in’ for their husbands or relatives. In addition, electoral violence has played 
a major part in excluding the rural society in the political practice both in terms of 
exercising their voting rights a well as standing as candidates. Rahman, in a study of five 
local level elections between 1973-1990 state there violence has increased over period 
with 1980s witnessing an expansion of violence as compared to 1970s.^*
In 1987, an attempt was made by regime to include military in the membership of the 
formerly civilian district councils. The Local Government {Zila Parishad) Amendment 
Bill, 1987 introduced in the parliament sought to revise the existing structure of the 
council by adding a non-voting member of the armed forces along with elected and 
nominated members and public officials. The move was met by general disapproval by
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the public and faced stiff resistance in the parliament as well as countrywide protests 
demanding the removal of the president. The Bill was eventually passed without the 
provision that caused the uproar. Thus, the beginning of a process perceived to gradually 
culminate in the representation of the military in all crucial institutions in Bangladesh, 
was foiled. An innovation called Palli Parishad (Rural Council) similar to previous 
regime’s gram sarker was also initiated but could not be launched due to unfavourable 
political situation that threatened the government. In 1988 the government introduced zila 
parishad?, with nominated chairmen but these never got off the ground.
While the creation of upzila provided opportunity for genuine participation at the local 
level, it was becoming increasingly apparent that the affairs of upzila parishad  were 
subject to strong government intervention. This was primarily done through national 
government control over the regulatory and financial aspects, thereby dictating the 
formulation and implementation of developmental administration and programmes. For 
example, in 1985 when supporters of opposition parties or independent candidates won 
56 percent of upzila positions, the government came up with a ‘control mechanism’ 
wherein allocation of funds were to be made on the basis of performance in terms of 
adherence to government guidelines for development programmes. On the other hand, 
there was a conscious effort by the regime to keep local politicians content; the tenure of 
parishad members, initially three years, was increased to five years. While corrupt 
procedures have always been part of the election process, it crossed all limits under 
Ershad government.
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The upzila system was driven by policies to gain both short and long-term political goals. 
Bypassing the powerful administration at the district level, Ershad wanted to establish a 
direct link with rural power-holders. On paper, the reform initiated by Ershad comprised 
of déconcentration of administration as well as devolution of power to the upzila level. In 
reality, Westergaard and Alam contend, the upzila parishad was far from devolution in 
that central government retained the regulatory functions including police, magistracy, 
revenue collection and land administration.^^ Although the government more or less 
accepted the major recommendations of CARR, their implementations were carried out in 
a haphazard manner^^ and the entire process of implementing decentralization during 
1982-90 has been marked by paradoxes and contradictions.^"^ Some fundamental issues in 
devolution of power and authority such as reforming the district-level administration 
were kept outside the purview of NICARR. The government ‘willfully disregarded the 
spirit of the recommendations and implemented them in a piecemeal and disjointed 
m a n n e r . T h e r e  was hardly any real opportunity for disadvantaged groups to gain access 
to the decision-making process of the councils contrary to the rhetoric.
4.6 Local Government Reforms under ‘Democratic’ Regimes 
4.6.1 Bangladesh Nationalist Party (1991-96)
The installation of democratic governance stimulated renewed interest in bringing about 
local government reform. Expectations were naturally high for meaningful changes in 
local development and administrative fronts and the new BNP government policies 
sought to institutionalize a ‘democratic’ local government system. From the very 
beginning, BNP was opposed to upzila system. Khaleda Zia, the party leader and later the
146
Prime Minister of the country, declared a crusade against upzila parishad during the anti- 
Ershad movement of 1990. BNP also drew large support from the civil bureaucracy, 
unhappy at losing power to local politicians.^® This antipathy from BNP can be attributed 
to the fact that the party only had a marginal presence in the upzila level. In 1985, BNP 
hardly participated in the upzila election and in 1990 the party got seats in only 14 upzilas 
out of a total of 460.
Khaleda Zia’s government promulgated the Local Government the Upzila Parishad and 
Upzila Administration Reorganization (Repeal) Ordinance in November 1991 to abolish 
upzila parishad a year after Ershad was removed from power. In June 1992, a cabinet 
division resolution was passed to replace upzila parishad by thana administration. 
According to Zafarullah, the move was a ‘political reprisal rather than any rational 
administrative or economic consideration.’®̂ Irrespective of the content of the upzila 
scheme, the BNP government felt that it was not acceptable within a ‘democratic’ 
framework. The official explanation however highlighted the failure of the system in 
attaining the intended objectives particularly in resource mobilization and people’s 
participation in local affairs, dependence on central government funds, resource wastage 
in unproductive projects, corruption, etc.
Eollowing the ‘usual’ norm, Khaleda Zia set up a high-powered Local Government 
Structure Review Commission (LGSRC). Many aspects of local governance which the 
commission was asked to look into issues such as people’s participation, electoral and 
gender representation, local level planning had already been examined by the committee
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which designed the upzila system. The political maneuvering of repeating the exercise 
served no practical purpose as the government overlooked many of the 
recommendations.^* In the report submitted in July 1992, the Commission nonetheless 
recommended ‘major changes’ in the structure, composition, functions and finances of 
local government bodies in order to facilitate local level development and also to ensure 
people’s participation.®^ Commission further reiterated that there has to be a balance 
between autonomy and control as regards the relationship between central and local 
governments.^®
Based on the recommendation of LGSRC, the parliament passed the Local Government 
(Union Parishads Amendment) Bill in July 1993 that was introduced in February 1993. 
This provided for a two-tier local government with the union level as the focal point of 
local governance. According to Commission’s recommendations, union parishads were 
to be responsible for various judicial functions, primarily settling minor disputes, as well 
development functions including minor construction, and promotion of education, 
agriculture and cottage industries. On the other hand, zila parishads will be responsible 
for a number of development activities including public works, large construction, etc. 
Apart from that, the Commission suggested establishment of village committees with the 
mandate to review Annual Union Parishad budget and development projects. In February 
1993, the government also introduced Local Government {Zila Parishad) (Amendment) 
Bill following the Commission’s recommendations of constituting the district council 
through indirect voting.
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A new two-tiered structure was thus created with Thana Development and Coordinating 
Committee (TDCC) at the thana level serving as a link between union parishad  at the 
union level and zila parishad at district level. TDCC was not a level of local government 
but rather its function was to coordinate development activities at the thana level. In the 
new system, the role of TDCC was thus considered crucial. The stated purpose of TDCC 
is to maintain communication between union parishads and thana administration as well 
as between union parishads and zila parishads. In addition to all union parishad 
chairmen, sixteen thana level officials will also be members of TDCC. These include 
Thana Executive Officer (member secretary), various sector officers like education, 
health, agriculture, etc., and police. A new feature of this TDCC system was the 
provision of local Member of Parliament to play an advisory role.
Subsequently, under the Local Government Amendment Act 1993, union parishad 
became the focal point of local level development and administration. Union parishad 
would elect their chairman and members directly while the post of chairman TDCC 
would rotate among the elected chairmen of union parishad. TDCC was essentially a 
deconcentrated unit at the thana level with the task of assessing the developmental needs 
of the thana and preparing projects for the unions to be approved by district level 
committees. The TDCC consisted of chairman of union parishads, three nominated 
women members, and heads of thana based government officials. The Thana Executive 
Officer (TNG) was made member secretary of the TDCC and meetings were presided 
over alternately by UP chairman every month.
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The main responsibility of TDCC was to decide the allocation of block grant for union 
and thana development. The central government allocation among the thanas was made 
on the basis of following weights: population 40 percent, land area 30 percent and degree 
of backwardness 30 percent. A number of criteria would influence the allocation of funds 
to upzila. However, how backwardness would be measured or what would be the 
indicators of performance was not specified. The strict allocation meant that thana 
administration were unable to transfer funds from one sector to another even if local 
situation required so. For example, a particular upzila already well developed 
infrastructure may require more investment in social sector but would be restricted to 
only a certain amount. The lack of discretionary authority of local government was 
antithetical to the central element of decentralization and autonomy. It was the 
government officials who dominated the planning process and participation by elected 
officials were limited due to lack of knowledge.
Table 4.6: Guideline for annual block grant for thanas'J'^
Sector Minimum allocation % Maximum allocation %
Agriculture and irrigation 15 30
Transport an communication 25 60
Physical infrastructure 10 15
Education and development 10 25
Evaluation of BNP Reforms
The local government reforms initiated by BNP came under considerable criticism due to 
its ineffectiveness in enhancing participation of people. Firstly, despite considerable 
promise, the upzila system was abandoned mainly for political considerations as BNP
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made a u-turn towards centralization of government. Union parishad continued to 
function but without an elected council at higher up at the sub-district level, to integrate 
them into the supra-local political system, union parishads were too small and isolated to 
enable rural population to influence government institutions in a meaningful way.’  ̂ The 
only effective tier of local government was union parishad as the envisaged zila parishad 
never came about. The relationship between the two tiers of local government was also 
not clearly defined.
While union parishad elections were held in 1992 and 1997, zila level elections were not 
held contrary to pledges from the ruling party. The outcome was that the elected union 
parishad completely lost its effectiveness as a powerful decentralized body. A highly 
bureaucratized thana administrative set-up was put in place to manage local development 
and administration in rural Bangladesh. Essentially, centrally appointed bureaucrats 
rather than people’s representatives ran the whole local government system. The 
complicated process of planning and implementation of development objectives was 
crucially affected by political commitment as well as administrative capacity.
Due to various reasons, the TDCC could not be effective. Absence of a regular chairman 
resulted in lack of direction. TDCC had no control over the officials of different 
ministries which, according to Zarina Khan, made the TDCC fairly ineffective.^^ In sum, 
the process of decentralization was reverted into a process of centralization and local 
government was virtually tuned into a subordinate agency of central government.’"̂ Thus 
the process of decentralization was ‘reversed into a process of centralization and the
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concept of self-government was virtually turned into that of a subordinate agency of 
national g o v e rn me n t / Ab se nc e  of a regular chairman caused lack of leadership and 
commitment. Coordination between inter-union matters as well as between official 
departments was poor. As regards participation of the people, no meaningful process of 
interaction with people was possible in this local government system.
On the other hand, the report of the review commission was never made public. 
Moreover, the report was implemented arbitrarily through executive action rather than 
through parliamentary debate.^® No action was taken to implement the some of most 
important recommendations of the commission with particular focus on union parishad. 
These included
• union parishad with the authority to supervise and review activities of
government officials at union level.
• formation of a statutory body called Local Government Commission.
• union parishad to get matching grant if they can mobilize internal resource for
development project.
• nine specific heads earmarked for union parishad taxation.
• union parishad should be allowed to credit from Banks for its projects.
• identification of twelve development functions as well as twelve functions related 
to maintenance of security and order.
The government however implemented the provision for 10 percent contribution to union 
parishad by NGOs as fees of project cost. Nevertheless, important recommendations the
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revival of village councils, which was established by the previous BNP government, were 
overlooked by the regime. The abolition of upzila parishad was appreciated by the 
bureaucracy who used the changing political scenario to regain their lost power. With 
neither thana nor district level having an elected body, Khaleda Zia’s reorganization was 
in essence a ‘reversal to central authority and concentration of powers in the hands of 
bureaucracy and politicians.’’^
6.2 Awami League (1996-2001)
After more than two years of political turmoil, unrest and violence, Awami League came 
to power through parliamentary elections in 1996. Keeping its pre-election promise to set 
up a strong and effective local government system, the new government appointed a new 
Local government Commission in September 1996. The Awami League also formed a 
high profile Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) in October 1997. The 
major objective assigned to the PARC was to review administrative structure for 
improving the quality and standard of service, achieve transparency and efficiency and 
suggest ‘comprehensive reform measure for public institutions in line with the spirit of 
devolution.’’  ̂ In doing so, Awami League continued the practice of forming high- 
powered bodies in an effort to change local government structure. Headed by a member 
of parliament, the eight-member Commission was given the responsibility to determine 
the framework of local government an in line with the government’s declared objectives 
of accelerating decentralization and participation.
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The Local Government Commission submitted its report in May 1997. The main thrusts 
of the Commissions recommendations were^
(i) directly elected council chairman at all levels
(ii) directly elected women at all levels
(iii) strengthening of the councils in terms of authority, resource base, functional 
boundaries, local-level planning, local budgeting and implementation
(iv) provision of bureaucratic accountability to local representatives at relevant 
levels
(v) Constitution of a permanent statutory Local Government Commission and a 
Finance Committee.
The Commission also underscored the need for delegating extensive powers to local
bodies for staff management of financial resource mobilization. The government
accepted most of the recommendations of the Commission, but ‘decided to adopt an 
incremental approach in its implementation.’*' The Commission came up with a 
recommendation in 1998 to revert back to the four-tiered system and reintroduce local 
governance at the thana/upzila level. The proposed four-tier system of local government 
comprised of gram parishad, union parishad, upzila/thana parishad and zila parishad. 
The Awami League government, in compliance with state policy and endorsing 
recommendations of Commission, established a four-tier local government structure at 
village, union, thana and zila level. The two-tiered structure of the BNP government was 
abolished and was dubbed as a failure to create effective local governance.
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Legislation in the form of Local Government {Gram Parishad) Act was passed in 1997 to 
form gram parishad at the ward level as the lowest tier of local government unit for 
planning and coordination. Consisting of elected ward members of union parishad  as 
chairmen, and six general and three female members, the gram parishad was assigned as 
many as fourteen functions ranging from socioeconomic surveys to adjudication of petty 
disputes to help union parishad to discharge its functions. However, gram parishad had 
no powers to charge taxes and had to depend on grant from government and union 
parishad.
In 1997, Local Government (Union Parishad) Act 1997 was passed. It included the 
amendment of the Union Parishad Ordinance of 1983 by which was provision were 
made for direct elections for women, the first time in the country’s history. Direct 
participation by women was thus ensued by three reserved seats in the union parishad 
membership. Elections were in December 1997 in 4,500 union parishads across the 
country. The polls provided for nearly 13,000 elected women union members. A Local 
Government Upzila Parishad Act was passed by Parliament in 1998 providing for the 
creation of elected councils at the thana/upzila level. However, upzila parishad elections 
were postponed several times amid the uncertain political situation prevailing in the 
country. Zila parishad, the fourth tier recommended by the Commission, has not yet got 
off the ground as legislation regarding this level of local government has not yet been 
proposed.
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Some of the more progressive recommendations of the Commission 1997 and that of 
Finance Committee 1999 did not find a place in subsequent Local Government Act 
providing for the four-tier system. Some of the Commission recommendations not 
implemented by the included:*^
• Union parishad chairman will write the performance report of union level 
government staff.
• Independent Local Government Commission proposed to look after local 
government finance and control.
• 22 specific functions earmarked for union parishad clustered into 10 broad 
functional areas.
• Representatives of cooperatives, freedom fighters,*^ and disadvantaged groups 
(fishermen, landless, destitute, women, weaver, etc.) will be non-voting members 
of union parishad.
•  Enhanced range for leasing ferry ghats, jalmahals (waterbodies), markets; 
enhanced share of land tax upto 5 percent.
• Union parishad five-year plan will be the basis of upzila five-year plan.
The government did form a permanent statutory Local Government Commission and a 
Finance Committee following the Commission’s recommendation. However, again the 
conventional procedure of scrutinizing of the Commission report by top-ranking civil 
servants was maintained. As well, the government has been indecisive in bringing about 
democratic changes in all tiers of local government as recommended by the Commission. 
As mentioned earlier, polls for gram and upzila parishads however were not held. A
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change in government at the national level in 1996 ‘clearly presaged another reform
reversal.
4.7 Conclusion
It is evident that in the first decade since liberation, local government remained a 
neglected sector under different regimes. Contrary to expectations, no major changes 
occurred during the country’s first government of Awami League. While Zia’s village 
level micro-government was encouraging, the reforms were mainly targeted towards 
reversing the Awami League dominance in the rural areas in his favour. Therefore even 
after the independence of Bangladesh in 1971, the pattern of highly bureaucratized and 
top-down decentralization system remained more or less unchanged. Crude political 
expediency more than anything else shaped the reform policies that worked against the 
devolution of power to local areas.
Ershad’s upzila structure saw a system never seen before in the country- subordination of 
all the technical development staff to generalist rural development cadre and the control 
of the whole administrative apparatus by a popularly elected thana/upzila level 
chairm an.H ow ever, the decentralization policy tightened the military leader’s grip over 
the countryside. The election of upzila chairman, although professed by the regime to be 
non-partisan, in reality was an exercise to install his loyal party members in the 
administration and the boycott of the election by opposition parties proved to be to his 
advantage. Nonetheless the upzila parishad with its devolutionary administrative and
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political features represented the most participatory local government structure in the 
country.
A review of BNP’s (1991-96) local government system reveals that not many positive 
changes have occurred after the transition to democracy. In particular, the impediments to 
political as well as economic autonomy and participation of the upzila system were not 
removed. The contours of the new TDCC system of local government ‘retain the 
emphasis on administration and central control with little autonomy to the lower tiers of 
local g o v e rn m en t.B ey o n d  the cosmetic changes, the BNP government hardly made an 
attempt to bring about any meaningful reform in decentralization policies. The fact the 
Khaleda Zia’s government did not have the provision for any elections in the district or 
sub-district level is indirect evidence in that regard. Similarly the Awami League reform 
did not bring any concrete measures in effective local governance. The inclusion of 
women as directly elected members of union parishad was undoubtedly a positive step. 
However, other important reform proposals by and large were ignored by the 
government.
Decentralization in Bangladesh has not taken the form of devolution of power and at best, 
it has been a mixture of devolution and déconcentration. Since independence, union 
parishad has been the only fully democratic body in the local government structure. 
However, it was subject to subordination and intervention from higher levels- thana and 
upzila parishads, neither of whom were completely elective bodies. Apart from union 
parishad, only the upzila parishad chairman was directly elected during Ershad’s rule.
158
Although the local government institutions enjoy some degree of operational autonomy, 
these are not independent of the central government or of the administrative hierarchy in 
the country. As a result, control and supervision by the central government range in a 
host of legal, operational and financial matters.
It is clear by the analyses of various efforts of decentralization that central government 
entmsted the local government with a large number of functions with without sufficient 
autonomy to plan and implement development projects. Essentially, local governments 
had been reduced to playing the role of executing agency of the development plans 
formulated at the centre. Bureaucracy has largely been apathetic to local government 
reforms, as devolution of power would undermine its hold on administrative affairs. 
While local bodies were given autonomy to functions such as collecting tax, issuing 
licenses, maintaining law and order, in most cases, they were not assigned with the 
requisites powers of execution remained with the field administration.**
Local government resources have been based on central government grants, and this has 
had a two-fold negative outcome on the success of decentralization. Firstly, resource 
mobilization at the local level was not given due importance; secondly the development 
expenditure often did not reflect the local needs due to the strict criteria for expenditures 
and disbursements which formed part of the central government grants. Moreover, an 
ironic result of this resource allocation structure for local governance was that as the 
decentralized bodies did not depend on the revenues generated locally, they were in fact 
less accountable to the local communities than under the old centralized structures.
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Revenue generation has been negligible, and local tax and non-tax revenue has never 
been enough to finance even the administrative expenditures of local government, let 
alone providing sufficient resources for local development. Consequently, a crucial 
aspect of self-governance- the allocation or creation of adequate financial resources to 
support local institutions of governance and their initiatives- has not been initiated even 
after three decades of experimentation with decentralization.^^
The increasing role of NGOs in the political economy of the country—a result of 
structural adjustment programs (SAPs) which saw the fiscal retreat of the central 
government from social welfare and development expenditures- resulted in the state 
sharing the responsibility of facilitating economic development in rural areas. Generally 
speaking, the IFI donor agenda of privatizing economic activities, along with the fiscal 
constraints of resulting from SAP liberalization policies, has significantly eroded the 
ability or the desire of the central government to hand down the necessary resources to 
the now-decentralized local institutions of governance. Since the 1980s, the amount of 
financial support to both thana/upzila and union levels has declined steadily. On the other 
hand, the inability of these bodies to generate income has reinforced the dependence of 
local governments on central government agendas and spending criteria. Therefore, with 
few resources available, barring isolated government-approved disbursements to selected 
sectors like infrastructure, a productive transformation of the rural economy through 
decentralization has still not come about in Bangladesh.
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The thesis set out to determine the dynamics of decentralization programmes pursued in 
Bangladesh. More specifically, the focus was on the period between 1982-2001. In the 
first part this period, Bangladesh was ruled by the military turned civilian regime of 
General Ershad while the 1990s saw parliamentary democracy in place in the country. In 
Chapter Two, the literature encompassing a broad spectrum of issues related to 
decentralization was critically reviewed. In the following chapter, the study made an 
attempt to highlight the salient political and economic changes with special reference to 
rural areas. The next chapter analyzed various decentralization reforms undertaken by 
different regimes to find out whether power and resources were transferred to the local 
level and extent of participation of people in the local government system. The objective 
of this final chapter is to integrate the findings of all of the previous chapters in order to 
outline the underlying processes of decentralization in terms of the political economy of 
Bangladesh.
Firstly, it can be inferred that decentralization is by no means a developmental panacea. 
As Smith suggests, if centralization leads to territorial justice or redistribution of wealth it 
could well he considered a preferable strategy.* Nevertheless, it is accepted that 
relocation of political power and resources is a definite way of achieving equitable and 
participatory development. On the other hand, given the intractability of issues associated 
with decentralization, it is convenient to forward normative interpretations of the concept. 
Indeed, decentralization, as part of the donor-led agenda of good governance has been the
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single most driving force behind the pursuit of decentralization in developing countries. 
In such analysis, the centrality of state power as well as the complex socioeconomic and 
political landscape within which the state operates is generally ignored.
The causes of underdevelopment in Bangladesh have been explained in terms of both 
external dependence and internal inequality. As well, it has been argued that the problems 
of governance in the country are deeply rooted in the country’s historical experience. As 
Kochanek argues, behind the façade of developmental state in Bangladesh, there exists a 
well-established patrimonial system based on a complex web of patron-client 
relationships, antiquated rules and procedures, and a complex bureaucratic structure that 
makes reform difficult.^ This study identifies the role of the state, particularly the form it 
takes given the political economy as well as social structure, as the most decisive factor 
in shaping the country’s development course.
The shift toward increasingly liberalized, export-led economy and the concomitant 
changes in governance in Bangladesh has not been independent of the economic interests 
and new relations of inequality. Pro-market reforms undertaken since the 1980s were 
implemented neither to stabilize the economy nor to meet greater development 
challenges, but rather to consolidate the power of ruling elites.^ International donors have 
consistently aided the relationships among all the ‘actors’ by ‘providing much of the 
lubricant for these linkages.’"̂ As well, the emergence of NGOs as the principal agents of 
development since the 1990s has undermined the legitimacy of the state. While NGO 
mobilization did facilitate local participation and empowerment of poor in some areas,^
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the overall impact has been marginal. All of these factors ‘left a constituency of losers in 
the restructured economy’ as the state patronage is not easily accessible in rural areas.^ In 
this context, decentralization of administration as part of aid conditionalities led to 
infrastructure development and the task of service delivery came to be distributed 
between government, NGOs, and the private sector.^
With regard to the rural setting, successive regimes in Bangladesh derived support from 
the rich peasant class for their survival, to contain unrest and muster election votes. Since 
the state lacked effective control of the countryside, there was a need for establishing a 
link between state and rich peasants to address the constraints of socioeconomic structure 
and manage class conflicts through exploitation and patron-client relations. Winning over 
leaders of rural society through the extension of state patronage and development funds 
was ‘a safe way of establishing control over the political system.’* The local leaders, 
largely drawn from the richer class, in turn maintained liaison with senior bureaucrats and 
political agents of the regimes in order to obtain economic benefits. Rather than wresting 
control from the political interests and rural elites that dominated the countryside, efforts 
in mral development actually reinforced that relationship.
There has been an increasing realization of the complexity of local issues and the 
inability of state to deal with these problems. Distribution and access to resources in rural 
Bangladesh has generally been characterized by systemic bias. Participation of people in 
development activities traditionally has been a difficult process and representation of 
marginalized groups does not ensure any concrete step towards voicing the needs of
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people. Rather as discussed in the Chapter Three, it is the complex socioeconomic 
structure that determines who benefits from rural development efforts and local 
government service delivery and who is left out of the process. Therefore, it can be 
argued that in case of Bangladesh, the vehicles to mediate incongruities between national 
development objectives and local ones have still not been established.^
For Bangladesh, a decentralization process that represents the neglected section of rural 
population and a development strategy that is truly participatory in nature are not the only 
but some of the necessary conditions for progress. With one of the highest population 
densities in the world and pervasive rural poverty, the need for an effective decentralized 
local government system is unquestionable. Although the issue of decentralization has 
frequently featured in development dialogues in Bangladesh, it has generally failed to go 
beyond normative discourse. Successive regimes have highlighted local government as 
the vehicle for people’s participation in the development process. However, no actors in 
the scene, politicians, bureaucrats or policy makers seem to be concerned or enthusiastic 
about putting decentralization in the mainstream national debate in a meaningful and 
vigorous way.*°
The study argues that, in Bangladesh, local government was introduced for administrative 
convenience rather than popular demand in the countryside and approaches to 
decentralization in Bangladesh, contrary to rhetoric have tended to be highly paternalistic 
and elitist. In addition, external pressures in the form of donors to enhance rural service 
delivery and rural development led to local institution building by the state. This is not to
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imply that reform was not overdue in local government in Bangladesh. Rather the point is 
that as the drive for local government reforms came from ‘above,’ the central control 
over local government functions has been even more extensive. The so-called nation- 
building departments located in different tiers which generally dominate the functions of 
local government, work as mere extensions or ‘local branches’"  of the central 
government.
The analysis in Chapter Four clearly indicate that decentralization efforts for long have 
been plagued by various problems. Some common trends can be identified in all 
decentralization programmes in Bangladesh:
Inadequate power and resources devolved to local institutions from the central 
government.
Grossly inadequate mobilization of resources at the local level and the inability 
to plan and undertake development activities by local units.
Conflicts and poor structures accountably between elected officials and field 
administration.
Limited or lack of participation of the rural poor and other disadvantaged 
groups in decision-making process in local bodies as well as in the development 
activities.
Providing adequate support to the local government has always been a problem in the 
country beset by scarcity of resources for development. Although the central government 
is under statutory obligation to provide grants, it exercises considerable degree of control
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over local institutions by varying the amount or by making their release subject to 
fulfillment of ‘conditionalities.’ On the other hand, regulation of local income generation 
remains stringent with a very narrow revenue and resource base. Moreover, local 
government powers and responsibilities are stipulated in general terms. For example, 
while union parishads have the responsibility to maintain law and order, the instruments 
to execute that task is retained in distract or sub-district level. The link between 
decentralization and poverty reduction and improvement of local economies are 
conspicuously absent; there has not been synchronization between rural development and 
local government system.'^ Some major development activities are being undertaken by 
central government agencies with support from donors that have very little or no input 
from local government bodies.'^
The history of decentralization in Bangladesh shows that each change in government was 
accompanied by a move to replacing the previous system and initiating a new one. 
Emphasis has shifted from one level of local government to another without any 
justification, a process critics dub ‘tier-experimentation. ’ Similarly, coups, assassinations, 
and political antagonisms have cut short many decentralization programmes. None of the 
local government systems was allowed to function long enough to be developed and 
consolidated. Policies were discarded due to ‘guilt through association’ with the previous 
regime. Lack of continuity and consistency in decentralization programmes had a 
negative impact in rural service delivery and participation. Over the years, among all the 
tiers of local government in the country, only the union parishad have had some sort of 
continuity. Another common tendency among all regimes in power, military or otherwise.
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has been the setting up of high-powered commissions and committees to look into the 
problems of local governments system and suggest reforms, an exercise redundant in the 
majority of cases. For the most part, local government in Bangladesh operated without 
any constitutional provisions. Articles 59 and 60 of the Constitution, which make elected 
local government in the country mandatory, remained suspended from along with the 
Constitution between 1975-1991.
Going back to the decentralization policies by different regimes, the first Awami League 
government was more concerned with consolidating its control over state machinery. 
Initially the party tried to limit the power of bureaucracy but later in its overriding 
concern to extend party control, the government came up with a highly centralized local 
government structure. The Zia regime adopted decentralization as a major economic 
policy in order to use public resources and patronage to build up a capitalist class in 
coexistence with a large public sector. While the micro government of gram sarker 
scheme initiated during BNP rule can be considered, to a certain extent, as a 
breakthrough in grassroots participatory development, the programme did not have time 
to evolve and was plagued by institutional problems.
Ershad’s martial law government wasted little time to undertake massive administrative 
reforms highlighting the failure of centralized political and administrative structures. The 
upzila system initiated by military government of Ershad were without a doubt the most 
far reaching of all local government reforms since independence of Bangladesh. It 
marked the first time that people’s representatives were intended to be the principal
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decision-makers at the local level in the country. The Committee of Administrative 
Reform/Reorganization (CARR) provided a blueprint for both political and 
administrative decentralization; the former emphasizing the shift from centre to the 
periphery and the latter underscoring hierarchical transfer to lower tiers of government. 
Military takeovers in developing countries are usually followed by sweeping changes 
politico-economic spheres and here Ershad’s reforms measures were no different.
In analyzing the formulation of local government reform of Ershad, it is important to 
recognize that the policy was introduced at a time when ‘a move toward democratic 
practices involving a high degree of popular participation was very unlikely.’ At the 
time of introducing the policy, Ershad was Chief Martial Law Administrator and supreme 
leader of the country. The question arises as to what factors led the regime to formulate a 
policy of devolution? Initially, for the military regime, the purpose of erecting structures 
of participation originated out of the need to stabilize and continuity amid uncertain 
situation after assuming power. Subsequently the lack of popular support and mandate 
necessitated the construction of ‘democratic’ local administration to link up with the 
citizenry. Decentralization of administration provided the regime with a suitable tool to 
demonstrate its good intentions in creating participatory mechanisms and bring about 
development for the majority. The study concludes that the local government reforms 
were an effort on the part of Ershad to legitimize the military rule in the eyes of civil 
society and donors, and provide credibility to his leadership.
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This search for legitimacy led to ‘discretionary’ policies in decentralization where key 
functions of local government were subject to strict central control. As such, even though 
upzila had sufficient power and authority on paper, it depended on centre for financial 
and functional support. In this situation, effective local governance on the basis of 
autonomy did not materialize in the country. The inauguration of upzilas without 
simultaneously holding elections for the chairmen, the weak financial base of the upzilas, 
the failure to introduce democratic governance at the district level were indicative of the 
regime’s intentions. Moreover, the second man in the military junta chaired CARR and 
considerably influenced the deliberations of the committee thereby ensuring that the 
regime’s intentions are reflected in the recommendations.
The formation of his own political party in 1986 provided Ershad with further legitimacy. 
However, the lack of popular support of regime was obvious and necessity of extending it 
to the grassroots level was realized by the military government. In this situation, 
decentralization policy served as a cornerstone of efforts to build a support base for the 
government and undercut the overwhelmingly urban political parties.'^ Undeniably, 
seeking rural support was a pragmatic approach by the regime; out of 460 upzilas, 63 
were urban and the rest 397 were rural. The scheme was successful in ‘acquiring’ the 
rural powerbrokers controlling the rural social order; and a party-based local government 
system evolved. An indication of Ershad’s success in securing some rural support was the 
fact that even after being overthrown in late 1990, his party did fairly well winning about 
ten percent of the seats in the 1991 parliamentary elections held under the caretaker 
government."^
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Decentralization policies not only served to create a sub-national power base for regime, 
the strengthening of military rule occurred concomitantly with the weakening of the 
political opposition and demobilization of the civil society. It was hardly surprising that 
the reforms were strongly opposed by the political parties. Among other things, the upzila 
eleetions held in 1985 and 1990 were successful in isolating prominent opposition leaders 
at that lev e l.M ajo rity  of the newly elected independent and opposition upzila chairmen 
joined Ershad’s Jatiya Party and contributed to the building and consolidation of the 
party.
The attempt to stabilize and strengthen the regime therefore was the single most driving 
force behind the upzila system. As mentioned earlier, this consolidation not only entailed 
centralization and bureaucratization but also led to sponsorship of central and loeal 
elitism.** A system based on patronage ensured the permanenee of military-bureaucratic 
rule. The regime attempted to co-opt rural landed elites and its preoccupation with using 
the decentralization system to get political allies resulted in its permissive approach 
towards council chairmen and local bureaucrats. While the intention of Ershad was to 
solidify his rule in rural areas, it nevertheless created some opportunities for popular 
participation through the upzila level. Indeed, there is some indication that Ershad’s 
policy had some positive impact on the facilitating participation of people.'^ However, 
given the regime’s marginal commitment to democratic devolution, local institutions 
remained too weak and politicized to effect equitable development in rural areas.
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The transition military to democratic governance has ushered a renewed interest in local 
government reforms in several developing countries. Bangladesh was no exception in this 
regard. It has been argued that with the greater transparency and accountability associated 
with the new democratic climate is likely to be more favourable to devolutionary 
practices. Given the long political history of authoritarian rule in Bangladesh, devolution 
of power is central to the development process in the country and ‘democratization at the 
level of nation state is a sine qua non in the period of (political) transition.
On the basis of the discussions in the previous chapters the study holds that the return to 
parliamentary democracy, contrary to expectations, did not result in concrete steps 
towards a decentralization process based on devolution and democratization. Firstly, 
there were no perceptible changes in decentralization structure the democratic regimes of 
both BNP and Awami League as compared to the previous military regime. As Chapter 
Four illustrates, the two successive regimes have instead shown the propensity to 
maintain the status quo in their effort not to disturb the existing power structure. It is 
clear that interest politics and patronage embedded the governance structure is not 
beyond the democratization process. Except for some electoral issues, decentralization 
agenda has been allowed to languish by both democratic regimes. The study attributes the 
lack of efforts in bringing changes in decentralization to the failure to institutionalize 
democracy at the centre. This is not least due to the confrontation between two leading 
political parties and the personal antagonism between their leaders. As Rehman Sobhan 
laments, ‘in such a malfunctioning system decentralized government degenerates into a 
cliche where local institutions remain powerless because national politicians and
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bureaucrats remain unwilling to surrender power and patronage associated with the
exercise of centralized control.’̂ ’
Similarly it has been argued by many that democratic politics is rarely conducive to 
bringing major policy changes because of the necessity for accommodation and 
compromise. In case of Bangladesh, the transition to democracy did not materialize into 
anything concrete in terms of political stability and economic growth nor did it change 
the governance situation qualitatively. The withdrawal of military and the constitutional 
provision for care-taker non-partisan government presiding over parliamentary elections 
is a major achievement on the political front. However, this is only one of many factors 
for democracy to he successful. Both BNP and Awami League which together, albeit 
reluctantly played a major role in the democracy movement in 1990, became more and 
more apathetic to democratic practices and norms towards the end of their respective 
terms. A combination of weak institutions, patrimonial and personalized politics lack of 
political consensus has resulted in a ‘partial democracy’ in the country.^^
There was an apparent reluctance to follow through with local government reforms by the 
both BNP and Awami League. The upzila system, which was being consolidated in the 
second half of the 1980s, was discarded by BNP; the move was a political ploy rather 
than based on any politico-administrative or economic rationale. Again Awami League, 
in turn, abandoned the BNP reforms. BNP’s TDCC system lacked any real strength while 
Awami League’s reforms were equally ineffective. Although the latter’s policy did pave 
the way for inclusion of women in union parishad, a common trait in the reforms by both
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regimes’ was very limited opportunity for participation of majority of rural populace in 
local institutions. This is probably due to the fact that the ruling parties were fearful of 
political opposition dominating local bodies and becoming a formidable weapon. In other 
words, both the governments were apprehensive that opposition elements would gain 
important foothold from which to launch political offensives and challenge the incumbent 
party. As such, while there was a widening and deepening of the participatory concept 
particularly with both Zia and Ershad regimes, this aspect seems to be noticeably absent 
since 1991. The study thereby concludes that attempts at regime consolidation even in 
relatively stable political scenario led to politically defensive decentralization policies by 
both BNP and Awami League. In this context, ‘national interest becomes secondary; 
political contrariety assumes greater significance.’^̂
For both authoritarian and ‘democratic’ regimes, state policies did not appear to a means 
of improving the performance of the economy or improving the living standard for the 
majority. Rather the regimes were concerned with stability and continuity of their rules 
particularly in view of uncertain political situation that the country experienced 
throughout its history. This, in turn had led to centralization tendencies in local 
government refo rm s.L ikew ise , Zarina Khan asserts that although there were frequent 
regime changes at the national level, the state always managed to keep a strong control 
through civil bureaucracy at the local l e v e l . T h e  continuous shift in emphasis in 
different tiers of local government only masked a continued dependence of these units on 
the ‘shifting whims of the central government.’ ®̂
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On the basis of the discussions in Chapter Two and the case study of decentralization in 
Bangladesh, it can be inferred that a strong and authoritarian state is as likely to transfer 
power to local level as a democratic one. An autocratic government with a narrow power 
base tends to produce greater administrative and institutional reforms. Indeed, the most 
radical reform in decentralization as demonstrated in the study has been introduced under 
martial law.^^ However, these reforms were cosmetic as it is improbable that 
democratization was in the agenda for the military government. While elaborate 
structures were created, jurisdiction over planning and finance remained firmly in control 
of central government. It nevertheless provided the regime a political tool to consolidate 
the rule further by creating a link with rural areas. The regimes in power have exercised 
political domination through the local governments; this is not dissimilar to Mouzelis’ 
conceptualization of mode of domination through the state machinery and party and 
political apparatuses.
The predicament facing rulers in most developing countries, not least in Bangladesh, is 
that in addition to controlling the outlaying areas, they have to secure the active support 
of rural electorate at the same time. As a result, while regimes recognize the need merit of 
creating participatory structures, the actual amount of autonomy and power transferred is 
extremely limited. This has been evident in all decentralization efforts in the country. 
However, while there has been a tendency to supervise and control local government 
functions, there also has been a concomitant creation of spaces for local political 
processes. This reflects ‘an implicit bifurcation whereby accountability issues are 
emphasized for lower tier and development administration issues for the upper tiers.
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The role of state and the way the country was governed by the politicians had a profound 
impact on decentralization programmes and irrespective of regime types, parliamentary 
or authoritarian, the state has not changed its demenours and hardly had any impact on 
governance. The state still has considerable bureaucratic power as repeated unsuccessful 
attempts by politicians to downsize the over bloated public sector indicates. Military 
expenditure during the decade of civilian rule, rather than decreasing, has in fact 
increased gradually. This points to the fact that state power is underpinned by a latent 
military threat.^^ In this context, Hamza Alavi’s thesis that the bureaucratic military 
oligarchy of post-colonial state prefers to rule through politicians, as long as the latter do 
not impinge upon their own autonomy and power, has some relevance in Bangladesh 
context.^® On the other hand, the history of Bangladesh development shows that the 
struggle and conflict in the interest of the poor is ‘as much with parts of civil society as it 
is with the s t a t e . T h i s  is not only due to the fact that the weak civil society is 
counterpoised by entrenched bureaucratic state power in Bangladesh and but also 
because, rather than being distinct entity, civil society signifies an adapted manifestation 
of state power.
The transition to democracy in 1990 was indeed a major step towards erecting a stable 
political process and Bangladesh entered a new era in 1991. However, elections cannot 
be confused with achievement of substantive democracy as evident in the last decade in 
Bangladesh. Political processes in Bangladesh remain hostage to highly inequitable state 
structures. As a result, relative autonomous political processes have failed to generate 
pressures needed to force the state to undertake meaningful economic and political
178
reforms. Suspension of political processes tilted the balance in favour of non-elected 
institutions of the state. Therefore, the moves to formal democracy halted military- 
bureaucratic authoritarianism, it ‘have not fundamentally altered the historic institutional 
i m b a l a n c e s . E l e c t e d  government began to behave in the same manner as its 
predecessors even after democracy was restored. A number of repressive laws that are in 
gross violation of human rights continue unabated.
This thesis has adopted a political economy approach that, in addition to focusing on the 
inherent relationship between the economy and the polity, places great importance on the 
form the state takes in developing countries. In this context, both the ‘new political 
economy’ and more traditional Marxist class analysis have tended to ignore certain socio­
political dynamics of the state, seeing it as only a rent-seeking entity that works as an 
impediment to development. On the basis of the discussions in Chapter Two and the case 
study of decentralization in Bangladesh, we have demonstrated that state power has to be 
fully integrated into the analysis as a source of political power where the economic 
interests are reinforced by the necessity of exerting control through the state machinery. 
Here, the form of government, military-authoritarian or democratic, is of marginal 
importance, as is evident in our study of decentralization in Bangladesh. The whole issue 
of democratization has to be seen in terms of the shift towards donor-led agendas of civil 
society and good governance which are in fact depoliticized methods for implementing 
specific economic policies aimed at more or less complete privatization of the developing 
economy. This is not to understate the desirability of democracy at the national level, but 
it is to emphasize the importance of contextual economic and political factors and the
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tenuous relationship between democratization and economic development in peripheral 
countries.
In summary, then, the purpose of decentralization in the eontext of SAPs and the 
mainstream, neo-liberal institutional framework is contradietory. On one hand, the state is 
forced to privatize responsibilities and resources to non-state actors—NGOs and the 
private seetor— while at the same time trying to capacitate local governments 
economically and politically in order to foster local development initiatives. Our study 
has demonstrated that the scarcity of resources is directly related to both the lack of 
productive transformation in rural areas and the explicit agenda of the central government 
to foster and maintain a dependent political relationship with the peripheral countryside. 
Issues of financial and administrative autonomy are crucial to the success of 
decentralization and local governance, and have profound political implications for local 
government reforms as our study of Bangladesh indicates. Perspectives on 
decentralization therefore have to be situated in the broader economic and political terms, 
particularly the nature of state and its role in development.
In Bangladesh, the fact that successive military and civilian regimes over the years have 
found themselves compelled to erect structures of local participation is quite remarkable. 
A closer look at the decentralization programmes, however, reveals that genuine 
devolution of power is still elusive. The study reveals that in ease of Bangladesh, the 
‘politics of development’ or realpolitik and non-economic institutional spheres played the 
most crucial role in shaping decentralization policies. It also puts these factors ahead of 
structural and functional causes to explain the outcome of decentralization policies.
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Indeed, political expediency was order of the day for the military and both the 
democratically elected regimes with regard to decentralization reforms. The success of 
decentralization process therefore is rooted in the tensions to establishing political and 
social powers. Samoff s observation is very useful; ‘...to make a sense of its forms and 
consequences in particular settings, we need to understand decentralization as a political 
initiative, as a fundamentally political process, and consequently as a site for political 
struggle.
One of the main causes of the birth of Bangladesh as a province of Pakistan was the 
excessive centralization of authority and the ensuing strained relationship with the 
‘centre.’ As it turned out, the ‘periphery’ still remains isolated from political and 
administrative centre in post-independent Bangladesh. While there is no easy way for 
achieving the goals of effective local governance, some degree of political commitment, 
among other things, will go a long way towards solving some of the problems of 
decentralization in Bangladesh. Otherwise, strong and pro-poor local governments will 
remain the elusive ‘golden deer’ that the country is seeking.
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